# Power of the President: Party Competition in Presidential Regimes

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# Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my family, who have given me a lot of support over the years.

## Abstract

I argue that party competition in legislative elections is partly a function of presidential elections. Previous research on spatial competition has assumed that parties are competing in parliamentary regimes, where the only election of concern for parties and voters is the legislative election. However, in presidential regimes, presidential elections lead to relatively centrist positioning of candidates, and coattail effects from the presidential elections help shape the legislative elections. Through spatial modeling, I demonstrate how presidentialism gives incentives for parties to take centrist positions in legislative elections. Using cross-national data, I give empirical validation to the spatial models by showing that presidential elections make parties relatively more centrist in legislative elections as compared to parties in parliamentary elections. Further empirical validation is given through case studies on Israel and France, which have both experienced changes regarding the selection of their executive. The evidence in these case studies also show that voters' views of the main parties are affected by these institutional changes.

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# Chapter 1

# Introduction

In 2008, the Democratic Party in the United States looked nowhere near being supportive of same-sex marriage. While the Democratic Party's platform that year backed providing "equal responsibility, benefits, and protections" to same-sex couples and opposed the Defense of Marriage Act, the platform stopped short of endorsing same-sex marriage (Peters and Woolley, 2008). In addition, only 19 percent (11 out of 57 Senators) of the Senate Democratic caucus publicly supported same-sex marriage at the beginning of the 111th Congress in 2009.

However, in early 2012, President Barack Obama publicly acknowledged that he supported same-sex marriage, after previously bring opposed to it (Calmes and Baker, 2012). Later that year, the Democratic Party's platform in 2012 general election for the first time included language that endorsed same-sex marriage by affirming that they "support marriage equality and support the movement to secure equal treatment under law for same-sex couples" (Peters and Woolley, 2012). There was a markedly-shift change back in the legislature as well. Currently, 94 percent (51 out of 54 Senators) of the Senate Democratic caucus publicly supports same-sex marriage (Matthews, 2013).

Why would a party have incentives all of the sudden to shift positions on a major issue? This rapid change in party policy on a major political issue provides for a

puzzle when it comes to understanding the ideological positioning of a party's legislative component vis-à-vis its executive component in presidential regimes. Traditional accounts of party discipline cannot explain the change in positions, since it occurred under a presidential regime and not a parliamentary regime (Sartori, 1997; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 1997; Cheibub and Limongi, 2002). Under parliamentary regimes, parties are traditionally characterized by strong party discipline, due to institutional incentives that cause legislators to continually support their party leader on legislation.

Under presidential regimes, however, there are institutional incentives that make it sometimes beneficial for legislators to not support their party's leadership on legislation. One manifestation of this is when a legislator represents a district where the predominant ideology of its constituents runs counter to that of the legislator's own party. The legislator will feel pressures to vote in line with their constituents. Given the separation of branches in presidential regimes, executive election results do not have any official bearing on legislative election results and vice versa. This gives such legislators more incentive to vote against their party on legislation, in order to ensure their re-election.

This dynamic is embodied in the vote on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the United States Congress. In the vote, legislators were highly responsive to constituents' views on the bill. As a result, a legislator's region was a better predictor of how they voted on the bill than their party affiliation. While the leadership of both parties in Congress supported the legislation, only 61 percent of Democrats in the House of Representatives voted for the bill, while 80 percent of Republicans voted for it (Govtrack.us, 2014a). In the Senate, 69 percent of Democrats voted for the bill, while 82 percent of Senate Republicans voted in favor (Govtrack.us, 2014b).

The differences are starker though when one looks at the regional breakdown of the vote. In the House, only seven percent of Southerners from either party voted for

the bill and 90 percent of Northerners from both parties were in favor. In the Senate, only nine percent of Southerners from both parties were in favor, while 92 percent of Northerners from either party supported the bill.[1]

Since legislators' tenure in office is not dependent on the continual support of the president, there is no immediate incentive for these legislative members to become more supportive of their *de facto* party leader on a major policy issue. So, returning to the original scenario, why was there such a dramatic shift in Senators' positions after President Obama's announcement in so little time, under an institutional arrangement that is not conducive to party discipline? The literature on legislative party discipline in presidential regimes offers little answers. This literature instead focuses on endogenous factors facilitating party cohesion (Crook and Hibbing, 1985; Layman et al., 2006), rather than factors external to the legislative party itself, such as the presidency.

Previous studies on legislative party positioning have attempted to explain and model how parties take various positions in elections. Notably, these studies have argued that parties in two-party systems have incentives to take positions that are centrist (Downs, 1957). All the while, parties competing in multi-party systems have incentives to take positions that are non-centrist (Greenberg and Shepsle, 1987; Cox, 1990).

However, these studies all made the same assumption: that the legislative party system being explained/modeled exists under a parliamentary regime. This assumption is important for two reasons. First, under presidential regimes, voters have to vote for two different types of candidates: legislative candidates and presidential candidates. Second, presidential elections generally lead to relatively centrist equlibria, given the majoritarian, winner-take-all nature of presidential elections.

[1]Southern legislators are defined as members of the House or Senate from any of the 11 states that were part of the Confederate States of America.

New research, however, has explained how parties campaign under presidential regimes. Specifically, presidential regimes lead to the creation of "presidentialized parties" that have to face tradeoffs when campaigning in elections (Samuels, 2002). While in parliamentary regimes parties can focus exclusively on winning seats, parties under presidential regimes must decide how to allocate their resources between the legislative and presidential elections. Under presidential regimes, winning the presidency is the bigger prize for parties, since the president is the country's chief executive. As a result, parties in these countries are more likely to allocate their limited resources toward winning the presidential election, as opposed to maximizing their share of legislative seats.

Furthermore, in presidential regimes, presidents and presidential candidates from opposing parties have a relative level of autonomy from their counterparts at the legislative level. This is because of the institutional separation of origin and survival between the executive and legislative branches in presidential regimes (Samuels and Shugart, 2010). To the extent that they do not sink or swim together, legislators in presidential regimes do not have any necessary incentive to follow their executive-level leaders. This is what makes the same-sex marriage example puzzling for political scientists. It is not obvious why conservative Democrats would switch positions in a quick manner, since their own electoral survival is independent of that of their *de facto* leader. They can remain in office well after President Obama has left office due to term limits.

However, legislators in presidential regimes, while having autonomy from the president, will have incentives to make their campaigns appear similar to their executive-level counterparts'. These incentives come in the form of "coattail effects," which run from the executive down to the legislature. These coattail effects are present, since in presidential regimes, the presidential election generates more attention than the

legislative election.[2]

This is why there was a pronounced change in the positions of most Democratic Senators on same-sex marriage between the 2008 and 2012 Presidential elections. This is best evidenced by the fact that the strongest call for including support for same-sex marriage in the party platform in 2012 came from members of the Senate (Johnson, 2012). While legislators in presidential regimes are not obliged to follow the line of their presidential candidates to the extent that legislators in parliamentary regimes have to follow the line of their leader, there still exists incentives for legislators under presidentialism to follow their leaders as well.

Returning to the previous studies on spatial party competition, we remember that presidentialism leads to relatively centrist candidates, while parties might have incentives to take non-centrist positions in legislative elections. However, if we now assume that the same legislative election is occurring under a presidential regime, then the parties in the legislative election will instead want to take centrist positions, similar to their respective presidential candidates.

With that said, in this dissertation, I argue that *within presidential regimes, legislative elections are functions of presidential elections*. Specifically, presidential regimes provide incentives for the legislative parties to adopt positions that are similar to their presidential candidates. This means, keeping in mind the centripetal nature of presidential elections, that legislative parties will have incentives to take positions that are relatively centrist, just like their counterparts in the presidential election.

[2]This, however, is a function of the powers that the president possesses in a given presidential regime. This dissertation will also look at how variations in presidential powers affect the extent to which coattail effects from presidential elections are present in legislative elections. In situations where voters are voting for a weaker president, the effects of presidential elections on legislative party competition will not be as strong. However, the fact that voters in these countries vote for a president separate from the legislature is still important, and coattail effects will still be present (albeit weaker) in these regimes. These distinctions will be explored in the next chapter, when factors affecting coattail effect strength are discussed.

This dissertation will show demonstrate things. First, parties will be more centrist in presidential regimes than parties in parliamentary regimes, other things being equal. Second, voters have the ability detect ideological shifts made by parties that result from institutional changes affecting how a country's chief executive is selected.

This project is important, due to the continued impact that political institutions have on the actions of parties, politicians, and voters. The original set of theories explaining party competition was developed during a period where parliamentary regimes were the predominant form of government throughout the democratic world. However, the latest wave of democratization has brought about an increase in the number of democratic presidential regimes. In the mid-1970's, over 60 percent of the world's democracies were parliamentary regimes. In the years since then, the number of democracies in the world has increased, primarily due to democratization mainly in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Today, two-thirds of all democracies in the world elect their presidents directly.

With this in mind, the existing set of theories that explain party competition is speaking to a smaller and smaller set of the world's democracies. This limits our ability to understand party competition across the full spectrum of democracies. This dissertation therefore has normative implications as well, which concern the consequences of different types of democratic institutions. When countries modify their political institutions, voters are affected by these changes. Research has shown that differing electoral rules have varying effects on how voters perceive electoral fairness. Namely, proportional elections lead voters to perceive the democratic process as being fairer than in countries with less proportional elections (Anderson et al., 2005; Birch, 2008).

Changes in institutions affect voters' views toward the democratic process. If presidentialism modifies some of the effects that proportional elections have on legislative party systems, then there are implications with regards to how fair these elections

are in the minds of voters. These evaluations of the electoral process are critical in countries that are seeking to consolidate democracy (Elklit, 1999).

Presidentialism's effect on party systems has implications in other areas as well. For example, researchers have explored how various electoral systems create different policy outcomes (Blais and Bodet, 2006; Golder and Stramski, 2010). This can be attributed in part to how parties position themselves in response to certain electoral systems. If presidentialism modifies legislative party systems in a way that is different from legislative electoral systems, then we can expect policy outcomes to be different in presidential regimes than in parliamentary regimes.

By presidentialism, I am referring to regimes in which the voters directly elect their head of state. This would thus include countries that fall into what is called the "semi-presidential" category, in which there is an elected president alongside a prime minister who acts as the head of government (Duverger, 1980). This category would include some countries that are considered to be *de facto* parliamentary regimes, such as Ireland, Finland and Portugal. Empirical evidence in this dissertation will show that even when presidentialism is defined as including semi-presidential regimes, the incentives will still be strong for parties to behave in more centrist manner.

Furthermore, one of the later chapters is a case study on Israel, where there was a brief period from 1996 through 2001 in which voters directly elected the Prime Minister. I will treat this period in Israel as a quasi-presidential regime, due to the electoral separation created between the executive and the legislature during this time.

## Organization of Dissertation

An overview of the rest of this dissertation now follows. Chapter 2 provides the theoretical explanation as to why legislative elections become functions of presidential

elections under presidential regimes. This is done through presenting a series of spatial models that capture the relationship between presidential candidates and their legislative parties. The chapter starts off by presenting standard models of spatial competition, where presidential and legislative elections are modeled separately.

Next, I present a series of new spatial models where the assumption of a world of presidentialism is added. In these models, the equilibria that were present in the standard legislative spatial models change. The new models will show that while non-centrist equilibria are likely in legislative elections under a parliamentary regime, centrist equilibria can be present if the same elections are held under a presidential regime.

Chapter 3 demonstrates the empirical evidence that supports the theoretical arguments from Chapter 2. This chapter utilizes evidence from over 400 legislative elections in over 50 countries over the past several decades. Using data from the Comparative Manifestos Project and the Median Voter Dataset, several findings are made.

First, under presidential regimes, countries' main parties will be ideologically closer to each other than the main parties in parliamentary regimes, all things being equal. In addition, the main parties in the legislative election under presidentialism will be ideologically closer to the position of the median voter than the main parties under parliamentary regimes, all things being equal. The results also show that within presidential regimes, the main parties are ideologically closer to each other and the median voter during concurrent elections than similar parties in non-concurrent elections.

The next two chapters are case studies on two countries that have experienced institutional changes affecting the selection of their executive: Israel and France. Chapter 4 provides for a case study on Israel. Israel works as a good case for this project due to the changes in the selection of their Prime Minister in recent years.

Between 1996 and 2002, Israel had direct elections for their Prime Minister. This is in contrast to the selection of prime ministers in other parliamentary regimes, where they are chosen by the legislature.

The direct election of the Israeli Prime Minister had the effect of turning Israel into a quasi-presidential regime, where there was a separation of origin between the executive and the legislature. This reform was put in place in an attempt to reduce the fragmentation of the highly proportional Israeli party system and to create a stronger bi-polar party system. However, the reform had the opposite consequences, in that it increased party system fragmentation during this period. It also had another effect as well. That is, the switch to direct elections for Prime Minister had the effect of making the two main parties focus mainly on winning the Prime Ministerial election, and less so on maximizing their share of legislative seats.

The evidence in this chapter will show that the increased focus on the Prime Ministerial election by the main parties had several effects. First, the direct elections for Prime Minister made the main parties downplay party branding during the campaigns, and instead put an increased emphasis on the parties' leaders. Second, it led voters to perceive the main parties as being more centrist during the period of direct elections for Prime Minister than during the period of pure parliamentary elections. Third, it caused voters' feelings toward the two main parties to become more similar to their feelings to each respective party's leader during the period of direct Prime Ministerial elections. In effect, parliamentary elections became a function of the Prime Ministerial election during the period of direct elections for Prime Minister.

Chapter 5 is a case study on institutional reform in France. While the previous Chapter on Israel examines changes in how the executive is selected, Chapter 5 explores changes to the electoral cycle. Specifically, the chapter looks at the effect of the constitutional reforms put in place in 2000 which ensured that the legislative elec-

tion would always occur a month after the Presidential election. Before the change, Presidential terms were set at seven years, while legislative terms were set at five years. This meant that most legislative elections occurred in different years from the Presidential election.

The new closeness of each legislative election to the Presidential election means that the coattail effects of the Presidential election have been felt on the legislative election more since 2000 than before. This is analyzed by looking at the 1997 legislative election (the last legislative election before the reform) and the 2002 legislative election (the first legislative election after the reform).

Evidence in this chapter will show that the now-relative concurrence between the Presidential and legislative elections in France has led to a few changes. First, the main parties in France campaigned more on substantial policy issues during the 1997 legislative campaign, while the 2002 legislative campaign was devoid of policy issues, and instead served as a "third round" of the Presidential election. Second, voters who voted for one of the main candidates in the Presidential election were more likely to feel ideologically closest to that Presidential candidate's party in 2002 than comparable voters did in 1997. Third, voters who identified as centrist were more likely to feel ideologically closest to either of the two main parties in 2002 than in 1997.

Chapter 6 is the final chapter and gives a summary of the dissertation's findings. It will also talk about limitations in this project, as well as give ideas for future research.

This project takes a multi-methods approach, utilizing a variety of methodological approaches. This includes using formal modeling for the theoretical argument, various forms of empirical data analysis, and evidence from primary and secondary qualitative sources.

In addition, this dissertation involves examining political actors across different

levels. First, political parties in the aggregate will be the subject of focus in Chapters 1 and 2. However, in Chapters 3 and 4, in-depth examinations of individual politicians within parties are presented. This is in addition to analyses of voters in these two chapters. Thus, I will be looking at the actions and behaviors of parties in the aggregate, politicians within parties, and voters in this project. Analyzing all three of these actors will lend more empirical support toward my argument.

# Chapter 2

# Theoretical Explanation of Presidentialism's Effect on Party Competition

An institution does not have an impact only on the behaviors of officeholders associated with that institution or voters. Institutions can also have an impact on other institutions. This is the case of elected heads of state in democratic regimes, with regards to how parties ideologically position themselves in legislative elections.

Standard models of party competition in legislative elections make the restrictive assumption that the only election occurring in a given country is the legislative election. In other words, the models assume that the country has a parliamentary regime.

However, in presidential regimes, most of the attention is focused on the presidential election, not the legislative election. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the theoretical explanation as to how parties ideologically position themselves in countries that directly elect their presidents.

The first portion of the chapter will provide a review of existing research on spatial modeling and party/candidate positioning. This is followed with providing the rationale for bringing in assumptions of presidentialism into existing models. After that, a formal explanation of party/candidate positioning in legislative and

presidential elections separately will be given.

After the models of these two types of elections are presented, the formal process of modeling legislative elections in presidential regimes will be described. Once it is explained how legislative elections are modeled within the context of presidentialism, a survey of the most relevant combinations of presidential and legislative elections will be shown. This will set up the final portion of the chapter, which will model these specific combinations.

## Literature Review

Models of party competition are concerned with two primary classes of actors: voters and parties (or candidates). In the models, both classes of actors are assumed to be acting out of self-interest. This means that voters have an established stake or interest in the outcome of an election, which lead them to vote in the manner they do. These models simply assume that voters understand their own self-interests, weigh alternative choices based on which of them will further their self-interest, and vote for the candidate or party that was most favorably evaluated. Voters are therefore acting in a rational manner.

Parties and candidates act rationally as well. Each party or candidate sees a link between the platform of issues they offer, their past records, and personal characteristics with the number of votes they receive. The parties' or candidates' goals are simply to win the election; whether that entails winning enough votes or seats to do so, or by maximizing their vote or seat share. In addition, parties and candidates will have the assumption that voters are self-interested.

Using spatial terms, the voter will vote for the candidate or party that is the "closest" to them in space, which delineates all of the factors that are of interest to the voter. The factors might be policy issues, such as taxation, defense, and

immigration. Factors can also be candidate traits, such as likability and previous political experience.

In each election modeled, voters decide whom they will vote for through utility models, denoted as $U_i$ for any given alternative a voter has to choose from. For each voter, every party or candidate has a utility that is derived from a function. The closer that a party or candidate is located to a voter, the greater the utility a voter will receive if that party or candidate is elected. Conversely, the further away a party or candidate is from a voter; the voter will receive less utility from from that party or candidate getting elected. The voter votes for the party or candidate that yields the largest utility. If more than one party or candidate yield the same utility for a voter, the voter randomizes their vote choice, and each of the parties/candidates has the same chance of being selected.

It should be kept in mind that the term "self-interest" in this context does not solely refer to economic self-interest. Self-interest can encompass a broad range of issues. For example, the issue of whether or not to go to war might be of self-interest to a voter, since that voter derives self-interest in the form of security (Enelow and Hinich, 1984).

Downs (1957) took the basic Hotelling-Smithies model of location games involving two firms (Hotelling, 1929; Smithies, 1941) and applied it to plurality elections with two candidates. The equilibrium Downs found was similar to Hotelling and Smithies' in that the model was in equilibrium whenever both candidates took the same position, being the location of the median voter. Both candidates move to this location because either of them would be worse off if they deviated even slightly from that position.

One of the earliest attempts at spatially modeling party competition in proportional and multiparty elections was done by Greenberg and Shepsle (1987). In their model, they showed there could be equilibria in which parties took positions away

from the median voter. Cox (1990) combined an analysis of both plurality and proportional elections to show situations in which both of these elections could have centrist and non-centrist equilibria. These equilibria are conditional on the district magnitude, number of candidates (or parties), and the number of votes per voter in each election.

Work since then has incorporated probabilistic voting into spatial competition models. These are models where a degree of uncertainty is added into people's vote decision. Essentially, voters will not always vote for the candidate that is closest to them. These models also have a tendency to bring in non-policy factors (Enelow and Hinich, 1989) and party identification (Adams et al., 2005). Some of the outcomes in probabilistic spatial models have confirmed Cox's propositions on centrist and non-centrist outcomes (Dow, 2001; Schofield, 2004), while others have run counter to them (Lin et al., 1999; Ezrow, 2005).

## Problems With Existing Literature

All of the previous research on spatial models has made an implicit assumption. That is, parties or candidates position themselves in elections where voters only have to concern themselves with voting for one branch of government. This assumption is, I suggest, problematic when we try to apply spatial models to explain party competition in legislative elections not held under parliamentary regimes. This is because voters must cast ballots both for a legislative party and a presidential candidate in presidential regimes and because of the potential impact of presidential elections on legislative elections.

Because of this electoral separation of the executive and the legislature, a party's main goal is to win the executive election, not to maximize their share of legislative seats. As a result, parties are more likely to organize around that purpose in

presidential regimes (Samuels, 2002; Samuels and Shugart, 2010). In addition, presidential elections affect legislative elections through "coattail effects," where a party's prospects at the legislative level are affected by their party's prospects in the presidential election (Jones, 1994; Shugart, 1995).

The coattail effect operates by running down from the more important institution (the presidency in this case) to the less important institution (the legislature). In presidential regimes, the presidency is considered the bigger prize for parties. As a result, presidential elections garner most of the media attention, along with receiving more campaign donations and having better campaign organizations. These reasons are why legislative parties are incentivized to run their campaigns around their party's presidential candidate, in the hopes of benefitting from the advantages that presidential candidates possess (Samuels, 2002).

These coattail effects have effects on a regime's party system as a result. Prior research has shown that presidentialism can affect the size and fragmentation of the party system at the legislative level (Jones, 1994; Neto and Cox, 1997; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Samuels, 2002; Mozaffar et al., 2003; Golder, 2006; Hicken and Stoll, 2011). In addition, some of this research has shown that presidential coattails can help a president's party achieve success in legislative elections (Born, 1984; Mondak, 1993; Flemming, 1995; Shugart, 1995). Also, voters will also use presidential elections as an informational shortcut to help guide their choice in the legislative election (Golder, 2006).

A key aspect of a party running their legislative campaign around their party's presidential candidate would involve modifying their ideological positions to be more in tune with their party's presidential candidate's. Presidential elections thus work as an external factor in explaining how parties position themselves ideologically within the context of presidential regimes. However, previous research on presidentialism has not specifically analyzed how presidentialism can affect how parties decide to

ideologically place themselves in legislative elections.

## Formally Modeling Legislative and Presidential Elections Separately

This portion of the chapter will provide separate examples of party competition in legislative and presidential regimes. First, the positioning of parties in legislative elections will be presented. This will be followed by a demonstration of the positioning of candidates in presidential elections.

For both legislative and presidential elections, different variations of each will be shown, according to different balloting rules. For legislative elections, models will be shown for those that use a majoritarian electoral system and those that use proportional representation. For presidential elections, models will be presented for elections that are conducted with a plurality ballot and those that utilize a runoff ballot. After the models for both legislative and presidential elections are given, I will show what happens when legislative elections are modeled within the context of a presidential regime.

In the following models, there are two classes of actors: parties (or candidates) and voters. For the models demonstrating spatial competition in legislative elections, parties will be used, and in the models showing competition in presidential elections, candidates will be used.

Next, I describe the action space in which the actors take part. The action space is a policy space which will be defined as $X$. $X$ is a closed compact set on a one-dimensional real line, with $X = [0, 1]$. 0 is the most extreme party position a party can take on the left, and 1 is the most extreme position a party can take on the right.

However, one-dimension lines are not the only way in which ideology can be measured. Two-dimensional lines can be used, where issues are grouped into two broad

categories. This was first devised by Davis et al. (1970). In many cases, this takes the form of one category representing economic issues, while the other category represents social issues (Miller and Schofield, 2003).

For this chapter, I will utilize a one-dimensional line instead of a multi-dimensional policy space. This is because the models I am creating are foundational in nature. I intend to build them off of the fundamental models which have shaped the discourse on party competition.

I also assume that there is a uniform distribution of voters on the line. Each party and candidate will take a position $x$ on $X$. The positions that parties in legislative elections take on line $X$ will be denoted by $x_{pi}$, with $i$ denoting the party that takes the given position. The positions that presidential candidates take will be denoted by $x_{ci}$. Furthermore, the position of the median voter on the line will be denoted by $x_m$. Also, any slight movement by a party or candidate away from a given position on $X$ will be denoted by $\delta$.

First, the parties and candidates place themselves on $X$ simultaneously. After that, the voters choose the party or candidate that is closest to them on $X$. Parties and candidates attain utility through gaining votes. At the same time, voters have their own utilities in the form of voting for the party or candidate that is most similar to them. Therefore, parties and candidates therefore maximize their utility by winning as many votes as possible, while voters maximize their utility by voting for the party or candidate that is closest to them on $X$. The utility for voters is in the form of the perceived benefit, based on their ideology, that a voter expects to receive if a particular party or candidate is elected into office. The utility function for each alternative a voter faces is:

$$U_{pi} = 1 - |x_v - x_{pi}|$$




Figure 2.1: Two-Party Plurality Legislative Elections

Consequently, the voter will vote for party $i$ if $U_{pi}$ if greater than all other alternatives.

Based on the amount of votes they receive, parties and candidates receive a vote share $s$. The proportion of the vote a party receives in a legislative election is denoted by $s_{pi}$. For candidates in a presidential election, $s_{ci}$ denotes the proportion of the vote the candidate received.

Furthermore, I will assume that voters are engaging in sincere voting. That is, the voters are policy-oriented, and will vote for the candidate or party that is the closest to their own position. This is the situation for all of the examples in this section. However, the assumption of proximity voting will be relaxed when I turn to modeling legislative elections held under presidential regimes.

Also, the utility models will be deterministic. This is in contrast to random utility models, which are probabilistic. In these models, voters do not always vote for the party or candidate that gives them the greatest utility (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 2000). While most of the recent developments in spatial modeling have focused on probabilistic models, it is important to go to the foundational method of spatial modeling. The following models will be the building blocks of understanding presidentialism's effect on legislative party competition. This is so that later on, more advanced modeling practices can better be able to incorporate presidential assumptions into them. The equilibria described in the models are Nash equilibria in pure strategies.




Figure 2.2: Four-Party Proportional Legislative Elections

## Legislative Elections

The first scenario among legislative elections that will be described are single-member district plurality/majoritarian elections. The assumptions that guide the coordination and exit of candidates for the plurality ballot will be in place here. Therefore, there will be only two effective parties in this election, being parties 1 and 2 (Duverger, 1964). In this type of election, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium will be $x_{p1}* = x_{p2}* = x_m$. The vote shares of each party will be $s_{p1} = s_{p2}$. Figure 2.1 shows this election in pure strategy equilibrium.

The next scenario among legislative elections is one that employs a form of proportional representation (PR). Given that PR elections set a lower threshold for parties attaining seats than majoritarian elections do, there are always more than two parties competing in a PR legislative election (Cox, 1997). This means that the potential number of parties competing in a PR election could be infinite. However, for this chapter, only two scenarios will be examined: PR elections with four parties competing, and PR elections where there are three parties competing.

In a four-party PR election, assume that there are four parties competing named parties 1, 2, 3, and 4. Given the expectations of party positioning when there are four parties competing in an election, the parties are at a pure strategy Nash equilibrium when $x_{p1}* = x_{p2}* = .25$ and $x_{p3}* = x_{p4}* = .75$. This is presented in Figure 2.2. This leads to vote shares of each party of $s_{p1} = s_{p2} = s_{p3} = s_{p4}$. This creates a situation with a non-centrist equilibrium, where all of the parties find it beneficial to take positions away from the median voter.

Next, assume that there are three parties competing in a PR legislative election




Figure 2.3: Plurality Presidential Elections

named parties 1, 2, and 3. Unlike the previous scenario, the three-party PR election will not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In this situation, one party will always have an incentive to leapfrog the other two parties, allowing them to attain higher share of the vote. This will cause the one of the other two parties to leapfrog the first party as well, leading to an infinite state of leapfrogging.

The lack of equilibrium in three-party legislative elections only holds when it is assumed the election is occurring under a parliamentary regime. As will be shown later, when the same three-party legislative election occurs under a presidential regime, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium can occur under some scenarios.

## Presidential Elections

Two types of of presidential elections will be modeled. These elections are those that are held under a plurality ballot, and those that are held under a runoff ballot. For each presidential election, a voter's utility function for voting for a specific candidate is:

$$U_{ci} = 1 - |x_v - x_{ci}|$$

Consequently, the voter will vote for candidate $i$ if $U_{ci}$ if greater than all other alternatives.

First, the pure strategy equilibrium conditions for presidential elections under the plurality rule will be presented. As shown in Figure 2.3, under this scenario, the candidate who attains the most votes wins the election. This is regardless of whether or not they won a majority of votes. Given this rule, there will be incentives for the




Figure 2.4: Three-Candidate Runoff Presidential Elections

coordination and the exit of unviable candidates, save for two candidates (Duverger, 1964). Therefore, there will be only two effective candidates in this election, named candidates 1 and 2. In this election, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium will be $x_{c1}* = x_{c2}* = x_m$, where both candidates where end up in the center of the ideological spectrum. Figure 2.3 shows the equilibrium for this model.

The difference between plurality and runoff presidential elections is that in runoff elections, presidential candidates have to take into account not only their position in the first round, but their position in the second round as well. The assumption being made in this chapter for runoff elections is that once a presidential candidate takes their position in the first round, they will maintain that same position in the second round. Therefore, the position the candidate takes in the first round will determine their vote share of $s_{ci1}$ in the first round, and $s_{ci2}$ in the second round.

Two specific types of runoff elections will be modeled. These are three-candidate elections and four-candidate elections. Three-candidate presidential elections are being shown, because, according to Cox (1997), the fewest number of candidates in a runoff election are always three. Four-candidate presidential elections are being looked at because in many runoff elections, the left's main presidential candidate might face a serious competitor to their left, while simultaneously, the right's main presidential candidate might face a serious competitor to their right. The distinction between the two are important, because three-candidate runoff elections will lead to a centrist pure strategy Nash equilibrium. All the while, four-candidate runoff elections can lead to not just a centrist Nash equilibrium, but a range of non-centrist Nash equilibria as well.




Figure 2.5: Four-Candidate Runoff Presidential Elections

Figure 2.4 models competition in a three-candidate presidential election. In this type of election, there will be three candidates named candidates 1, 2, and 3. While the case of three-party legislative elections did not lead to any pure strategy Nash equilibria, this will not be the case for three-candidate runoff presidential elections. In this type of election, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium will be $x_{c1}* = x_{c2}* = x_{c3}* = x_m$, such that the vote shares of the parties will be $s_{c11} = s_{c21} = s_{c31} = .33$ and $s_{c12} = s_{c22} = s_{c32} = .50$ for all possible combinations of match-ups in the second round. Therefore, the three candidates will end up in a centrist position on the ideological spectrum.

For four-candidate runoff presidential elections, the candidates are candidates 1, 2, 3, and 4. Figure 2.5 shows this type of election. In the case of this election, there is pure strategy Nash equilibria for any positioning of the candidates where $x_{c1}* = x_{c2}* = [x_m - e, x_m]$ and $x_{c3}* = x_{c4}* = [x_m, x_m + e]$, where $e = [0, .25)$. There is also Nash equilibria in the situation when $x_{c1}* = x_{c3}* = [x_m - e, x_m]$ and $x_{c2}* = x_{c4}* = [x_m, x_m + e]$, where $e = [0, .25)$; and $x_{c1}* = x_{c4}* = [x_m - e, x_m]$ and $x_{c2}* = x_{c3}* = [x_m, x_m + e]$, where $e = [0, .25)$. These pure strategy Nash equilibria would lead to vote shares of $s_{c11} = s_{c21} = s_{c31} = s_{c41} = .25$ and $s_{c12} = s_{c22} = s_{c32} = s_{c42} = .50$ (for any of the two candidates that advance to the second round).

The equilibria in four-candidate runoff elections can fall anywhere within almost the middle half of the ideological spectrum, allowing for both centrist and non-centrist equilibria. However, the most non-centrist pure strategy equilibrium is not as non-centrist as the pure strategy equilibrium in four-party legislative elections. This shows

that even when the pure strategy equilibrium is non-centrist for a runoff presidential election, it will always give incentives for parties in four-party legislative elections to move closer to the median voter.

## Modeling Legislative Elections in a World of Presidentialism

The final portion of this chapter will show what happens when legislative elections are assumed to be occurring under a presidential regime. Given the varieties of presidential elections (pure presidentialism vs. semi-presidentialism and plurality vs. runoff ballots) and legislative elections (plurality vs. PR ballots), it has to be determined which combination of electoral rules will be modeled. Combinations that will be modeled will be ones which reflect the realities of the universe of presidentialism. As seen in Table 2.1, among presidential regimes, the most common type of electoral system combination is one where the president is elected through a runoff ballot, and the legislature is elected through PR.

| | Plurality | Runoff |
|---|---|---|
| Majoritarian | 5 | 5 |
| Proportional | 8 | 36 |

Table 2.1: Combinations of Electoral Systems Used in Presidential and Legislative Elections in Presidential Regimes

Before the models are presented, I will explain how how parties in legislative elections earn votes. In the models where I assume a legislative election is occurring under a presidential regime, I will modify the utilities derived from voting for parties that have candidates in the presidential election. There are two modifications I will make to the models. First, instead of simply taking into stock the position of a voter from a given party, I will now also take into stock the position of the voter from




Figure 2.6: Majoritarian Legislative Election Where the President is Elected by Plurality Vote

that party's presidential candidate, in addition to the position of the party from their party's presidential candidate. This is because voters are figuring in the positions of presidential candidates when coming to vote decision in legislative elections now. If a voter is at the same position of a presidential candidate, then the utility of voting for that candidate's party in the legislative election will increase the closer the party moves to the location of their presidential candidate. Therefore, the utility function for a legislative party with a candidate in the presidential election is:

$$U_{pi} = 1 - |x_v - x_{pi}| + |x_v - x_{pi}| \times |x_v - x_{ci}|$$

While the utility function for a legislative party without a presidential candidate is:

$$U_{pi} = 1 - |x_v - x_{pi}|$$

I will model five types of legislative elections under presidential regimes. Three of the elections will be under presidential regimes where the president is elected through a plurality ballot, while the other two will be elections under presidential regimes where the president is elected through a runoff ballot. In each election, I assume that the presidential candidates position themselves on the scale first, followed by the legislative parties.

Figure 2.6 shows a majoritarian legislative election held under a presidential regime where the president is elected by plurality vote. If the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a plurality presidential election is $x_{c1}* = x_{c2}* = x_m$, then the pure




Figure 2.7: Three-Party Proportional Legislative Election Where the President is Elected by Plurality Vote




Figure 2.8: Four-Party Proportional Legislative Election Where the President is Elected by Plurality Vote

strategy Nash equilibrium for a majoritarian legislative election is $x_{p1}* = x_{p2}* = x_m$. Both of the parties in the legislative election will be at a centrist location.

The next two examples model proportional legislative elections under a regime where the president is elected by plurality vote. The first model describes competition in a three-party legislative election, while the second model describes competition in a four-party legislative election. Figure 2.7 shows party competition in a three-party legislative election. If the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a plurality presidential election is $x_{c1}* = x_{c2}* = x_m$, then the pure strategy Nash equilibrium condition for a three-party PR or mixed-member legislative election is $x_{p1}* = x_{p2}* = x_m$, and any location on $X$ for party 3 in the legislative election.

Figure 2.8 shows party competition in a four-party legislative election under a plurality presidential regime. If the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a plurality presidential election is $x_{c1}* = x_{c2}* = x_m$, then the pure strategy Nash equilibrium condition for a four-party PR or mixed-member legislative election is $x_{p1}* = x_{p2}* = x_m$, and any locations on $X$ for parties 3 and 4 in the legislative election.

Next is the three-party legislative election under a presidential regime where the




Figure 2.9: Four-Party Proportional Legislative Election Where the President is Elected by Runoff Vote

president is elected by runoff vote. If the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a three-candidate runoff presidential election is $x_{c1}* = x_{c2}* = x_{c3}* = x_m$, then there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the legislative election. However, all three parties will have incentives to take positions away from $x_m$ so that they can maximize their vote shares as much as possible.

Figure 2.9 shows a four-party PR legislative election. If the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a four-candidate runoff presidential election is $x_{c1}* = x_{c2}* = [x_m - e, x_m]$ and $x_{c3}* = x_{c4}* = [x_m, x_m + e]$, where $e = [0, .25)$, then the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a four-party proportional or mixed-member legislative election is $x_{p1}* = x_{p2}* = .25$ and $x_{p3}* = x_{p4}* = .75$.

## Adding Coattails

Next, I will further modify the utility functions by taking into account the strength of the coattail effect in each legislative election. This strength of a coattail effect is measured with $c$. When $c$ is greater, it will cause a voter's utility function for a party with a presidential candidate to weight the position of themselves from the position of themselves from the party's presidential candidate/position of the party from their presidential candidate more than the position of themselves from the party. When $c$ is smaller, it will cause a voter's utility function for a party with a presidential candidate to weight the position of the party from themselves more than the position of themselves from the party's presidential candidate/position of the party from their

presidential candidate. This will present a problem for parties without presidential candidates when the coattail effects are stronger. This is because these parties will yield lower utilities for voters, since they do not have presidential candidates that increase the utility of voting for them. Therefore, the new utility function for a legislative party with a candidate in the presidential election is:

$$U_{pi} = 1 - ((1-c)|x_v - x_{pi}|) + c \times |x_v - x_{pi}| \times |x_v - x_{ci}| \mid c \in (0,1)$$

While the new utility function for a legislative party without a presidential candidate is:

$$U_{pi} = (1-c)(1 - |x_v - x_{pi}|) \mid c \in (0,1)$$

There are two ways in which coattail effects can vary in presidential regimes: timing between the presidential and legislative elections, and the powers that the president possesses. The timing between the presidential and legislative elections refers to how close in proximity the legislative elections are to the presidential election. The closer the two elections are to each other, the stronger the coattail effects on the legislative election will be. The further apart the two elections are, the weaker the coattail effects will be on a legislative election. This is because both media attention and popular attention are more focused on the presidential election the closer a day is to the presidential election. This increased media attention on the presidential election will have the effect of drowning out attention on the legislative election. Predictably, the situation in which the coattail effects will be the strongest is when the presidential and legislative elections are held on the same day. Conversely, the coattail effects will be the weakest when the legislative election is held at the midpoint of a presidential term.

When the president has more institutional powers, the more emphasis that par-

ties place on winning the presidential election over that of maximizing their share of legislative seats. As a result, the presidential election's coattail effects on the legislative election will be stronger. This means that pure presidential regimes will have the strongest coattail effects, while semi-presidential regimes will have weaker coattail effects on the legislative election. However, semi-presidential regimes vary in the amount of powers that are given to the president. Criticisms of Duverger's (1980) definition of semi-presidentialism has led to the creation of a greater distinction among semi-presidential regimes that take into account the variance in powers. Shugart and Carey (1992) identified two sub-groups of semi-presidential regimes. The first sub-group consists of premier-presidential regimes and the second sub-group is president-parliamentary regimes. The key difference between the two sub-groups is that the president's powers are greater under president-parliamentary regimes than under premier-presidential regimes.

The extent to which $c$ is higher or lower will depend on the combination of these two factors. For example, when a legislative election is occurring the same day as a presidential election under a pure presidential regime, the $c$ will equal 1. However, when a legislative election is occurring under a parliamentary regime, then c would equal 0 (since there would be no coattail effects from another election onto the legislative election. This indicates that even under situations where there are non-concurrent legislative and presidential elections under semi-presidential regimes, there will be some coattail effects present on the legislative election, albeit not as strong as in the previous scenario. The advantage of the $c$ measurement is that it allows one to model the effects of presidentialism on party competition for an infinite range of combinations of presidential powers and election proximities in each voter's utility function.

Again, I will model the same five types of legislative elections under presidential regimes. However, for some of the scenarios, there will be equilibrium situations




Figure 2.10: Majoritarian Legislative Election Where the President is Elected by Plurality Vote




Figure 2.11: Three-Party Proportional Legislative Election Where the President is Elected by Plurality Vote if $c \geq .4$

under all conditions of coattail strength. Under the other elections, there will only be equilibrium conditions when the coattail strength is relatively strong.

Figure 2.10 shows a majoritarian legislative election held under a presidential regime where the president is elected by plurality vote. If the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a plurality presidential election is $x_{c1}* = x_{c2}* = x_m$, then the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a majoritarian legislative election is $x_{p1}* = x_{p2}* = x_m$ for any value of $c$. Both of the parties in the legislative election will be at a centrist location.

The next two examples model proportional legislative elections under a regime where the president is elected by plurality vote. The first model will describe competition in a three-party legislative election, while the second model will describe competition in a four-party legislative election. Figure 2.11 shows party competition in a three-party legislative election. If the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a plurality presidential election is $x_{c1}* = x_{c2}* = x_m$, then the pure strategy Nash equilibrium condition for a three-party PR or mixed-member legislative election is $x_{p1}* = x_{p2}* = x_m$, and any location on $X$ for party 3 in the legislative election if $c \geq .4$. There is no pure strategy equilibrium condition for the election if $c < .4$.




Figure 2.12: Four-Party Proportional Legislative Election Where the President is Elected by Plurality Vote if $c \geq .4$

Instead, when $c < .4$, parties 1 and 2 will have incentives to take positions away from $x_m$ in order to maximize their vote shares as much as possible. However, the parties will still not end up in an pure strategy equilibrium position.

Figure 2.12 shows party competition in a four-party legislative election. If the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a plurality presidential election is $x_{c1}* = x_{c2}* = x_m$, then the pure strategy Nash equilibrium condition for a four-party PR or mixed-member legislative election is $x_{p1}* = x_{p2}* = x_m$, and any locations on $X$ for parties 3 and 4 in the legislative election if $c \geq .4$. There is no pure strategy equilibrium condition for the election if $c < .4$. Instead, when $c < .4$, parties 1 and 2 will have incentives to take positions away from $x_m$ in order to maximize their vote shares as much as possible. However, the parties will still not end up in a pure strategy equilibrium position.

Next is the model for the three-party legislative election under a regime where the president is elected by a runoff ballot. If the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a three-candidate runoff presidential election is $x_{c1}* = x_{c2}* = x_{c3}* = x_m$, then there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium for any value of $c$. However, all three parties will have incentives to take positions away from $x_m$ so that they can maximize their vote shares as much as possible.

Figure 2.13 shows a four-party PR legislative election. If the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a four-candidate runoff presidential election is $x_{c1}* = x_{c2}* = [x_m - e, x_m]$ and $x_{c3}* = x_{c4}* = [x_m, x_m + e]$, where $e = [0, .25)$, then the pure strategy




Figure 2.13: Four-Party Proportional Legislative Election Where the President is Elected by Runoff Vote if $c \geq .4$

Nash equilibrium for a four-party proportional or mixed-member legislative election is $x_{p1}* = x_{p2}* = .25$ and $x_{p3}* = x_{p4}* = .75$, for all values of $c$.

Table 2.2: Positioning of Legislative Parties with Presidential Candidates When Coattails are Strong

| | **Presidential Ballot Type** | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **No Presidential Election** | **Plurality** | **Runoff** |
| **Two-Party Majoritarian** | Centrist | Centrist | - |
| **Three-Party Proportional** | No Equilibrium | Centrist | No Equilibrium |
| **Four-Party Proportional** | Non-Centrist | Centrist | Non-Centrist |

To summarize, all of the different scenarios are presented in the following two tables. Table 2.3 shows the positioning of parties when the coattail effects are strong (when $c \geq 4$), and Table 2.4 shows the positioning of parties when the coattail effects are weak (when $c < .4$). In each table, the first column shows the pure strategy equilibrium conditions under parliamentarism. Table 2.3 shows that under strong coattail effects, all legislative elections in a regime where the president is elected under a plurality ballot, the parties with presidential candidates will end up in a centrist position. When there is a runoff ballot for president, however, there will be non-centrist positioning of legislative parties in four-party elections, and there will be no equilibria in three-party elections. Instead, the parties will generally take

non-centrist positions, but will not settle in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

Table 2.3: Positioning of Legislative Parties with Presidential Candidates When Coattails are Weak

| | **Presidential Ballot Type** | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **No Presidential Election** | **Plurality** | **Runoff** |
| **Two-Party Majoritarian** | Centrist | Centrist | - |
| **Three-Party Proportional** | No Equilibrium | No Equilibrium | No Equilibrium |
| **Four-Party Proportional** | Non-Centrist | No Equilibrium | Non-Centrist |

In Table 2.4, There is no centrist position of legislative parties in elections, except when there is a two-party majoritarian legislative elections with a plurality presidential ballot. There will be non-centrist positioning in four-party elections under a runoff presidential ballot, but in all other elections, there are no equilibria. Instead, for these elections, parties with presidential candidates will have to negotiate between taking a centrist position and taking a non-centrist position, due to legislative parties without presidential candidates taking votes from the ends of the ideological spectrum. Overall, we are more likely to see non-centrist positioning of parties when the coattail effects are weaker in a legislative election, than when they are stronger.

## Conclusions

This chapter has provided the theoretical explanation for how presidentialism affects party competition in legislative elections. The review of literature showed that previous research has failed to provide an explanation to competition in these settings. This is because previous models have assumed legislative party competition is oc-

curring under a parliamentary regime. However, in presidential regimes, legislative elections partly become functions of presidential elections. This is due to the coattail effects produced by presidential elections. When the same legislative election is occurring under a presidential regime, equilibria can potentially be different than they would be under a parliamentary regime.

The extent to how strong the coattail effects are dependent on two factors. The first is the institutional powers of the president, and the second being the timing between the presidential and legislative elections. When the coattail effects are strong, there will be a centrist positioning of parties when the president is elected by plurality vote. However, when the president is elected by runoff vote, we will see a greater non-centrist positioning of legislative parties. When the coattail effects are weak, we will not see the centrist positioning of parties, except in a two-party legislative election where the president is elected by plurality vote.

The next chapter will test the theoretical claims made in this chapter, by using empirical data on the positions of political parties throughout numerous democracies across time. The results in the next chapter will be in line with these theoretical expectations. That is, the main parties in presidential regimes will be significantly closer to each other and the median voter than the main parties in parliamentary regimes.

# Appendix

## Legislative Plurality Election

**Theorem:** The pure strategy Nash equilibrium will be $x_{p1}* = x_{p2}* = x_m$, leading to vote shares that are $s_{p1} = s_{p2} = .5$.

**Proof:** If party 1 moved to $x_m + \delta$ then the vote share of party 1 would be $s_{p1} < s_{p2}$. This is because $U_{p2} > U_{p1}, \forall x_v = [.5 + \frac{\delta}{2}, 1]$.

## Legislative Proportional Four-Party Election

**Theorem:** The parties are at pure strategy Nash equilibrium when $x_{p1}* = x_{p2}* = .25$ and $x_{p3}* = x_{p4}* = .75$. This leads to vote shares that are $s_{p1} = s_{p2} = s_{p3} = s_{p4}$.

**Proof:** If the parties are located at $x_{p1}* = x_{p2}* = .25$ and $x_{p3}* = x_{p4}* = .75$, and party 2 decides to move to $x_{p2} = .25 + \delta$, then party 2 would have a vote share that is $s_{p2} < s_{p1}$, $s_{p2} < s_{p3}$, and $s_{p2} < s_{p4}$. This is because $U_{p1} > U_{p2}$, $U_{p1} > U_{p3}$, and $U_{p1} > U_{p4}$ $\forall x_v = [0, .25 + \frac{\delta}{2}]$; and $U_{p2} > U_{p1}$, $U_{p2} > U_{p3}$, and $U_{p2} > U_{p4}$ $\forall x_v = [.25 + \frac{\delta}{2}, \frac{\delta + .75}{2}]$.

## Legislative Proportional Three-Party Election

If the parties are at $x_{p1} = x_{p2} = x_{p3} = x_m$, the vote shares of the parties would be $s_{p1} = s_{p2} = s_{p3}$. While the vote shares are equal In this situation, party 1 could move to $x_m + \delta$, and then take all of the votes to the right of that location. This would then make the parties' vote shares $s_{p1} > s_{p2} = s_{p3}$. This is because $U_{p1} > U_{p2}$ and $U_{p1} > U_{p3}$, $\forall x_v = [.5 - \frac{\delta}{2}, 1]$, and $U_{p2} = U_{p3}$, $\forall x_v = [0, .5 - \frac{\delta}{2}]$. Party 2 would move to a position slightly right of $x_m + \delta$, such that $x_{p2} = x_m + 2\delta$. This would take away the

vote share party 1 attained, giving the parties vote shares of $s_{p3} > s_{p2} > s_{p1}$. This is because $U_{p3} > U_{p1}$ and $U_{p3} > U_{p2}$, $\forall x_v = [0, .5 + \frac{\delta}{2}]$, and $U_{p2} > U_{p1}$ and $U_{p2} > U_{p3}$, $\forall x_v = [.5 + \delta, 1]$. This would now induce either parties 1 or 2 to leapfrog party 3 to the left, resulting in a cycle where all three parties keep leapfrogging each other. The parties would therefore not settle into a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

## Presidential Plurality Election

**Theorem:** The pure strategy Nash equilibrium will be $x_{c1}* = x_{c2}* = x_m$, leading to vote shares that are $s_{c1} = s_{c2} = .5$.

**Proof:** If candidate 1 moved to $x_m - \delta$ then the vote share of candidate 1 would be $s_{c1} < s_{c2}$. This is because $U_{c2} > U_{c1}, \forall x_v = [.5 - \frac{\delta}{2}, 1]$.

## Three-Candidate Presidential Runoff Election

**Theorem:** The Nash equilibrium will be $x_{c1}* = x_{c2}* = x_{c3}* = x_m$, such that the vote shares of the candidates will be $s_{c11} = s_{c21} = s_{c31} = .33$ and $s_{c12} = s_{c22} = s_{c32} = .5$ for all possible combinations of match-ups in the second round.

**Proof:** For example, if candidate 1 decided to move to $x_{c1} = x_m + \delta$ the new vote shares would be $s_{c11} > s_{c21} = s_{c31}$. This is because $U_{c11} > U_{c21}$ and $U_{c11} > U_{c31}$, $\forall x_v = [.5 - \frac{\delta}{2}, 1]$, and $U_{c21} = U_{c31}$, $\forall x_v = [0, .5 - \frac{\delta}{2}]$. This would guarantee that candidate 1 will advance to the second round. However, this would mean that if candidate 1 faced either candidate 2 or candidate 3 in the second round, candidate 1's vote share would be $s_{c12} < s_{c22}$ or $s_{c12} < s_{c32}$. This is because $U_{c22} > U_{c12}, \forall x_v = [0, .5 + \frac{\delta}{2}]$ and $U_{c12} > U_{c22}, \forall x_v = [5 + \frac{\delta}{2}, 1]$ (or, $U_{c32} > U_{c12}, \forall x_v = [0, .5 + \frac{\delta}{2}]$ and $U_{c12} > U_{c32}, \forall x_v = [.5 + \frac{\delta}{2}, 1]$). This would mean that candidate 1 would lose in the

second round, despite getting the most votes in the first round.

## Four-Candidate Presidential Runoff Election

**Theorem:** There is pure strategy Nash equilibria for any positioning of the candidates where $x_{c1}* = x_{c2}* = [x_m - e, x_m]$ and $x_{c3}* = x_{c4}* = [x_m, x_m + e]$, where $e = [0, .25)$. There is also pure strategy Nash equilibria in the situation when $x_{c1}* = x_{c3}* = [x_m - e, x_m]$ and $x_{c2}* = x_{c4}* = [x_m, x_m + e]$, where $e = [0, .25)$; and $x_{c1}* = x_{c4}* = [x_m - e, x_m]$ and $x_{c2}* = x_{c3}* = [x_m, x_m + e]$, where $e = [0, .25)$. These pure strategy Nash equilibria would lead to vote shares of $s_{c11} = s_{c21} = s_{c31} = s_{c41} = .25$ for the first round and $s_{c12} = s_{c22} = s_{c32} = s_{c42} = .50$ (for any of the two candidates that advance to the second round).

**Proof:** If $x_{c1} = x_{c2} = x_{c3} = x_{c4} = x_m$ , then the vote shares for round 1 would be $s_{c11} = s_{c21} = s_{c31} = s_{c41} = .25$ and $s_{c12} = s_{c22} = s_{c32} = s_{c42} = .50$ (for any of the two candidates that advance to the second round). However, if candidate 1 decided to move to $x_{c1} = x_m + \delta$, then their vote share for round 1 would be $s_{c11} > s_{c21} = s_{c31} = s_{c41}$, guaranteeing candidate 1 a place in the second round against either candidate 2, 3, or 4. This is because $U_{c11} > U_{c21}$, $U_{c11} > U_{c31}$, $U_{c11} > U_{c41}$, $\forall x_v = [.5 + \frac{\delta}{2}, 1]$; and $U_{c21} = U_{c31} = U_{c41}$, $\forall x_v = [0, .5 + \frac{\delta}{2}]$. However, since candidate 1 is at $x_{c1} = x_m + \delta$, while candidates 2, 3, and 4 are still at $x_{c2} = x_{c3} = x_{c4} = x_m$, candidate 1 would lose in the second round of the election with a vote share of $s_{c12} < s_{c22} = s_{c32} = s_{c42}$. This is because $U_{c22} > U_{c12}$, $\forall x_v = [0, .5 + \frac{\delta}{2}]$ and $U_{c12} > U_{c22}, \forall x_v = [.5 + \frac{\delta}{2}, 1]$ (or $U_{c32} > U_{c12}, \forall x_v = [0, .5 + \frac{\delta}{2}]$ and $U_{c12} > U_{c32}, \forall x_v = [.5 + \frac{\delta}{2}, 1]$; or $U_{c42} > U_{c12}, \forall x_v = [0, .5 + \frac{\delta}{2}]$ and $U_{c12} > U_{c42}, \forall x_v = [.5 + \frac{\delta}{2}, 1]$).

In addition, $x_{c1} = x_{c2} = .333$ and $x_{c3} = x_{c4} = .667$, with vote shares of $s_{c11} = s_{c21} = s_{c31} = s_{c41} = .25$ for the first round and $s_{c12} = s_{c22} = s_{c32} = s_{c42} = .50$ (for any of the two candidates that advance to the second round), is a Nash equilibrium

as well. If candidate 1 moved to $x_{c1} = .666$, they would receive vote shares that are $s_{c11} < s_{c31} = s_{c41} < s_{c21}$. This is because $U_{c21} > U_{c11}$, $U_{c21} > U_{c31}$, and $U_{c21} > U_{c41}$, $\forall x_v = [0, .4995]$; $U_{c11} > U_{c21}$, $U_{c11} > U_{c31}$, and $U_{c11} > U_{c41}$, $\forall x_v = [.4995, .6665]$; and $U_{c31} = U_{c41} > U_{c11}$, and $U_{c31} = U_{c41} > U_{c21}$, $\forall x_v = [.6665, 1]$. In this scenario though, candidate 1 would fail to receive enough votes to advance to the second round. At the same time, candidate 2 and either candidates 3 and 4 would advance to the second round, and would tie in the second round of the election with vote shares of $s_{c22} = s_{c32} = s_{c42}$. This is because $U_{c22} > U_{c32}, \forall x_v = [0, .5]$ and $U_{c32} > U_{c22}, \forall x_v = [.5, 1]$ (or $U_{c22} > U_{c42}, \forall x_v = [0, .5]$ and $U_{c42} > U_{c22}, \forall x_v = [.5, 1]$; or $U_{c32} = U_{c42}, \forall x_v on X$).

## Adding in the Assumption of Presidentialism

### Legislative Plurality Election Under a Presidential Regime Where the President is Elected by Plurality Vote

**Theorem:** The pure strategy Nash equilibrium will be $x_{p1}* = x_{p2}* = x_m$, leading to vote shares that are $s_{p1} = s_{p2} = .5$.

**Proof:** If party 1 moved to $x_m + \delta$ then the vote share of party 1 would be $s_{p1} < s_{p2}$. This is because $U_{p2} > U_{p1}, \forall x_v = [.5 + \frac{\delta}{2}, 1]$.

### Three-Party Proportional Legislative Election Under a Presidential Regime Where the President is Elected by Plurality Vote

**Theorem:** If $x_{c1}* = x_{c2}* = x_m$ for the presidential election, then $x_{p1}* = x_{p2}* = x_m$ and any position on $X$ for party 3 for the legislative election. This will lead to vote

shares that are $s_{p1} = s_{p2} = .5$ and $s_{p3} = 0$.

**Proof:** For example, if party 1 moved to $x_m - \delta$, then the vote shares of the parties would be $s_{p1} = .5 - \delta$, $s_{p2} = .5 + \frac{\delta}{2}$, and $s_{p3} = 0$. This is because $U_{p2} > U_{p1}$ and $U_{p2} > U_{p3}$, $\forall x_v = [.5 - \frac{\delta}{2}, 1]$.

## Four-Party Proportional Legislative Election Under a Presidential Regime Where the President is Elected by Plurality Vote

**Theorem:** If $x_{c1}* = x_{c2}* = x_m$ for the presidential election, then $x_{p1}* = x_{p2}* = x_m$ and any position on $X$ for parties 3 and 4 for the legislative election. This will lead to vote shares that are $s_{p1} = s_{p2} = .5$ and $s_{p3} = s_{p4} = 0$.

**Proof:** For example, if party 1 moved to $x_m - \delta$, then the vote shares of the parties would be $s_{p1} = .5 - \delta$, $s_{p2} = .5 + \frac{\delta}{2}$, and $s_{p3} = 0$. This is because $U_{p2} > U_{p1}$, $U_{p2} > U_{p3}$, and $U_{p2} > U_{p4}$, $\forall x_v = [.5 - \frac{\delta}{2}, 1]$.

## Three-Party Proportional Legislative Election Under a Presidential Regime Where the President is Elected by Runoff Vote

If the parties are at $x_{p1} = x_{p2} = x_{p3} = x_m$, the vote shares of the parties would be $s_{p1} = s_{p2} = s_{p3}$. While the vote shares are equal In this situation, party 1 could move to $x_m + \delta$, and then take all of the votes to the right of that location. This would then make the parties' vote shares $s_{p1} > s_{p2} = s_{p3}$. This is because $U_{p1} > U_{p2}$ and $U_{p1} > U_{p3}$, $\forall x_v = [.5 - \frac{\delta}{2}, 1]$, and $U_{p2} = U_{p3}$, $\forall x_v = [0, .5 - \frac{\delta}{2}]$. Party 2 would move to

a position slightly right of $x_m + \delta$, such that $x_{p2} = x_m + 2\delta$. This would take away the vote share party 1 attained, giving the parties vote shares of $s_{p3} > s_{p2} > s_{p1}$. This is because $U_{p3} > U_{p1}$ and $U_{p3} > U_{p2}$, $\forall x_v = [0, .5 + \frac{\delta}{2}]$, and $U_{p2} > U_{p1}$ and $U_{p2} > U_{p3}$, $\forall x_v = [.5 + \delta, 1]$. This would now induce either parties 1 or 2 to leapfrog party 3 to the left, resulting in a cycle where all three parties keep leapfrogging each other. The parties would therefore not settle into a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

## Four-Party Proportional Legislative Election Under a Presidential Regime Where the President is Elected by Runoff Vote

**Theorem:** The parties are at pure strategy Nash equilibrium when $x_{p1}* = x_{p2}* = .25$ and $x_{p3}* = x_{p4}* = .75$. This leads to vote shares that are $s_{p1} = s_{p2} = s_{p3} = s_{p4}$.

**Proof:** If the parties are located at $x_{p1}* = x_{p2}* = .25$ and $x_{p3}* = x_{p4}* = .75$, and party 2 decides to move to $x_{p2} = .25 + \delta$, then party 2 would have a vote share that is $s_{p2} < s_{p1}$, $s_{p2} < s_{p3}$, and $s_{p2} < s_{p4}$. This is because $U_{p1} > U_{p2}$, $U_{p1} > U_{p3}$, and $U_{p1} > U_{p4}$ $\forall x_v = [0, .25 + \frac{\delta}{2}]$; and $U_{p2} > U_{p1}$, $U_{p2} > U_{p3}$, and $U_{p2} > U_{p4}$ $\forall x_v = [.25 + \frac{\delta}{2}, \frac{\delta + .75}{2}]$.

# Elections with Varied Coattail Effects

## Legislative Plurality Election Under a Presidential Regime Where the President is Elected by Plurality Vote

**Theorem:** The pure strategy Nash equilibrium will be $x_{p1}* = x_{p2}* = x_m$, $\forall c$. This will lead to vote shares that are $s_{p1} = s_{p2} = .5$.

**Proof:** For any value of $c$, if $c = .75$ and party 1 moved to $x_m + \delta$, then the vote share of party 1 would be $s_{p1} < s_{p2}$. This is because $U_{p2} > U_{p1}, \forall x_v = [.5 + \frac{\delta}{2}, 1]$.

## Three-Party Proportional Legislative Election Under a Presidential Regime Where the President is Elected by Plurality Vote

**Theorem:** If $c = [.4, 1]$ and $x_{c1}* = x_{c2}* = x_m$ for the presidential election, then $x_{p1}* = x_{p2}* = x_m$ and any position on $X$ for party 3 for the legislative election. This will lead to vote shares that are $s_{p1} = s_{p2} = .5$ and $s_{p3} = 0$. If $c = [0, .4)$, then there is no pure strategy Nash Equilibrium for the election.

**Proof:** For example, if $c = [.4, 1]$, and party 1 moved to $x_m - \delta$, then the vote shares of the parties would be $s_{p1} = .5 - \delta$, $s_{p2} = .5 + \frac{\delta}{2}$, and $s_{p3} = 0$. This is because $U_{p2} > U_{p1}$ and $U_{p2} > U_{p3}$, $\forall x_v = [.5 - \frac{\delta}{2}, 1]$.

Furthermore, assume $c = .39$ and $x_{p1} = x_{p2} = x_m$ and $x_{p3} = .01$. In this situation, the vote shares of the parties are $s_{p1} = s_{p2} = .49$ and $s_{p3} = .02$. This is because $U_{p3} > U_{p1}$ and $U_{p3} > U_{p2}$, $\forall x_v = [0, .02]$; and $U_{p1} = U_{p2} > U_{p3}$, $\forall x_v = [.02, 1]$. If party 2 moved to $x_{p2} = .51$, then the vote shares of the parties would be $s_{p1} = .485$,

$s_{p2} = .495$ and $s_{p3} = .02$. This is because $U_{p3} > U_{p1}$ and $U_{p3} > U_{p2}$, $\forall x_v = [0, .02]$; $U_{p1} > U_{p2} >$ and $U_{p1} > U_{p3}$, $\forall x_v = [.02, .505]$; and $U_{p3} > U_{p1} >$ and $U_{p3} > U_{p2}$, $\forall x_v = [.505, 1]$. This would then cause party 1 to move to $x_{p1} = .49$, which would lead to vote shares of $s_{p1} = s_{p2} = .5$ and $s_{p3} = 0$. This is because $U_{p1} > U_{p2}$ and $U_{p1} > U_{p3}$, $\forall x_v = [0, .5]$; and $U_{p2} > U_{p1} >$ and $U_{p2} > U_{p3}$, $\forall x_v = [.5, 1]$. However, party 2 could then move to $x_m$, leading to vote shares of $s_{p1} = .495$, $s_{p2} = .505$ and $s_{p3} = 0$. This is because $U_{p1} > U_{p2}$ and $U_{p1} > U_{p3}$, $\forall x_v = [0, .495]$; and $U_{p2} > U_{p1} >$ and $U_{p2} > U_{p3}$, $\forall x_v = [.495, 1]$. This would then cause party 1 to move back to $x_m$ as well, leading us back to the beginning of the cycle at $x_{p1} = x_{p2} = x_m$ and $x_{p3} = .01$.

Furthermore, assume $c = .25$ and $x_{p1} = x_{p2} = x_m$ and $x_{p3} = .01$. In this situation, the vote shares of the parties are $s_{p1} = s_{p2} = .445$ and $s_{p3} = .11$. This is because $U_{p3} > U_{p1}$ and $U_{p3} > U_{p2}$, $\forall x_v = [0, .11]$; and $U_{p1} = U_{p2} > U_{p3}$, $\forall x_v = [.11, 1]$. If party 2 moved to $x_{p2} = .51$, then the vote shares of the parties would be $s_{p1} = .395$, $s_{p2} = .495$ and $s_{p3} = .11$. This is because $U_{p3} > U_{p1}$ and $U_{p3} > U_{p2}$, $\forall x_v = [0, .11]$; $U_{p1} > U_{p2} >$ and $U_{p1} > U_{p3}$, $\forall x_v = [.11, .505]$; and $U_{p3} > U_{p1} >$ and $U_{p3} > U_{p2}$, $\forall x_v = [.505, 1]$. This would then cause party 1 to move to $x_{p1} = .29$, which would lead to vote shares of $s_{p1} = .4$, $s_{p2} = .6$ and $s_{p3} = 0$. This is because $U_{p1} > U_{p2}$ and $U_{p1} > U_{p3}$, $\forall x_v = [0, .4]$; and $U_{p2} > U_{p1} >$ and $U_{p2} > U_{p3}$, $\forall x_v = [.4, 1]$. However, party 2 could then move back to $x_m$ to attain a higher vote share, bringing us back to a previous arrangement of parties, leading to cycling.

## Four-Party Proportional Legislative Election Under a Presidential Regime Where the President is Elected by Plurality Vote

**Theorem:** If $c = [.4, 1]$ and $x_{c1}* = x_{c2}* = x_m$ for the presidential election, then $x_{p1}* = x_{p2}* = x_m$ and any position on $X$ for party 3 for the legislative election. This will lead to vote shares that are $s_{p1} = s_{p2} = .5$ and $s_{p3} = s_{p4} = 0$. If $c = [0, .4)$, then there is no pure strategy Nash Equilibrium for the election.

**Proof:** For example, if $c = [.4, 1]$, and party 1 moved to $x_m - \delta$, then the vote shares of the parties would be $s_{p1} = .5 - \delta$, $s_{p2} = .5 + \frac{\delta}{2}$, and $s_{p3} = s_{p4} = 0$. This is because $U_{p2} > U_{p1}$ and $U_{p2} > U_{p3}$, $\forall x_v = [.5 - \frac{\delta}{2}, 1]$.

Furthermore, assume $c = .39$ and $x_{p1} = x_{p2} = x_m$, $x_{p3} = 0$, and $x_{p4} = 1$. In this situation, the vote shares of the parties are $s_{p1} = s_{p2} = .48$ and $s_{p3} = s_{p4} = .02$. This is because $U_{p3} > U_{p1}$, $U_{p3} > U_{p2}$, and $U_{p3} > U_{p4}$, $\forall x_v = [0, .02]$; $U_{p1} = U_{p2} > U_{p3}$ and $U_{p1} = U_{p2} > U_{p4}$, $\forall x_v = [.02, .98]$; and $U_{p4} > U_{p1}$, $U_{p4} > U_{p2}$, and $U_{p4} > U_{p3}$, $\forall x_v = [.98, 1]$. If party 1 moved to $x_{p2} = .48$ and party 2 moved to $x_{p2} = .52$, then the vote shares of the parties would be $s_{p1} = s_{p2} = .5$ and $s_{p3} = s_{p4} = 0$. This is because $U_{p1} > U_{p2}$, $U_{p1} > U_{p3}$, and $U_{p1} > U_{p4}$, $\forall x_v = [0, .5]$; and $U_{p2} > U_{p1}$, $U_{p2} > U_{p3}$, and $U_{p2} > U_{p4}$, $\forall x_v = [.5, 1]$. This would then cause party 1 to move to $x_{p1} = .52 - \delta$, which would lead to vote shares such that $s_{p1} > s_{p2} > s_{p3} > s_{p4}$.

## Three-Party Proportional Legislative Election Under a Presidential Regime Where the President is Elected by Runoff Vote

For any value of $c$, if the parties are at $x_{p1} = x_{p2} = x_{p3} = x_m$, the vote shares of the parties would be $s_{p1} = s_{p2} = s_{p3}$. While the vote shares are equal In this situation, party 1 could move to $x_m + \delta$, and then take all of the votes to the right of that location. This would then make the parties' vote shares $s_{p1} > s_{p2} = s_{p3}$. This is because $U_{p1} > U_{p2}$ and $U_{p1} > U_{p3}$, $\forall x_v = [.5 - \frac{\delta}{2}, 1]$, and $U_{p2} = U_{p3}$, $\forall x_v = [0, .5 - \frac{\delta}{2}]$. Party 2 would move to a position slightly right of $x_m + \delta$, such that $x_{p2} = x_m + 2\delta$. This would take away the vote share party 1 attained, giving the parties vote shares of $s_{p3} > s_{p2} > s_{p1}$. This is because $U_{p3} > U_{p1}$ and $U_{p3} > U_{p2}$, $\forall x_v = [0, .5 + \frac{\delta}{2}]$, and $U_{p2} > U_{p1}$ and $U_{p2} > U_{p3}$, $\forall x_v = [.5 + \delta, 1]$. This would now induce either parties 1 or 2 to leapfrog party 3 to the left, resulting in a cycle where all three parties keep leapfrogging each other. The parties would therefore not settle into a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

## Four-Party Proportional Legislative Election Under a Presidential Regime Where the President is Elected by Runoff Vote

**Theorem:** The parties are at pure strategy Nash equilibrium when $x_{p1}* = x_{p2}* = .25$ and $x_{p3}* = x_{p4}* = .75$. This leads to vote shares that are $s_{p1} = s_{p2} = s_{p3} = s_{p4}$.

**Proof:** For any value of $c$, if the parties are located at $x_{p1}* = x_{p2}* = .25$ and $x_{p3}* = x_{p4}* = .75$, and party 2 decides to move to $x_{p2} = .25 + \delta$, then party 2 would have a vote share that is $s_{p2} < s_{p1}$, $s_{p2} < s_{p3}$, and $s_{p2} < s_{p4}$. This is because

$U_{p1} > U_{p2}$, $U_{p1} > U_{p3}$, and $U_{p1} > U_{p4}$ $\forall x_v = [0, .25 + \frac{\delta}{2}]$; and $U_{p2} > U_{p1}$, $U_{p2} > U_{p3}$, and $U_{p2} > U_{p4}$ $\forall x_v = [.25 + \frac{\delta}{2}, \frac{\delta + .75}{2}]$.

# Chapter 3

# Empirically Testing the Theoretical Explanation of Presidentialism's Effect on Party Competition

The previous chapter exhibited that when party competition is modeled with the assumption that the said competition is taking place against the backdrop of presidentialism, legislative parties with presidential candidates have vote-gaining incentives to move toward the location of their presidential candidate. Simultaneously, this means that legislative parties are moving toward the center of the party system. The purpose of this chapter is to empirically prove that parties in presidential regimes exhibit centrist tendencies more than parties in parliamentary regimes.

Using data from the Comparative Manifestos Project and the Median Voter Dataset, I will show that major parties on the left and the right in presidential regimes are ideologically closer to each other and the median voter in legislative elections than similar parties in parliamentary regimes. In addition, I demonstrate that the timing between legislative and presidential elections affects the placement of parties in legislative elections. Specifically, major parties on the left and the right will be ideologically closer to each other and to the median voter when the legislative election is concurrent with the presidential election. Conversely, major parties on the left and the right will be ideologically further apart from each other and the median

voter when the legislative election is not concurrent with the presidential election.

These findings are important, because standard accounts of spatial competition show that parties in legislative elections that use PR (or are otherwise multi-party systems) position themselves in a non-centrist fashion. I show that this result holds only when the election in question occurs under a parliamentary regime. However, in presidential regimes, parties will place themselves in a centrist fashion regardless of the electoral system.

First, I will show how bringing in presidentialism has already contributed to a clearer understanding of legislative party systems. Building off of this literature, I will explain that presidentialism can also help us better understand party competition in legislative elections. Next, the data used in this chapter will be discussed; along with the methodology used to test the theory. This will be followed with the presentation of the results, which will also include selected real-world examples. These examples will provide an up-close perspective to presidentialism's effects on party competition, which complements the cross-national analysis that is the focus of this chapter. Finally, conclusions and limitations with the analysis in this chapter (along with avenues for potential future research) will be discussed.

## Background

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, a party's electoral success in a legislative election can be determined by their ideological position relative to that of their presidential candidate. This is because of the coattail effects that presidential elections have over legislative elections in a presidential regime.

The coattail effects cause the presidential election to be judged more important by both the parties and voters. As a result, most of the attention is drawn toward these elections, at the expense of the legislative election. In order to garner attention and

resources, legislative parties will modify their own campaigns to be more in line with that of their presidential candidate. This includes making their ideological position resemble that of their presidential candidates'. Since the presidential election is the most important election in a country, voters will gauge legislative parties' positions based on the positions of presidential candidates.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, prior research has shown that presidential elections affect the size and fragmentation of a country's legislative party system (Jones, 1994; Neto and Cox, 1997; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Samuels, 2002; Mozaffar et al., 2003; Golder, 2006; Hicken and Stoll, 2011). This research has focused on how variations within presidentialism affect these outcomes. More specifically, in regard to how both the ballot method of presidential elections and the timing between presidential and legislative elections affect the party system. Presidential regimes with plurality presidential elections and concurrent elections are more likely to have a smaller number of parties in legislative elections. This is compared to presidential regimes with runoff presidential elections and non-concurrent elections (Golder, 2006).

It can be expected that these two factors will also have an effect on where parties decide to ideologically place themselves in legislative elections. Specifically, when a legislative election is concurrent with a presidential election, parties will be more centripetal in the legislative election. Conversely, when the same legislative election is non-concurrent with the presidential election, the parties will be more centrifugal. Also, when a country elects its president with a plurality ballot, the parties will be more centripetal in the legislative election. However, when a country elects is president with a runoff ballot, the parties will be more centrifugal in the legislative election. The expected hypotheses based on the theory can be given as follows:

**H1:** In countries where the head of state is directly elected, the main parties will be ideologically closer to each other and the median voter than the main parties in

regimes where the head of state is not elected.

**H2:** Among regimes in which the head of state is directly elected, the main parties will be ideologically closer to each other and the median voter during years in which the legislative election is concurrent with the presidential election.

**H3:** Among regimes in which the head of state is directly elected, the main parties will be ideologically closer to each other and the median voter in regimes in which the head of state is elected through a plurality election than in regimes where the head of state is elected in a runoff election.

## Data and Methods

The empirical evidence comes from two different, but related, datasets. The data on the positions of the parties comes from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) (Budge, 2001), which provides the ideological positions of every political party in each legislative election since the end of the Second World War for select countries.[1]

This dataset alone however cannot provide the evidence necessary to demonstrate how presidentialism impacts party competition. The main problem facing the CMP is that it does not provide the positions of presidential candidates for each party in those countries with presidential elections. Neither the CMP nor any other dataset

[1]The initial dataset only had 20 countries included. However, in the latest version that number has grown to 52 countries, including virtually almost every democratic election in the postwar era. The CMP has 2,347 positions of 632 different political parties in its latest edition. The positions of parties in the CMP are derived from codifying the sentences of every election manifesto in its dataset as a way of placing the parties on the left-right scale. Then, the party's actual ideological value is computed by subtracting the sum of the percentage of left-wing codified statements from the sum of the percentage of right-wing codified statements. Therefore, a positive value represents a party with a right-leaning ideological position, while a negative value represents a party with a left-leaning position. The ideological values of parties can range on an infinite scale from -100 (the most left-wing position a party can take) to 100 (the most right-wing position a party can take). The timeframe for the CMP ranges from 1945 till the mid-2000's decade.

has any record of presidential candidate positioning for the entire postwar era.

This still leaves the problem of finding an alternative measurement that can capture how parties position themselves in presidential regimes. Such an alternative measurement is found by using the statistic of the median voter in each election.

The median voter statistic can be useful for measuring the effects of presidentialism on a party system for a couple of reasons. First, as stated earlier, the location of the median voter gives a measure of where the center of the party system is located in any given election. This provides a starting point for any kind of analysis of party system behavior. Second, presidential elections induce presidential candidates to move toward the center of the political spectrum. This causes presidential elections to have a centripetal nature. If parties desire to have positions similar to their respective presidential candidates, they would therefore have to move toward the location of the median voter as well.

This method of estimating the effect of presidentialism on party competition is akin to how astrophysicists discuss star clusters that are invisible in the sky. These clusters cannot be seen, but can still be detected. The conclusions that these astrophysicists make are widely accepted, even though there is no direct evidence of these stars existing. The methods I am using to test party positioning are similar to this. This is because the positions of presidential candidates are like invisible stars. However, unlike invisible stars, we can still observe presidential candidates.

The median voter statistic is taken from a dataset by De Neve (2011), which is essentially an expanded version of an already-existing dataset created by Kim and Fording (1998).[2] To calculate the statistic of the median voter in each election,

[2]The Kim and Fording version of the median voter dataset includes the location of the median voter in 364 elections in 25 countries. However, De Neve's more recent version includes not only the 25 countries from Kim and Fording's initial dataset, but 28 more countries that were not included by Kim and Fording. Along with including more countries than Kim and Fording, De Neve also slightly revised the methodology by which the median voter statistic was calculated, by basing his values off a version of the CMP that corrects for random error (Benoit et al., 2009). Along with the 53 countries included in De Neve's median voter dataset, I took the methods used by Kim and

Table 3.1: Breakdown of Elections in Dataset by Regime and Concurrence

| | **Concurrent** | **Non-Concurrent** | **Total** |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Parliamentary** | - | - | 310 |
| **Pure Presidential** | 24 | 8 | 32 |
| **Semi-Presidential** | 7 | 91 | 98 |
| **Total** | 31 | 99 | 440 |

they first took the values of the positions of each party from the CMP for a given election. Next, they calculated the midpoint in-between each party for that election. Finally, they found the percentage of the vote received by each party in that election, and weighted each party's position by that vote share to come up with an accurate representation of what the distribution of voters looked like in that election.[3]

The advantage of using the median voter dataset is that it provides for a way in which the median voter can be assessed in each election. This assessment can be done regardless of country or time of election. The only other method as to which the median voter can be assessed is through using survey data. However, such information is nonexistent for most elections. This is due to electoral surveys having only been conducted for a select few countries, and select elections within those countries. With this said, the median voter dataset has been validated by comparing it to preexisting measures of voter ideology. Two such surveys that it has been compared to are the Eurobarometer survey (European Commision, 2011) and Stimson's (1999) "policy mood" model of Americans' collective ideology since the 1950's.

As described in Table 3.1, counting only democratic cases, there are 32 elections in the dataset that occurred under a pure presidential regime. Meanwhile, there are 98 elections that occurred under a semi-presidential regime. Broken down

Fording/De Neve, and calculated the median voter for all of South Korea's legislative elections from 1992 to 2008. This gives me a total of 54 countries for analysis.

[3]It should be noted that the statistic of the median voter in each election is based on the same scale used by the CMP, therefore a median voter value that is negative indicates that the median voter in that given election was on the left side of the spectrum, and a positive median voter value means that the median voter was right-leaning in that election.

further, 24 elections in pure presidential regimes were concurrent, while eight were non-concurrent. Furthermore, only seven elections in semi-presidential regimes were concurrent, while the other 91 were non-concurrent. The numbers become smaller when broken down further according to the electoral system used in the presidential election.

These small numbers are the result of two factors. First, most of the dataset's democratic regimes are located in Western Europe. This region of the world is known for primarily featuring countries with parliamentary regimes. Second, the dataset does not include any countries from Latin America (with the exception of Mexico). Most of the world's pure presidential regimes are located in this region.

In an ideal world, I would prefer to have a dataset that included a wider range of countries. Specifically, I would add in those countries in Latin America that employ pure presidential regimes. This would also give me a larger number of elections that were held concurrently with presidential elections. Having a smaller sample size means that it will be harder to make inferences from the results of the analyses. The more cases that are available, the more confidence can be placed in the results.

Despite these limitations, the positive aspect of the current dataset is that there is a large enough sample size to allow me to make inferences about the effects presidentialism has on party competition in general. As a result, I will combine both pure presidential and semi-presidential regimes into one category measuring presidentialism, containing 130 cases. This will give me 31 concurrent elections and 99 non-concurrent elections in all presidential regimes. While I will only be able to give results of the effects that presidential elections have on party placement, this serves as a useful starting point to demonstrate how presidentialism affects party behavior in ways that have not been explained by political scientists who study party competition.

## Dependent Variables

The dependent variables of interest in this chapter are the distance between the two major parties from each other and the distance of the two major parties from the median voter. The distance between the major parties is important to the theory of centripetal incentives in presidentialism. This is because if the two major parties are trying to mimic their presidential counterparts, they should be converging toward each other. The variable of the distance of the major parties from each other is simply taken by getting the absolute value of the difference in CMP scores of the two major parties in each election. Therefore, the smaller the value of the dependent variable, the closer in distance the two major parties are from each other in the given election. The larger the value, the further away the parties are from each other.

The same logic of convergence should manifest itself also when we look at the distance of the major parties from the median voter. This variable is the sum of the squared distances of each major party from the median voter. The dependent variable of the distance of the major parties from each other will exclusively use data from the CMP. The dependent variable of the distances of the major parties from the median voter will use data from both the CMP and the median voter dataset.[4]

Before going any further, it is necessary to explain what I mean by a major party. For the purposes of this chapter, a major party is the largest party in terms of vote share on each side of the ideological spectrum. This is irrespective of the extremeness of the ideology of that party.[5] Furthermore, in many countries, there have been

[4]Further detail on the two dependent variables is available in this chapter's appendix.

[5]For example, in some countries, the major party of the left is the country's social-liberal party (i.e., the Democratic Party in the United States), while in other countries, the major party of the left is the country's social-democratic party (i.e., the Labour Party in the United Kingdom). In some countries, the major party of the left is the country's communist party (i.e., the Progressive Party of Working People in Cyprus). On the right side of the ideological spectrum, the major party of the right is the country's Christian democratic party (i.e., the Christian Democratic Union in Germany), and in other countries the major party of the right is the country's economically-liberal party (i.e., the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan).

changes as to which party becomes the major party on the right or left, based on the vote shares in each election.[6] Table A.1 in Appendix A shows the parties used for each election in the dataset.

As expected, the smaller the value of the dependent variable, the closer in distance the two major parties are from the median voter in the given election. The larger the value, the further away the parties are from the median voter. While it is plausible that one of the major parties could be relatively far away from the median voter while the other major party is closer to the median voter, my theory states that both of the parties will move closer toward the median voter as the result of the presence of a presidential election. One major party cannot be close to the median voter while the other major party is not. Both parties have to be close to the median voter under regimes of presidentialism.

## Independent Variables

Both of the dependent variables will be tested on several independent variables, all of which are dummy variables. The effects of presidentialism will be tested at three levels.[7] At each level, parliamentary regimes will be used as the reference category. Therefore, all results on the independent variables should be put in comparison to parliamentarism.

The first test is the simplest: between the effect of elections held in separation of powers regimes (presidential and semi-presidential) versus parliamentary regimes.

[6] An example of this would be in Switzerland, where the Christian Democratic People's Party had long been for decades the major party on the right. However, since the 1999 Swiss parliamentary election, the national conservative Swiss People's Party has been attaining the most votes on the political right in Switzerland.

[7] The independent variables are being created in the above stated manner, as opposed to running interaction models for the independent variables. The reason for doing so is because creating interaction models proved to be problematic. This is because running interaction models using these variables leads to several of the interaction terms being dropped, due to multicollinearity present among some of the interaction terms in the model. Instead, each institutional category, save for the reference group, is placed in each level's model.

The second test explores the impact of concurrence. I create two dummies here to explore against the reference category (parliamentary elections): legislative elections in presidential regimes in which the legislative election occurs the same day as the presidential election, and legislative elections in presidential regimes where the presidential election is not held on that same day. These variables explore the impact of concurrence and non-concurrence on parties' positions.

The third test explores the impact of presidential election rules on legislative party positioning. Here, I create a dummy for concurrent and non-concurrent elections held under plurality rule for the presidential elections, and then a dummy for concurrent and non-concurrent elections held under a two-round runoff election. The reference category for each dummy includes elections held under parliamentary regimes.

The differences in these two types of presidential ballots are important to consider. This is because plurality elections have the effect of reducing the effective number of candidates down to two in an election. On the other hand, runoff elections reduce the effective number of candidates down to three (Cox, 1997; Golder, 2006). Thus, I expect the presidential elections held under the plurality rule to have a stronger reductive effect on the distance between the two major parties than elections held under a two-round system.

Table 3.2 in the appendix of this chapter gives a breakdown of all of the countries included in the dataset, categorized by the type of institutional regime, along with the years in which their legislative elections are included in the dataset used for this analysis.

In each model that follows I also included a control for the electoral system implemented in the legislative election. This is important, because the literature has shown that the type of electoral system used in a legislative election affects the number of parties competing in an election. This in turn affects where the parties decide to position themselves (Downs, 1957; Cox, 1990; Kollman et al., 1992). As a result, PR

electoral systems cause parties to move away from the median voter, while majoritarian electoral systems cause parties to move toward the median voter. Such an effect on the placement of parties must be accounted for then in the models.

I created two dummy variables, for majoritarian and PR legislative systems, with mixed systems as the reference category. The first dummy variable includes all legislative elections that were held in single-member districts, where the winner was decided either through a plurality vote, two-round runoff system, or instant runoff voting. The second includes all legislative elections that were held under a PR system, either through a party list, single non-transferrable vote, or multi-member district single transferrable vote. Elections that were held under a mixed-member electoral system are used as the reference category. These include all legislative elections that were conducted under a system of mixed-member PR or parallel voting.[8]

# Results

## Testing the Parties' Distances From Each Other

Figure 3.1 looks at the effect presidential regimes have on the distance between the major parties in each election. All of the models are run using Prais-Winsten FGLS panel regressions, to account for serial autocorrelation, with semirobust standard errors in order to account for heteroskedasticity. The models in Figure 3.1 progressively test the hypotheses using the distance of the major parties from each other as the dependent variable. Each of the cells reports the coefficients and semirobust standard errors for how much each of the categorical independent variables affects the distance

[8]Testing the models using a dichotomous distinction between majoritarian systems and systems that are either PR or mixed-member did not change the relationship between presidentialism and the placement of parties. Also, using a more-detailed distinction within majoritarian (plurality, instant-runoff voting, two-round runoff) electoral systems did not change the relationship between presidentialism and the placement of parties.

Figure 3.1: Presidentialism's Effects on the Distance of the Major Parties from Each Other




of the major parties from each other. This figure is essentially a backwards results tree, where the coefficients are reported only for cases which meet all of the criteria for a specific branch of the tree. The procedure is repeated for the tests on the distances of the major parties from the median voter in Figure 3.4. The full models that are used to create the coefficients and standard errors, along with the impact of control variables, are located in Appendix A.

Model 1a tests whether or not the distance of the major parties from each other varies between regimes of direct presidential elections and parliamentarism, thus testing Hypothesis 1. The results confirm that, all things being equal, the distance between the major parties in countries that elect presidents is smaller than in countries that have parliamentary regimes.

Examples from real cases illuminates presidentialism's effect on party competition. The first example compares Sweden and Finland. Sweden and Finland are good for comparison, since they are two culturally- and economically-similar countries in Scandinavia that both employ PR for their legislative elections. The key difference

Figure 3.2: Comparison of Distances Between Major Parties in Sweden and Finland




between these two countries is that, as a semi-presidential regime, Finland directly elects its head of state, while Sweden does not (being a parliamentary constitutional monarchy).

Figure 3.2 compares the distances of the major parties from each other in both of the countries. For Sweden, the two major parties that are used are the Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party on the left, and the Moderate Party[9] on the right. For Finland, the two major parties that are used are the Social Democratic Party of Finland on the left,[10] and the National Coalition Party on the right.

According to the results in Model 1a, Figure 3.2 should show that the major parties in Finland are closer to each other. In each of the examples, the same scale that is used for the CMP is used for the examples. The larger the number on the scale, the further the ideological distance, while the smaller the number, the smaller the ideological distance. Looking at Figure 3.2, it shows that the two major parties

[9]Previously known as the National Organization of the Right and the Rightist Party.

[10]It should be noted that for the 1962 and 1966 Finnish legislative elections, the communist Finnish People's Democratic League was used as the left-wing party, since they finished ahead of the Social Democratic Party in vote totals.

Figure 3.3: Comparison of Distances Between Major Parties in the Czech Republic and Poland




in Finland have generally been closer to each other than the two major parties in Sweden (save for an outlier case in the 1975 Finnish election).

Another example uses two countries that have recently made the transition to democratic rule: the Czech Republic and Poland. As with Sweden and Finland, the Czech Republic and Poland are culturally-similar bordering countries, which employ PR for legislative elections. The two countries also transitioned to democracy at the same time during the late 1980's-early 1990's.

The key difference is that Poland, as with Finland, is a semi-presidential regime, while the Czech Republic is a pure parliamentary regime, with an appointed head of state.[11] Given these characteristics, the expectation is that the major parties in Poland should be closer to each other and the median voter than the major parties in the Czech Republic.

For the Czech Republic, the major left-wing party used is the Czech Social Demo-

[11]In 2013, the Czech Republic started having direct elections for its president.

cratic Party,[12] and the major right-wing party used is the Civic Democratic Party.[13] In Poland, the major left-wing party used is the Democratic Left Alliance, while there is a different right-wing party used in each election (listed in Table A.1.).[14] The results described in Model 1a are once again shown in this example, as Figure 3.3 shows that the major parties in Poland are closer to each other than in the Czech Republic.

Model 1a however is a starting point for the comparisons. Model 1b assesses the impact concurrent and non-concurrent elections have within presidential regimes, while comparing them to elections held in pure parliamentary regimes. Within presidentialism, we see a greater effect on the distance between the major parties among concurrent elections compared to that of non-concurrent elections. This gives support to my second hypothesis.

In Model 1b, the estimate for concurrent elections is smaller than the estimate for non-concurrent elections, indicating that concurrent elections have major parties that are closer to each other than in non-concurrent elections. Furthermore, the estimates for both concurrent and non-concurrent elections remain negative. This gives additional support for my first hypothesis.

Model 1c brings in information regarding the type of presidential ballot used in a given regime, allowing for a testing of my third hypothesis. Here, the results are only partly in line with my basic expectations: Among concurrent elections, the estimate for elections in a country with a plurality presidential ballot is larger than the estimate for elections in a country with a runoff presidential ballot. However, among non-concurrent elections, the estimate for elections in a country with a plurality presidential ballot is smaller than the estimate for elections in a country with a runoff presidential ballot. As a result, my third hypothesis cannot be fully confirmed, since

[12]The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is used for the 1990 and 1992 elections.

[13]Its predecessor organization, the Civic Forum, is used for the 1990 election.

[14]This is because a different right-wing party earned the most votes in the first four Polish legislative elections.

concurrent elections in countries with runoff presidential ballots have major parties closer to each other than concurrent elections in countries with plurality presidential ballots.

The results in Figure 3.1 provide strong support for my first two hypotheses, but only partial support for the third one. The analyses show that regimes which provide for direct presidential elections have major parties that are ideologically closer to each other. Also, this effect is pronounced more among concurrent elections than in non-concurrent elections. While non-concurrent elections in countries with plurality presidential ballots have major parties that are closer to each other than major parties in non-concurrent elections in countries with runoff presidential ballots, the evidence shows that this is not so for concurrent elections.

## Testing the Parties' Distances From The Median Voter

Next, I turn to assessing the impact presidentialism has on the distances of the major parties from the median voter. Once again, this assessment is important, because it will show that regardless of other incentives that might make parties exhibit centripetal and centrifugal tendencies, the major parties in presidential regimes will move toward the ideological center. This is similar to what presidential candidates do in those regimes. Figure 3.4 shows the results.

As with Model 1a, Model 2a provides for a comparison between regimes of direct presidential election and parliamentary regimes. However, each institution is now being tested on the extent to which they affect the distance of major parties from the median voter, thus testing Hypothesis 1. The results confirm that, all things being equal, the distance of the major parties from the median voter in regimes that directly elect presidents is smaller than the distance of similar parties in parliamentary regimes. Thus, the first hypothesis is fully confirmed.

The same real-world cases used for Model 1a are used to provide up-close evidence

Figure 3.4: Presidentialism's Effects on the Distance of the Major Parties from the Median Voter




Figure 3.5: Distance of Major Parties from the Median Voter in Sweden and Finland

Figure 3.6: Distance of Major Parties from the Median Voter in the Czech Republic and Poland




for Model 2a. Figure 3.5 compares the distances of the major parties from the median voter in Sweden and Finland. Figure 3.5 conforms to the general results seen in Model 2a. It shows that for most of the post-war history, the major parties in Finland have been ideologically closer to the median voter than have the major parties in Sweden. Figure 3.6 shows the differences in the distances of the major parties from the median voter in the Czech Republic and Poland. The graph again provides evidence for Model 2a, as the major parties in Poland are closer to the median voter than in the Czech Republic.

Once again, Model 2a is only the starting point for the rest of the analysis. Model 2b investigates the within-difference among presidentialism, between concurrent and non-concurrent elections. In concurrent elections, there is a greater effect on the distance of the major parties from the median voter compared to that of non-concurrent elections. This gives full confirmation to Hypothesis 2. However, only the estimates for concurrent elections are significant. While this is so, both the estimates for concurrent and non-concurrent elections are negative. This indicates that both types of

Figure 3.7: Distance of the Major Parties from the Median Voter in France




elections still move major parties closer to the median voter, providing more confirmation of Hypothesis 1.

The effect of concurrent elections making the major parties move closer to the median voter can clearly be seen when looking at the case of France. France in general makes for a unique observation, given the variations in their institutions used during the post-war era. From the end of World War II till 1958, France was a parliamentary regime, under the constitution of the Fourth Republic. Since 1958, it has been a semi-presidential regime under the constitution of the Fifth Republic.[15] In addition, from 1962-2002, legislative elections have been held non-concurrent alongside presidential elections. From 2002 onward, presidential elections have occurred within a month of legislative elections. This change in 2002 has created relative concurrence between the presidential and legislative elections.

Figure 3.7 shows the distance of the major parties from each other during this timeframe.[16] Looking at Figure 3.7, it is seen that the distance between the major

[15]Direct presidential elections have been held in France since 1962.

[16]The major left-wing party used until 1962 is the French Communist Party. Since then, the

parties has generally taken a downward path in the Fifth Republic. This again gives another example of the results in Model 2a being shown at a national level. The smallest distance between the parties is present in 2002, the first year of concurrent elections. This provides evidence that supports the results in Model 2b. In the figure, however, there is a small reversal of the downward trend in 1986. This can potentially be attributed to the change in electing members of the French National Assembly from a two-round majoritarian ballot to PR, causing more centrifugal parties. France returned to a majoritarian ballot for the next legislative election.

Model 2c looks at the presidential ballot type for each election. This allows for a testing of the third hypothesis. In line with Model 1c, the results show that among concurrent elections, the estimate for elections in a country with a runoff presidential ballot is smaller than the estimate for elections in a country with a plurality presidential ballot. Also as with Model 1c, among non-concurrent elections, the estimate for elections in a country with a plurality presidential ballot is smaller than the estimate for elections in a country with a runoff presidential ballot. These results in Model 2c only provide partial confirmation for the hypothesis, as the runoff elections do not exhibit a significant relationship with the dependent variable.

The results in Figure 3.4 provide strong evidence for Hypotheses 1 and 2, and partial evidence for Hypothesis 3. Despite results that show major parties being further away from the median voter in concurrent plurality elections than concurrent runoff elections, the analyses show that regimes with direct presidential elections have major parties that are closer to the median voter. Furthermore, within presidentialism, there is reason to believe that concurrent elections cause major parties to be closer to the median voter than in non-concurrent elections.

Socialist Party is used. On the right, various right-wing parties are used until 1956. Since then, each era's main Gaullist party is used (with the current one being the Union for a Popular Movement). However, elections in-between 1956 and 1973 are not included in this graph, since France had a Polity score of less than six during this period, and are therefore not part of the analysis.

## Conclusions

As stated earlier, previous scholarship has overlooked how presidentialism affects spatial party competition. Namely, major parties are given incentives to move toward the position of their presidential candidate (and equally toward the center of the party system) in a legislative election. This happens in every presidential regime, regardless of other incentives (such as the electoral system that is in place for the legislative election, or the number of parties competing in that election).

The analyses in this chapter tested the general tendencies of these expectations. This was achieved through indirect inference by comparing the locations of parties relative to that of the center of the party system in each election. The tests on how presidentialism affects party competition showed several things. First, presidentialism induces major parties in each country to move closer to each other (and to the location of the median voter), all things being equal. Second, presidentialism induces major parties in each country to move closer to each other (and to the location of the median voter) when elections are concurrent, as compared to non-concurrent elections. Finally, there is preliminary evidence that major parties move closer to each other (and the location of the median voter) in non-concurrent elections in presidential regimes that implement a plurality ballot in presidential elections over that of presidential regimes where the president is elected through a two-round runoff vote.

Despite these findings, there are a couple of limitations to the study that needs to be addressed. First, as stated earlier, the dataset used in the analyses did not include a variable for the positions of presidential candidates in countries that have presidential elections. Second, and more important, the selection of cases in the dataset did not include the whole coverage of presidential regimes in the world. This is due to the fact that the highest concentration of pure presidential regimes is located in Latin America. This left an incomplete perspective of the presidential universe,

and required me to combine pure presidential and semi-presidential regimes into one broad category of presidentialism.

In the situation of an ideal world, an appropriate analysis would appear as follows. To start, my dataset would have these key features. First, my new dataset would include the positions of not only parties in each legislative election, but the positions of presidential candidates in each presidential election. This would allow for a more effective analysis of the movement of parties toward their presidential candidates. This is opposed to using the value of the median voter to indirectly infer that parties are moving closer to their presidential candidates. Presently, the CMP only gives the positions of the parties at the time of each legislative election for each country. However, my theory holds that parties are close to their respective presidential candidates in presidential elections.

Second, the new dataset would have a more inclusive set of countries from which I could analyze the positions of parties. This is a result of the CMP having focused mainly on European countries, and not having any cases in Latin America outside of Mexico. Having these cases would simultaneously increase the number of cases of pure presidential regimes and concurrent elections. Latin America provides an excellent resource to those studying presidential regimes, since the majority of the world's pure presidential regimes are located in that region. In addition, there are several omitted countries in Asia that have presidential regimes. An increase in the number of cases around the world in later editions of the CMP and median voter datasets would give more opportunities to test the theories of presidentialism's impact on party competition.

After the appropriate dataset is in place, I could go forward with the ideal analysis. First, I would examine three different dependent variables. The first variable would compare the distances of major parties from their respective presidential candidates in legislative elections. The second variable would once again compare the distances of

major parties from each other. The final variable would again compare the distances of major parties from the median voter in each election.

Second, I would run models using the following independent variables. The first of these variables would compare the effects of these three dependent variables on pure presidentialism and semi-presidentialism. Pure presidentialism should have major parties that are closer to the presidential candidates, each other, and the median voter versus that of parties in semi-presidential regimes.

The second of these variables would show how the timing of elections affects these dependent variables as well. Concurrent legislative elections will have major parties that are closer to their respective presidential candidates, each other, and the median voter as compared to that of non-concurrent legislative elections.

The final independent variable would show how the presidential ballot would affect these dependent variables. Presidential regimes with plurality ballots would have major parties closer to their presidential candidates, each other, and the median voter, versus that of presidential regimes with runoff ballots.

These independent variables would also be interacted with each other in a coherent manner. However, given the limitations I discussed earlier on interacting the dummy variables in the analysis, I would instead have to make each combination of institutional classifications as a different dummy variable. All the while, making parliamentarism as a reference category.

Setting up my analysis as I have just described would allow me to accurately test my theoretical assumptions regarding the effects of presidentialism on party competition. However, being constrained with the data limitations that have been presented to me, I instead tested the theoretical assumptions in this chapter as close as I could.

Despite not being able to exactly replicate the theory, there are promising results from the analysis in this study. The first is that it can be concluded that presidentialism plays an important role in making major political parties more ideologically

moderate. Second, concurrent elections appear to make major parties move closer to each other, as compared to major parties in non-concurrent elections. And finally, there is reason to believe that countries with plurality presidential elections have major parties that are more ideologically moderate than major parties in countries that have runoff presidential elections.

The next couple of chapters move to the national level, by showing up-close the dynamics uncovered in this chapter at the cross-national level. The evidence in those chapters will provide even more evidence that presidentialism impacts party competition in ways that are not seen in parliamentary regimes.

# Appendix

Table 3.2: Countries by Type and Year in Dataset

| Country | Type | Years | Country | Type | Years |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Australia | PARL | 1946-2001 | Macedonia | PRES | 1994-1998 |
| Austria | PRES | 1949-2002 | Mexico | PRES | 1997-2000 |
| Belgium | PARL | 1946-1999 | Moldova | PRES | 1994 |
| Bulgaria | PARL | 1990-2001 | Netherlands | PARL | 1946-2003 |
| Canada | PARL | 1945-2000 | New Zealand | PARL | 1946-2002 |
| Cyprus | PRES | 1996-2001 | Northern Ireland | PARL | 1921-1969 |
| Czech Republic | PARL | 1990-2002 | Norway | PARL | 1945-2001 |
| Denmark | PARL | 1945-2001 | Poland | PRES | 1991-2001 |
| Estonia | PARL | 1992-2003 | Portugal | PRES | 1975-1999 |
| Finland | PRES | 1945-2003 | Romania | PRES | 1996-2000 |
| France | PARL | 1946-1956 | Russia | PRES | 2003 |
| France | PRES | 1973-2002 | Serbia | PRES | 2000 |
| Georgia | PRES | 2004 | Slovakia | PARL | 1990-1998 |
| Germany | PARL | 1949-2002 | Slovenia | PRES | 1996-2000 |
| Greece | PARL | 1974-2002 | South Korea | PRES | 1992-2008 |
| Hungary | PARL | 1990-2002 | Spain | PARL | 1977-2000 |
| Ireland | PRES | 1948-2002 | Sri Lanka | PARL | 1952-1977 |
| Israel | PARL | 1951-1996 | Sweden | PARL | 1944-2002 |
| Israel* | PRES | 1996-1999 | Switzerland | PARL | 1947-2003 |
| Italy | PARL | 1946-2001 | Turkey | PARL | 1950-1999 |
| Japan | PARL | 1960-2000 | Ukraine | PRES | 1994-2002 |
| Latvia | PARL | 1993-2002 | United Kingdom | PARL | 1945-2001 |
| Lithuania | PRES | 1992-2000 | United States | PRES | 1920-2008 |

*Israel conducted direct prime ministerial elections from 1996-2001.

## Dependent Variables

*Distance of the Major Parties from Each Other*

To calculate the dependent variable of the distance of the major parties from each other, I subtracted the CMP value of the right-wing major party in each election from the CMP value of the left-wing major party in the same election. Then, I calculated the absolute value of this difference, in order to allow for a meaningful comparison across elections. This is because most of the left-leaning parties in my dataset have an ideological position that is a negative number, given that the most left position a party can take, according to the CMP, is -100. This means most of the left-leaning parties have a raw value that is usually lower than the raw value of the respective right-leaning party.

For example, let us assume in one hypothetical election the left-wing major party has an ideological value of -10, the right-wing major party has an ideological position of 10. When the value of the right-wing major party is subtracted from the value of the left-wing major party, the difference is -20. Now us assume that in a second hypothetical election, the left-wing major party has an ideological value of -5, the right-wing major party has an ideological position of 5. When the value of the right-wing major party is subtracted from the value of the left-wing major party, the difference is -10. While the value of -20 from the first election is technically a smaller number than the value of -10 from the second election, it is obvious the distance between the major parties is smaller in the second election than the distance between the major parties in the first election. Therefore, the absolute values of the differences are taken from each election, giving us a distance value of 20 in the first election, and a distance value of 10 in the second election.

*Distance of the Major Parties from the Median Voter*

To calculate the dependent variable of the distance of the major parties from the median voter, I used a multi-step process. First, I took the two major parties in each election, and squared the difference between the major party's position and the position of the median voter for each of the parties. Second, I added these squared numbers together to get a sum of the squared distances. Finally, for simplicity purposes, I divided each of the summed squared distances by 100.

## Independent Variables

*Presidentialism*

The type of institution is coded as a dichotomous variable: 1 = presidential regimes, 0 = parliamentary regimes

*Concurrent Elections*

The type of election is coded as a dichotomous variable: 1 = concurrent elections in presidential regimes, 0 = all other elections

*Non-Concurrent Elections*

The type of election is coded as a dichotomous variable: 1 = non-concurrent elections in presidential regimes, 0 = all other elections

*Concurrent Elections with Plurality Ballot*

The type of election is coded as a dichotomous variable: 1 = concurrent elections in presidential regimes with a plurality ballot in the regime's presidential election, 0 = all other elections

*Concurrent Elections with Runoff Ballot*

The type of election is coded as a dichotomous variable: 1 = concurrent elections in presidential regimes with a runoff ballot in the regime's presidential election, 0 = all other elections

*Non-Concurrent Elections with Plurality Ballot*

The type of election is coded as a dichotomous variable: 1 = non-concurrent elections in presidential regimes with a plurality ballot in the regime's presidential election, 0 = all other elections

*Non-Concurrent Elections with Runoff Ballot*

The type of election is coded as a dichotomous variable: 1 = non-concurrent elections in presidential regimes with a runoff ballot in the regime's presidential election, 0 = all other elections

## Control Variables

*Majoritarian*

The type of institution is coded as a dichotomous variable: 1 = regime with a plural-

ity vote, two-round runoff system, or instant runoff voting for its legislative election, 0 = all other regimes

*Proportional*

The type of institution is coded as a dichotomous variable: 1 = regime with a party-list vote or single non-transferrable vote for its legislative election, 0 = all other regimes

# Chapter 4

# The Effects of the Direct Elections for Prime Minister on Party Campaigning and Perception in Israel

The goal of the next two chapters is to show at the national level how party competition has been affected by reforming procedures regarding the selection of the executive. By observing the effects of institutional reform within a country over time, we can witness a natural experiment that cannot be achieved through a basic cross-national study. The findings in these chapters will provide us with stronger evidence of presidentialism's impact on party competition at the legislative level.

The country that will be examined in this chapter is Israel. Israel makes for a prime case for investigation, since it has witnessed change related to the selection of its executive in the recent past. Israel was established in 1948, originally as a parliamentary republic. However, in 1992, a constitutional change was put in place, which stated that the Prime Minister would be elected separately from the legislature, by way of direct popular vote. In 2001, this reform was repealed, and Israel reverted back to its original system of parliamentary government.

The switch to direct elections for Prime Minister effectively turned Israel into a

quasi-presidential republic, in which the country's party system was presidentialized. As a result, campaigning by the major parties focused more on winning the election for Prime Minister and less on winning as many legislative seats as possible. In addition, given the dynamics of candidate competition in presidential elections, the candidates took a centrist approach in their campaign strategy (Samuels, 2002).

In this chapter, I will show this temporary institutional change led to two effects. The first effect is that voters perceived the two main parties during this period to be more centrist during the era of direct Prime Ministerial elections than during the period of pure parliamentary elections. The second is that the gap in voters' feelings between a given major party and that party's leader grew significantly smaller during the period of direct elections for Prime Minister. This is because the campaigns of the parties during this period deemphasized their party brands and policy positions in favor of promoting their candidates for Prime Minister. In essence, the candidates became the party during this time.

I will start by giving background on the Israeli electoral system, and the political dynamics that ultimately led to the constitutional reform in 1992. This will be followed with a look at the campaign strategies used by both of the major parties during the period of direct Prime Ministerial elections and after the repeal of the reform. Also, a look at select television advertisements by the parties from this period will be done, to show how these campaign strategies were at work when the parties were communicating directly to the voting public. This will be followed with the empirical testing of the changes in the perception of the ideological gap between the parties, along with the changes in the feeling gap between the parties and their leaders.

# Background

## Factors Leading to Reform

Since its first election in 1949, Israel has used PR to elect members of the Knesset, the unicameral legislature of Israel. Every election up until 1992 took place under the framework of a parliamentary regime. A nationwide closed party list was used to elect Members of the Knesset (MKs) to the 120-member legislature, since the country was not divided into electoral districts.

This institutional arrangement led to Israel becoming a multiparty system. This is because the larger the district magnitude, the more parties will be elected from a district (Taagepera and Shugart, 1993; Cox, 1997). This is compounded with a low electoral threshold that parties have to reach in order to attain representation in the Knesset.[1] Thus, no single party has ever held a majority of the seats in the Knesset. Instead, the formation of governments throughout the history of Israeli politics has centered around coalition building.

The highly proportional nature of the Israeli electoral system is a result of the political system that served the Yishuv (the pre-independence Jewish community in Palestine). State-building in what would later become Israel had challenges, given the diasporic nature of the Jewish population. Consequently, the political institutions in the Yishuv were pluralistic in nature and allowed for the representation of different segments within the Jewish population in Palestine. This would also have the effect of allowing the Zionist movement to appear to have a large amount of supporters (Sandler, 1997; Doron, 2000; Harris and Doron, 1999).

Also compounding the social cleavages in Israel was the 1950 Law of Return, which

[1]From the 1949-1988 elections, the threshold for parties was one percent. Starting in the 1992 election, the threshold was raised 1.5 percent. In 2006, the threshold was once again raised, this time to two percent.

allows any Jewish person in the world the right to immigrate to Israel.[2] These factors have fostered a multitude of minor parties that have been formed on ideological, ethnic, or religious lines.[3] As a result of the extremely proportional nature of the Israeli electoral system, combined with the strong societal divisions, the sustainment of governing coalitions in the Knesset has proven to be a challenge.

From the beginning of Israel until 1977, the party system was dominated by the left-wing party Mapai and its successor, the Labor Party.[4] While Mapai was nominally on the political left, they were more located toward the center (Mendilow, 1983). Even though they formed coalitions with smaller parties to its left and right, the relatively centrist location of Mapai made it hard for more ideologically extreme parties on the left and right to come together to topple Mapai governments.

After 1977, the party system was split between two primary poles consisting of Labor, and the relatively new right-wing party Likud. The shift from a dominant party system to a bipolar system exacerbated the problems that were evident in the hyper-proportional system with regard to coalition formation.

The post-1977 bipolar party system led to two scenarios in coalition formation. The first was that it allowed the smaller parties, primarily the ultra-Orthodox parties, to become the kingmaker in elections.[5] They used this kingmaker position to sponsor religious legislation and grow the budgets for their constituencies. As a result, the process of coalition formation was delayed, and the minor parties put demands on the major parties that were in most cases unworkable.

This second scenario was that Labor and Likud ended up in grand coalition governments with each other, sharing most of the ministerial posts. The problems of

[2]With exceptions for security and health reasons.

[3]Or combinations of the two, as with the case of Shas (whose support comes from the ultra-Orthodox Sephardic community) and United Torah Judaism (whose support comes from the ultra-Orthodox Ashkenazi community).

[4]From 1965 till 1988, Mapai and Labor were part of the Alignment, which was an electoral alliance with other left-wing parties in Israel.

[5]Occurred after the 1981 election.

coalition formation led to this scenario occurring twice.[6] This arrangement made lawmaking very difficult. These noted problems drove the main impetus for electoral reform in Israel (Rahat, 2008).

During the 1980's and early 1990's there was more demand for reform. The reformers recommended changing the way both Knesset members and the Prime Minister were elected. Under the proposal, elections for the Knesset would be through a mixed-member electoral system consisting of members from regional multi-member districts and members from a PR national party list. The other part of the proposal was having the Prime Minister elected by direct popular vote. Ultimately, only this latter portion of the proposal succeeded in passage.

There were several arguments for this second part of the proposal. First, having direct elections for Prime Minister would decrease the reliance of the Prime Minister on the Knesset. Before 1992, the person designated by the President to attempt to form a government needed to have the support and agreement of minor parties in order to become Prime Minister. Therefore, the smaller parties could swing the office of the Prime Minister to either Labor or Likud, based on which of the major parties would provide their party the greatest benefit. Furthermore, once in office, the minor parties could extract concessions (with the threat of bringing down the government) for their constituencies from the Prime Minister. It was thought that having the Prime Minister elected by popular vote instead of by the Knesset would bring an end to this type of politics.

In addition, it was also believed that this would strengthen the Prime Minister-elect's hand during the coalition formation process. Now, the Prime Minister-elect could appoint more cabinet members based on professional capabilities, and less of them based on political reasons (Doron, 2000). In addition, proponents of the direct election reform hoped that the change would give the Prime Minister a stronger

[6] Occurred after the 1984 and 1988 elections.

mandate to govern, guarantee that changes in the government would come from popular voting, and see the size and influence of minor parties reduced (Ottolenghi, 2001).

It was also argued that there would be a reduction in the number of parties in the Knesset due to direct Prime Ministerial elections. This was because it was hoped that the requirement of an absolute majority in a separate election for Prime Minister would reduce the number of candidates in that election to the two main parties, leading to straight-ticket voting for the Prime Minister and the Knesset. Finally, having direct elections for Prime Minister, while simultaneously preserving extreme proportionality in the Knesset elections, would mean there would be no trade-off between governability and representation (Hazan and Rahat, 2000).

While a reduction in the number of parties would lead to a centripetal effect on the party system as well, arguments made by proponents of separate elections did not include statements about the ideological location of parties in Israel. Instead, the arguments focused only on the problems of the fragmentation of the party system and government formation (Diskin and Diskin, 1995; Hazan, 1997; Bueno de Mesquita, 2000). However, we will see that the reform did have implications for the locations of the main parties.

## The Reform

The reform came to ahead when the Basic Law: The Government of 1968 was replaced with a new Basic Law: The Government in 1992.[7] Under the provisions of the 1992 Basic Law, the Prime Minister would now be elected by the voters (not the Knesset) in direct, national elections. Furthermore, the election of the Prime Minister would

[7]Israel has no single constitutional document. Instead, the development of constitutional law has taken a gradual, step-by-step approach. This has been in the form of a series of "Basic Laws," which have been passed by the Knesset over the course of decades. These laws detail different aspects of the institutional framework that comprises the Israeli political system (Arian, 2005).

take course in the form of a two-round runoff ballot. If a candidate received over 50 percent of the vote in the first round, then they would be elected Prime Minister. If no candidate received over 50 percent of the vote in the first round, then a runoff election would take place between the top-two vote getters two weeks later. Also, the terms of the Prime Minister and the Knesset would be concurrent in the form of four-year terms.

Once elected, the Prime Minister would have the right to appoint all members of the cabinet. However, half of the cabinet members, including the Prime Minister, would have to be MKs. Plus, the entire cabinet must have the confirmation of Knesset before taking office.[8] Members of the cabinet could also be removed from their office by a super-majority of 70 votes in the Knesset.

In addition, the Knesset could remove the Prime Minister from office with a simple majority of 61 votes.[9] The removal of the Prime Minister from office would also lead to the dissolution of the Knesset, which would trigger new elections for both the Knesset and Prime Minister. All the while, the Knesset would continue to be elected by a closed party list version of PR in a single, nationwide district with an electoral threshold of 1.5 percent for all parties (Hazan, 1996).

The direct elections for Prime Minister had the most obvious effect of increasing the fragmentation of the party system. This increased fragmentation was the opposite expectation of supporters of the reform, since it was expected the coattail effects from the Prime Ministerial election would increase the size of Labor and Likud in the Knesset.

Increased fragmentation occurred, however, because having separate elections for Prime Minister and the Knesset encouraged voters to split their ballots between

[8] In earlier versions of the 1992 Basic Law, the cabinet would not be subject to the approval of the Knesset.

[9] In earlier versions of the 1992 Basic Law, it would take a super-majority of 70 Knesset members to remove the Prime Minister from office.

different parties. In the 1999 election (the second election held under the rules of the 1992 Basic Law), the combined seat share of the two largest parties in the Knesset reached an all-time low of 45 seats. In addition, the effective number of parliamentary parties reached an all-time high as well in the 1999 election, with a factor of 8.69. This is above the previous high of six in the 1955 Knesset election (Kenig et al., 2005).

Table 4.1: Parties and Seats in Knesset Elections, 1981-2003

| Election | Labor | Likud | Others | Parties in Government |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1981 | 47 | 48 | 25 | 5 |
| 1984 | 44 | 41 | 35 | 6 |
| 1988 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 6 |
| 1992 | 44 | 32 | 44 | 3 |
| 1996 | 34 | 32 | 54 | 6 |
| 1999 | 26 | 19 | 75 | 7 |
| 2003 | 19 | 38 | 63 | 3 |

Furthermore, Table 4.1 shows the number of seats obtained by Labor and Likud from the 1981 to 2003 elections, along with the number of parties in each governing coalition. The table shows once again that during the 1996 and 1999 elections, Labor and Likud had their lowest seat shares combined. This is compounded with the fact that the 1999 election led to a record high of seven parties in government.

As can be expected, this fragmentation had the effect of making coalition formation even more difficult than during the pre-1992 system. The fragmentation made coalitions unstable as well. After winning the Prime Ministerial election in 1996, Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud-led coalition suffered several resignations of cabinet ministers, most notably the Deputy Prime Minister from the Gesher party. This, combined with the defeat of several no-confidence motions, helped contribute to the early dissolution of the Knesset in 1999 (Hazan and Diskin, 2000). After left-leaning Ehud Barak's 12-point victory over Netanyahu in the 1999 election, right-wing and ultra-Orthodox parties still made up a numerical majority in the Knesset. As a result,

Barak put together an unwieldy coalition of seven parties, flanked by the left-wing Meretz on the left, and the ultra-Orthodox Shas on the right.

Already existing tensions between the coalition partners were exacerbated by the failure of the Camp David Summit and the beginning of the Second Intifada in 2000. Ultimately, less than two years after taking office, Barak was forced to resign from office and call an early election for Prime Minister. After defeating Barak in a landslide, Ariel Sharon and his government passed the Basic Law: The Government of 2001. This repealed the 1992 Basic Law, and returned Israel to the pre-1992 system of parliamentary government (Ottolenghi, 2001).

Much has been discussed about how the direct election of the Prime Minister caused increased fragmentation of the Israeli party system. However, there has been no empirical analysis on how the direct elections impacted perceptions of the ideological placement of the parties. This chapter will show how the changes to the selection of the Prime Minister in Israel impacted how voters perceived the locations of the major parties in elections.

## The Direct Elections' Effects on Voters' Views of the Parties

Not only did the 1992 Basic Law affect the fragmentation of the party system, it also shaped how the voters perceived both of the major parties. Two key things will be shown. First, the change to direct Prime Ministerial elections caused voters to perceive both of the main parties to be more centrist than during the era of pure parliamentary elections. The second is that this change in perception was caused by perceptions about the parties' leaders.

This is because the 1992 institutional reform effectively created an electoral separation of origin between each party's candidate for Prime Minister and the rest of

their party. This is compounded with the importance the Prime Ministerial elections received over the legislative elections during this period. As a result, the ideology of the major parties became associated with the positions of their Prime Ministerial candidates, even when there was divergence between the legislative parties and the Prime Ministerial candidates.

This also brings us back to Chapter 2, where legislative party competition under presidentialism was modeled. Remember, in these models, the stronger the coattail effect from a party's presidential candidate to their respective legislative party, the more the utility of voting for a legislative party is based on that party's presidential candidate's position. This also means that the stronger the coattail effect in an election, the more the voters identify a party with that party's presidential candidate. This is the scenario that occurred in Israel during the 1996 and 1999 general elections. Voters judged Labor and Likud more based on their leaders than they did the parties' actual positions.

This means three things about the period of direct Prime Ministerial elections. First, voters perceived Labor and Likud to be ideologically closer to each other during the era of direct Prime Ministerial elections than during times of pure parliamentary elections. Second, because of the separation of origin during the period of direct Prime Ministerial elections, Labor and Likud's Prime Ministerial candidates would have some ideological divergence from their parties' positions. Finally, because of the coattail effects present in the 1996 and 1999 general elections, the voters' attitudes about the Labor and Likud leaders shaped the perceptions they had about the ideology of Labor and Likud in general.

Furthermore, these findings will support the findings from Chapter 3, which showed in cross-national perspective that major parties on the left and the right are ideologically closer to each other and the median voter in presidential regimes than in parliamentary regimes. In essence, the previous chapter proved that parties

do make ideological changes, based on the institutional environment. However, this chapter will prove that voters see these shifts that the parties are making.

To test these expectations, I utilize data from both the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) (Sapiro and Shively, 2001, 2006) and the Israel National Election Studies (INES) (Arian and Shamir, 1992, 1996, 1999b, 2003). Using the data, I will show that voters perceived Labor and Likud to be ideologically closer to each other during the period of direct Prime Ministerial elections than the period of pure parliamentary elections. Next, I will show that voters' feelings about the Labor Party and its leaders converged during the era of direct Prime Ministerial elections, but were more separate during the period of pure parliamentary elections. I do the same thing for Likud and its leaders as well.

More specifically, the results here will show that the change to direct elections for Prime Minister led to a convergence of voters' feelings between the parties and their leaders. Once the change was made back to the pre-1992 system of elections, a shift back to a divergence in feelings between the parties and leaders occurred.

Before I present the empirical findings, I will give overviews of Labor and Likud's campaign strategies during the 1996, 1999, and 2003 elections. This will be followed with descriptions of selected television advertisements aired by the two parties during the 1992, 1996, 1999, and 2003 elections.

The purpose of giving these overviews and discussing these ads during this period is to demonstrate that both Labor and Likud took major efforts to deemphasize the issues and bases of support that defined each of the parties. This was done in exchange for the goal of winning the office of Prime Minister. As a result, the candidates for Prime Minister became stand-ins for their respective parties in the minds of voters. Therefore, they were more likely to associate their feelings of the Prime Ministerial candidates with that of the candidates' respective parties than they would have before the 1992 Basic Law was implemented and after it was repealed.

More importantly, this, along with the non-ideological nature of these elections, led voters in those elections to perceive Labor and Likud as being ideologically closer to each other during the period of direct elections for Prime Minister than during the period of pure parliamentary elections.

# Election Campaigns

## The 1996 Campaign

To understand the campaigning styles of the major parties during the period of direct Prime Ministerial elections, one must remember one key aspect of the 1992 reforms. This was that the winning candidate in the Prime Ministerial election would automatically form the next government, regardless of whether or not their party won the most seats in the Knesset election. As a result, both Labor and Likud made the decision not to run separate campaigns for Prime Minister and the Knesset, but to combine the two campaigns, and give priority to the Prime Ministerial election (Lehman-Wilzig, 1998).

Both of the parties took actions they hoped would win over centrist voters in the campaign. On the Labor side, their platform called for a referendum on any permanent status agreement reached with the Palestinians. The idea behind this proposal was to allow the voters to vote for Labor leader Shimon Peres, while simultaneously limiting his authority during peace negotiations. Emphasizing the importance of the Prime Ministerial election, Avraham Burg, the writer of the 1992 platform and a former Labor MK, said that the 1996 platform did not represent the views of Labor Party members, but was written principally for the election for Prime Minister (Hazan, 1999).

In addition, during the televised debated between Peres and Likud leader Ben-

jamin Netanyahu, Peres declined to mention several key parts of Labor's platform, including the establishment of a Palestinian state, a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights, and an ultimate agreement with Palestinians on the status of Jerusalem (Inbar, 1998). Labor's shift to the center during the campaign drew the anger of the Arab parties to its left, who threatened not to vote for Peres on the Prime Ministerial vote (Rekhess, 1996).

Labor also sought to court the support of religious voters as well. One way they tried to achieve this was by diminishing the anti-religious campaign that its favored coalition partner to the left, Meretz, ran, so that religious voters would not run away from voting for Peres. Labor even sought votes from the ultra-Orthodox community as well. One way of achieving this was by taking several sections from their 1992 election platform,[10] that upset religious leaders, out of the 1996 platform. This prompted Meretz leader Yossi Sarid to say that Labor had surrendered to the religious parties' demands (The Jerusalem Post, 1996b). Peres (along with Netanyahu) also spoke at the Agudat Yisrael (the original party created for the ultra-Orthodox community) conference during the campaign (Keinon, 1996a). In addition, Labor added sections in their platform that would appeal to religious voters (Hazan, 1999). Also, then-Housing Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer suggested that a deputy ministership would be given to a member of Agudat Yisrael (Keinon, 1996b). Finally, in the last few weeks before the election, Peres wrote open letters to Orthodox newspapers asking their readers to their vote for him the Prime Ministerial election, while at the same time telling them to vote for an ultra-Orthodox party on their Knesset vote (Hazan, 1999).

Likud's campaign took place in the aftermath of the assassination of Labor Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 by a far-right Israeli citizen (Hazan, 1999). However,

[10]These sections included statements on the separation of religion and state and the easing of abortion laws.

when official campaigning for the general election began, the gap in support between the Labor and Likud candidates in opinion polls was exactly the same as it was pre-assassination. This was due in part to a wave of Hamas-led suicide bombings around that time which killed almost 60 people. This is also combined with the decision of Labor deciding to downplay the Rabin assassination throughout their campaign, since Peres wanted to win the election on his own merits (Arian and Shamir, 1999a).

Probably the most important step Likud took was to deemphasize the hawkish ideology that defined Likud for years, and replace it with messages of security. This was epitomized in the campaign slogan for Likud during the election, "Netanyahu - Peace Through Security," which was an attempt to challenge Labor's monopoly on the peace issue (Inbar, 1998). This included Netanyahu not ruling out the situation of a Likud-led government talking with then-Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat, which led to criticism from the right (The Jerusalem Post, 1996c).

In addition, during the 1996 campaign, both Labor and Likud took tremendous steps to obscure policy differences between them, in order to win votes in the center. For instance, Labor countered Likud's slogan with one saying "A Strong Israel with Peres," touting Peres' hawkish credentials (Kollek and Kollek, 1996). Furthermore, when Netanyahu gave his seven policy guidelines, Labor accused Likud of stealing three of the guidelines from them, and stated that the others were devoid of content (Hazan, 1999). Labor also accused Netanyahu and Likud of implementing a "weather vane policy" during the campaign in an attempt to deceive voters (Yudelman, 1996b), and accused them of duping voters by adopting Labor's policies (Yudelman, 1996a). Furthermore, Yehuda Harel, leader of the centrist Third Way party, said that the unclear nature of the positions of Labor and Likud were taking votes away from his own party (The Jerusalem Post, 1996a).

Also, both Labor and Likud took steps to remove their staunchest supporters from public view. For example, Netanyahu did not use Israeli settlers in the Palestinian

territories, Likud's most steadfast activists, in the final weeks of the campaign. On the other side, Labor did not use the services of Histadrut, the national trade union in Israel, which had historically been linked to Labor and its predecessor, Mapai.

Finally, in a joint decision a week before the election, both of the major parties cancelled their mass rallies traditionally held on the eve of the election. It was explained by Likud campaign leader Michael Eitan that the reason for cancelling the rallies was because only loyal voters attended the rallies, and that the election was going to be decided by undecided voters (Hazan, 1999). Critics in Likud said the advertisement campaign ignored its traditional supporters. A former Likud spokesman even resigned from campaign headquarters because he felt the campaign "did not reflect the traditional Likud positions" (Inbar, 1998).

## The 1999 Campaign

In the 1997 primaries for the Labor Party, party members decided to elect Ehud Barak, a political outsider who was most notably the former Chief of Staff (supreme commander) of the Israel Defense Forces, as party leader. Understanding the implications of the new electoral system, and the hesitation of voters on the right to vote for Labor, Barak decided to create a new brand for the party in the election. As a result, the Labor Party brand effectively disappeared from sight during the whole election, and in its place was the electoral banner of One Israel (Doron, 2002). One Israel was essentially a political grouping of Labor, Meimad (to its left), and Gesher (to its right). It was hoped the military record of Barak, combined with the replacement of the Labor brand with One Israel, would lead the party to victory in the election. Some in the media called the re-branding a "triumph of avoidance," in turning Labor into an invisible party (Steinberg, 1999).

The usage of the One Israel name also allowed Barak to have the space needed to conduct a campaign independent from Labor. He and his advisers solely set his

campaign's policies, and these policies automatically also became those of One Israel (Medding, 2000). Effectively, the platforms for Barak and One Israel were the same, helping to make the connection between party and leader as strong as it could ever be in the eyes of the voter. Candidates who were on the party list for One Israel were not mentioned in campaign advertisements, and even Peres was left out of the party's campaign. This was capped off even by Barak only mentioning the name of the party once in his victory speech, and instead using the word "I" every other time (Lochery, 1999).

The official platform for One Israel in the campaign was non-ideological in almost every aspect. The platform was essentially devoid of specific policy proposals by a One Israel-led government.[11] On the issue of security, they proclaimed they would "Endow the citizens of Israel with maximal security based on a strong army and true peace with our neighbors. We will keep Jerusalem united forever. We will never agree to return to the 1967 borders." However, this statement could have been made by numerous parties (including Likud) during the campaign (Goldberg, 2001).

In an attempt to distance itself from its leftist stance on economic issues, One Israel talked about these issues in terms of the interests of the individual citizen, not the interests of a certain social class. Daniel Bloch (1999) of *The Jerusalem Post* even commented that Barak's economic platform, as well as the entourage of business people around him, were similar to Netanyahu's. Observers also noted that Barak was trying to emulate the successes of other leaders on the left, such as Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, and Gerhard Schröder, by embracing free-market principles. Barak even hired Clinton adviser James Carville to run One Israel's economic campaign (Amotz, 1999). Barak also played up his past career in the military in television advertising. This also included a television advertisement showing him during his younger years in

[11] The only exception to this was a proposal to end the exemption of ultra-Orthodox citizens from conscription into the military. However, other issues related to religion and state were left out of the platform.

the IDF, standing over the dead body of an Arab terrorist that he killed (Goldberg, 2001).

The fact that the party aired an advertisement like this is a testament to how the presence of a two-candidate Prime Ministerial election changed the way campaigns were conducted. In the period before the 1992 reforms, airing such an ad would be unthinkable, given the historical reliance of the Labor Party on the Arab vote. However, with the reforms in place, One Israel had decided to place its efforts into winning the Prime Minister's race in exchange for maximizing their Knesset seat share. This meant that in order to win over 50 percent of the vote share, they would need to expand beyond their traditional base of support and attract voters on the right. At the same time, Arabs' only other option would have been to vote for Netanyahu, which was a non-starter.[12] With this in mind, and no alternative to vote for on the left, Arabs had no choice but to vote for Barak on the ballot for Prime Minister.[13]

As in 1996, the focus of Likud's campaign was to get Netanyahu re-elected as Prime Minister. However, they had to do so on a tighter budget, due to Likud's parliamentary group losing 13 MKs during the 14th Knesset.[14] As a result, very little of Likud's campaign funds went to the Knesset election or party activists. Not giving money to the latter, however, was not a big concern for campaign headquarters since they preferred to keep the party's activists out of public view for the Prime Ministerial election. Also, not funding activists adequately meant that there was less potential for

[12]In 1996, about 87 percent of Israeli Arabs had a negative view of Netanyahu and 84 percent of them had a negative view of Likud. This is compared with about 76 percent of Israeli Arabs having a positive view of Labor that same year (Arian and Shamir, 1996).

[13]Azmi Bishara ran as a candidate for Prime Minister in 1999 for Balad, a left-wing party with support predominately from Israeli Arab community. However, he dropped out of the election two days before election day.

[14]Likud suffered seven defections from within its own party to two newly created political parties (Herut-The National Union and the Centre Party), and the other six MKs were Gesher and Tzomet members who left the parliamentary group when the Likud-Gesher-Tzomet group formally split apart during the Knesset term.

squabbles with ideologically-neighboring parties, whose supporters Netanyahu would need if he wanted to win re-election (Mendilow, 2002).

Likud's problems during the campaign can be seen as a result of the presence of a direct election for Prime Minister. As the first Prime Minister to be not elected by the Knesset, Netanyahu had difficulties related to keeping his coalition and even his own party together. These governing problems were likely to occur, given the new institutional arrangement. Since Netanyahu did not earn the office of Prime Minister due to his party's standing in the Knesset (but instead due to the voters), he did not need to be accountable to his own party (Samuels and Shugart, 2010). However, with the Prime Ministerial election getting almost all of the media attention, Netanyahu's leadership issues became a focus of the campaign. This only enhanced the image of Likud not being fully in sync with its traditional base of supporters, since Netanyahu (like Barak was with One Israel) was the sole face of Likud's campaign.

## The 2003 Campaign

The 2003 election was the first election after the repeal of the 1992 Basic Law, meaning there was a return to the pre-1992 electoral system. The leader for Labor was now Amram Mitzna and the Likud leader was then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. The shift back to pure parliamentary elections had a clear impact on how the parties decided to campaign. In the 1996 and 1999 elections, the parties avoided competing with parties that were ideologically adjacent to each other, in order to win those parties' supporters' votes for the Prime Ministerial ballot. However, now that control of the Prime Minister's office once again depended on the number of seats a party attained, Labor and Likud now had to make appeals to neighboring parties.

Labor attempted to do this by declaring they would not join a "National Unity Government" with Likud and a relatively new centrist party called Shinui. This was a tactic of appearing less moderate, in order to win voters who might be tempted to

vote for Meretz. At the same time, this was also an attempt at making an argument to voters in the middle that Shinui was simply a satellite of Likud. In fact, Labor attacked Shinui by saying that a vote for Shinui was a vote for Sharon and Likud, and that a Likud-Shinui government would lead to a right-wing government instead of a centrist secular government (Goldberg, 2005).

Obviously in the 1996 and 1999 elections, there were not going to be any national unity governments with Labor/One Israel and Likud (which the 1992 reforms tried to prevent from occurring). However, making a clear statement that Labor would not join Likud in a coalition government sent a clear signal that they would not work across the other side. This is a different tone than would have been used during elections that featured a separate ballot for Prime Minister.

In addition, right before the campaign began, Labor approved a platform which called for Israel to only keep control of Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem, relinquishing the Temple Mount (the holiest site in Judaism), and a unilateral withdrawal of the IDF from the then-occupied Gaza Strip (Hoffman, 2002). This was in contrast to the more hawkish stances taken by Labor/One Israel in the two prior campaigns.

On the right, Likud notably refrained from attacking ultra-Orthodox parties during the 1996 and 1999 campaigns, so that they could win their supporters in the vote for Prime Minister. However, during the 2003 election, Likud decided to challenge these parties. A prime example of this was Likud's assertion that a vote for Shas would hurt Sharon's chances of remaining Prime Minister (Bick, 2005). In other words, they were declaring that a vote for Likud was vote for Sharon, effectively trying to remind people that the rules of the game had changed back to they way they were before the 1996 election.

# Television Advertising During the Campaigns

## 1992 Election

We can also look at the advertising campaigns from before, during, and after the 1992 reforms to see how the presence (or absence) of direct elections for Prime Minister influenced the messages the parties wanted to send to the voters. Looking first at the 1992 election, in a positive advertisement by Labor, a song is played about how Israel needs Rabin in office. Even though Labor emphasized Rabin in the advertisement, the usage of Rabin can be characterized as a supplement to Labor. This is best exemplified at the end of the advertisement where the Labor Party logo is prominently shown on the screen, but with "Under Rabin" added underneath of the logo. Plus, Rabin himself is only seen on screen for barely a second in the advertisement (Israeli Labor Party, 1992b).

Another advertisement in 1992 by Labor attacked Likud's handling of terrorism. In the advertisement, most of the criticism is leveled toward the party itself, and not toward Likud leader Yitzhak Shamir (except for a short clip played of Shamir speaking) (Israeli Labor Party, 1992a). Finally, in a positive advertisement made by Likud, a song was played which said that Likud was the correct choice, and that the party resonates in the hearts and minds of Israeli citizens. Throughout the advertisement, constant references are made to Likud, and not a single reference is made to Shamir in it (Likud, 1992).

## 1996 Election

As described earlier, in the 1996 election, both of the parties gave a tremendous focus on the candidates and not the parties during the campaign. This holds true for the television advertisements as well. In a positive ad made by Likud, the focus on the

ad was wholly on Netanyahu. This is exemplified by then-MK Benny Begin (son of former Prime Minister Menachem Begin) being shown in the advertisement at a rally, repeatedly telling the audience to "vote Machal and Netanyahu." Machal, being the symbol used for Likud on the ballot in Knesset elections. Using the Machal symbol was a way for the party to distance itself from the Likud name in the advertisement. In fact, the word "Likud" is not spoken or visible anywhere in the advertisement (Likud, 1996).

## 1999 Election

In 1999, there was also a focus on the candidates in advertising as well, at the expense of the parties. In a One Israel advertisement during the campaign, the alleged failings of the previous government are mentioned, namely the recession, unemployment, and the potential violation of the 1994 peace treaty with Jordan. However, these failings are not described in terms of being Likud's failings, but as Netanyahu's failings. The end of the advertisement tells the viewer to "imagine another four years with Netanyahu," but not another four years with Likud (One Israel, 1999).

Likud's advertisements also had a candidate-centric focus in 1999. In an attack ad targeted toward One Israel, a clip of Barak played where he said that if he were Palestinian, he would have joined a terrorist organization as well. The advertisement concludes with saying "If Barak wins, Israel will lose." Again, just as with the advertisement above by One Israel, the ad does not say "if One Israel wins," but instead mentions only Barak (Likud, 1999b).

In another Likud attack advertisement, they say that one person has been waiting for the election for three years, and it is very important to that person that Barak is elected. The advertisement then ends by saying if Barak (not One Israel) wins, he will get everything he wants, and that the person is Yasser Arafat (Likud, 1999a).

In yet another attack advertisement by Likud, Barak and Peres are accused of

doing nothing to stop terrorism. The ad then describes Netanyahu's achievements in maintaining security in the country, and says that he is the only one who can bring security and peace to Israel. Again, the advertisement makes use of the party leader, but not the party itself. This is best embodied by the claim that Netanyahu, not Likud, can bring peace and security. Another thing that should be noticed about the advertisement too is that when talking about the last Labor government, they mention Peres, and not Labor Likud (1999c).

These advertisements mark a stronger entrenchment of the direct elections for Prime Minister than the election prior. For example, while Likud only referred to the party brand by the Machal symbol in 1996, we see that by the second election held under the rules of the 1992 reform, the parties completely disappeared from campaign advertising in the 1999 elections.

## 2003 Election

The 2003 election was the first election that returned to the rules of the pre-1992 system. In Labor's ad campaign, while there was a focus on leader Amram Mitzna (including a song in all of the ads called "We Believe in you Mitzna"), one can see a shift back to the direction of incorporating the party back into advertising. In one advertisement, Mitzna talks about his days in the military, and says "you don't drink from your canteen until the last soldier has drank from it," and "you don't eat before you make sure all of the other soldiers eat too" (Israeli Labor Party, 2003b). Messages like these, which allude to income redistribution, would appeal to the traditional voting base of Labor and less so to centrists. Another Labor advertisement has Mitzna alluding to traditional Labor policy as well, by saying he will change the budget for the purposes of helping Israeli society (Israeli Labor Party, 2003a).

Another ad shows Mitzna at a press conference with other senior Labor Party figures, including Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, Matan Vilnai, Dalia Itzik, and Haim Ramon

stating how they will not join Likud in a national unity government. All the while, the conference is occurring in a room that has Labor Party logos displayed prominently in the background. Also, the senior figures make repeated references to Labor in the advertisement. Vilnai says that Labor (not Mitzna) is the real alternative, and Ramon says that if you want change, vote Labor (Israeli Labor Party, 2003c).

One final Labor advertisement shows Mitzna in a meeting with senior party members that is reminiscent of a cabinet meeting. Notably, among the people present at the meeting is Peres, who, as described earlier, was intentionally left out of One Israel's 1999 campaign. The usage of other party leaders in Labor's ads shows the shift away from the leader being the sole focus of the campaign, making it less likely that voters will conflate the leader and the party in their minds. Finally, there is a large portrait of Yitzhak Rabin in the background of the room, which would also arouse enthusiasm among traditional Labor supporters (Israeli Labor Party, 2003d).

The pattern in advertisements during the period of Prime Ministerial elections and during the period of pure parliamentary elections shows how the party is treated in the different scenarios. During the 1996 and 1999 elections, there is obviously a higher focus on the candidates for Prime Minister, and the parties were virtually hidden away (party logos did not even appear in advertisements). However, in the 1992 and 2003 elections, even though the leaders were present in some of the advertisements, their role in the ads did not supplant that of the party. Plus, attacks by the parties were couched in terms as failings of the other party's leader, and not the party itself. However, attacks by the parties in 1992 and 2003 were couched in terms of the other party's failings. These strategies ultimately made voters more likely to associate their feelings about the parties with that of their feelings of the parties' respective leaders during the period of direct Prime Ministerial elections.

Figure 4.1: Voters' Perception of the Ideological Distance Between Labor and Likud




# Empirical Evidence

The tactics in campaigning by Labor and Likud during the 1996 and 1999 elections will manifest itself in public opinion when we look at a couple of key empirical tests. The first test is where voters ideologically place the two parties in relation to each other. The second test is the degree of closeness regarding each of the parties in relation to their respective leaders during the period of direct Prime Ministerial elections versus the period of pure parliamentary elections.

## Shift in Ideological Distance Between the Parties

Using CSES data, I compared voters' perceived ideological distance of Labor from Likud in 1996 and 2003.[15] I created the measurement of ideological distance by simply taking the absolute value of the difference in the ideological placements of Labor and Likud in each election for each voter. Ideology in the CSES is measured

[15]I only used the 1996 and 2003 elections, since data from the CSES is not available for the 1992 and 1999 elections.

on an 11-point scale from 0-10, with 0 being the most right position and 10 being the most left position. We would expect that in 1996 (the first election to feature direct elections for Prime Minister), the gap between the parties would be closer to each other than in 2003 (the first election after the repeal of the 1992 Basic Law) because of the effects of the Prime Ministerial election. Looking at Figure 4.1, we see that these results hold up when we look at the average differences in the placement of Labor from Likud in the two elections.[16] This is in line with our expectations from looking at the campaign styles of the parties during the period of direct elections.

## Change in Feeling Thermometer Gap Between Party and Leader

However, this evidence alone does not provide full evidence of presidentialism's effect on public opinion toward the parties' positions. We also need to know that the voters' perception of the relationship between the parties and their leaders was altered as a result of the reforms. The way this can be achieved is through comparing the differences between each party and their leader on a feeling thermometer that is asked about several parties and political leaders in the INES.[17] This method has already been used by Arian and Shamir (2002). They show that there is a significant difference in feelings with regards to each major party and their respective candidate for Prime Minister in the 1992 and 1996 elections, but not a significant difference in those feelings for the 1999 election.

However, there is a problem with how Arian and Shamir measure feeling thermometer distances from the party and its leader. They first find the mean placement across all voters on the feeling thermometer for each party and leader, and then com-

[16]The ideological distances between the parties for each election were compared by ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors. The regression model off of which this test is based is located in Appendix A.

[17]The INES' feeling thermometer asks respondents on a scale of 10 their level of attraction or rejection of a certain party or political leader, with 1 being a "strong rejection" and 10 being "strong support."

Figure 4.2: Voters' Feeling Gap Between the Party and Its Leader




pare the difference in those two means. Arian and Shamir explain their finding in the 1996 election by arguing that there would be a significant difference still in people's feelings about each party and their candidates that year, since it was the first time there were direct elections for Prime Minister. As a result, the distinctions between the parties and their Prime Ministerial candidates would need another electoral cycle to be fully blurred.

Nonetheless, given the immediate change in campaigning styles by both parties that I demonstrated did occur in the 1996 election, we should still expect to see a significant closing in the feeling gap between parties and their leaders. If we analyze the gap between feelings toward Labor (or Likud) and their Prime Ministerial candidate for each voter, we will see that the gap between each party and their candidate was significantly smaller during the 1996 and 1999 elections, as compared to the gap in the 1992 and 2003 elections. In addition, Arian and Shamir's test was done before the 2003 Knesset election, which was the first election after the switch back to the pre-1992 system.

I, instead, modify Arian and Shamir's method of assessing change in the feeling

Figure 4.3: Voters' Feeling Toward the Parties




thermometer gap by taking the absolute value difference between the rating for each party and their leader in each election for each voter.[18] When we change the analysis to look at the mean of every voter's feeling thermometer gap between party and leader, we now see that for both the 1996 and 1999 elections, there is a significant decline in the gap between feelings of each party and their leader.[19] As opposed to Arian and Shamir's analysis, the narrowing of the gap occurs immediately after the 1992 reform in the 1996 election. The shrinkage in the gap is more pronounced for the 1999 election, and the gap increases during the 2003 election.

This parallel shift in the feeling gap for both parties is more impressive when looking at the feeling patterns for both parties and their leaders over the same period of time. In Figures 4.3 and 4.4, we look at the average feeling thermometer rating for each party and leader over the same time period. Labor (and their leaders) and Likud

[18]For example, in 1996, I find the absolute value of the difference between a voter's feeling thermometer rating for the Labor Party and Peres, and also find the absolute value of the difference between their rating of Likud and Netanyahu.

[19]The gaps for each election were compared by ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors. Results are shown in Appendix A.

Figure 4.4: Voters' Feeling Toward the Party Leaders




(and their leaders) follow their own unique paths in average feelings among the public. However, when comparing the changes in gaps between parties and their leader, the changes are parallel to each other. This indicates that there were systematic changes occurring during the 1996 and 1999 Knesset elections which caused the gap between each party and their leader to shrink. That systemic factor is the direct election for Prime Minister.

As I indicated in the backgrounds on the 1996 and 1999 elections, Both Labor and Likud took extreme steps in submerging their parties' brands (and even most loyal supporters) in order to win the office of Prime Minister. The outcome of those efforts was an alteration in people's minds about the distance of a leader from their party. In the 1996 and 1999 elections, the campaigns projected an image of the leaders and the party being indistinguishable. As a result, the voters reacted by being more likely to have their feelings about each party and their leader being identical to each other. This meant that the voters were more likely to see the party and its positions through the lens of the leader than through that of the party in general.

## Conclusions

The implementation of the Basic Law: The Government in 1992 called for the direct election of the Prime Minister of Israel. This was put in place in the hopes of creating changes in the party system that would benefit the two largest parties in the country. However, there were effects that were not foreseen by the reformers. Along with the oft-discussed effect the reform had on the fragmentation of the party system, the direct elections caused the parties' identities to be submerged during campaigning in the hopes of winning the Prime Minister's office. As a result, voters associated the leaders as being synonymous with the parties in these campaigns. Given that the candidates for Prime Minister were downplaying ideological differences between each other during campaigning, voters also perceived Labor and Likud to be ideologically similar to each other in these elections.

Using survey data, I indicated two key findings. The first is that voters perceived Labor and Likud to be closer to each other during the period of direct Prime Ministerial elections than during the period of pure parliamentary elections. The second is voters' attitudes toward each of the two parties and their respective leaders became more similar during the period of direct Prime Ministerial elections. This indicates that ideological perceptions of the parties during the reform period were more driven by the election for Prime Minister than the Knesset election.

The next chapter will turn to the case of France. While this chapter focused on the effect of changes from direct versus indirect executive elections and back within the same country, the next chapter looks at how changes to the electoral calendar has affected party competition in legislative elections. The findings in the next chapter will be in line with those in this chapter.

# Chapter 5

# The Effects of the Change to Concurrent Presidential and Legislative Elections on Party Campaigning and Perception in France

The 2002 Presidential and National Assembly elections were the first in a now-permanent feature of French politics that came as a result of constitutional changes to the French electoral calendar. The changes ensured that the Presidential election would always occur a month before the legislative election every five years. This was done to reduce the likelihood of the President and the Prime Minister coming from opposing parties. So far, these expectations have borne out, as the 2002, 2007, and 2012 elections have all led to Presidents and Prime Ministers coming from the same party each time.

Along with ensuring that success for a party in the Presidential election will translate to success in the legislative election, the institutional reforms had another impact as well. That is, competition between the parties in the legislative election has now become a function of the preceding Presidential election. This chapter examines the effects these constitutional changes had on party competition between the two

main parties in France. Samuels and Shugart (2010) showed how the change in the timing of the elections in France caused the presence of stronger coattail effects onto the legislative campaign in 2002, creating the effect of presidentialized parties in the legislative election that year. This chapter expands on this analysis to show how competition between the parties was affected, along with how voters were affected by the change.

Using evidence from both political leaders and survey data, I will show that before the institutional reforms, debates in legislative elections had three characteristics: they focused more on substantive policy issues, they framed cohabitation as a shift in which party controlled the power to set the policy agenda, and featured fewer incursions into the legislative election by the President. However, after the changes, debates in legislative elections were largely devoid of policy issues, framed cohabitation as a weakening of the incumbent President's power to set the policy agenda, and featured more incursions by the President into the legislative campaign. This, as a result, caused voters to identify the parties more in terms of those parties' Presidential candidates. Simultaneously, this caused the parties to be perceived as more centrist. This is because, as explained in previous chapters, presidential candidates are forced to take relatively centrist positions. The elections that will be examined in this chapter are the 1997 legislative election (the last election before the changes), and the 2002 legislative election (the first election after the changes).

First, background on the factors leading to the institutional reforms will be discussed. This will be followed with accounts of the 1997 and 2002 legislative elections. These accounts will include numerous examples of how politicians from the main parties campaigned differently in each of these elections. The accounts will show that debate in the 1997 legislative election was more substantive in policy, while debate in the 2002 legislative election centered on whether or not the President should be given a legislative majority. In essence, the 2002 legislative campaign was placed in the

context of the preceding Presidential election a few weeks earlier. Next, the impact of the institutional changes on French voters will be assessed, through using French election survey data. The results from the survey data will show that in the 2002 election, voters who voted for either the Gaullist or Socialist Presidential candidate were more likely to feel the closest ideologically to that candidate's party than similar voters were in 1997. In addition, centrist voters in 2002 were more likely to feel ideologically closest to either the Gaullist or Socialist parties than similar voters in 1997. These results will then be followed up with concluding remarks for the chapter.

# Background

Within the framework of semi-presidential regimes, political scientists classify France as a premier-presidential regime, as opposed to a president-parliamentary regime (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Samuels and Shugart, 2010). This means that the French President possesses fewer constitutional powers than presidents under a president-parliamentary regime. Despite these constitutional limitations of the French President, they have been able to wield considerable *de facto* political powers. Primarily, this has been through two of their most important formal powers: the power to appoint the Prime Minister, and the power to dissolve the National Assembly.[1]

This has meant that during the first years of the Fifth Republic, the President has had their way with policy through these informal powers. However, this has been conditional on the President and Prime Minister coming from the same party. This was not the case when President François Mitterrand's Socialist Party (five years into his seven-year term) lost their majority in the National Assembly in the 1986 legislative election. As a result, Mitterrand was forced to appoint Rally For the Republic (RPR) leader Jacques Chirac as Prime Minister. This is because the

[1]While the President can dissolve the National Assembly, they can only do it past 12 months after the last dissolution.

Prime Minister must have the confidence of the majority of the National Assembly. Consequently, France entered its first period of "cohabitation," in which the President and Prime Minister come from opposing parties. During this period of cohabitation, the Prime Minister became a more powerful political figure, with the ability to shape domestic policy through their legislative majority. The President's powers, on the other hand, were relegated to foreign policy and defense, through their capacities as head of state and Commander-in-Chief of the military (Lewis-Beck, 1997).

The first cohabitation between Mitterrand and Chirac ended when the Socialists regained a majority in the National Assembly after the 1988 legislative election. However, a second cohabitation occurred when President Mitterrand was forced to appoint former RPR Finance Minister Édouard Balladur[2] in the wake of the RPR-UDF landslide[3] in the 1993 legislative election. This second cohabitation ended when Chirac was elected President in 1995. The third cohabitation occurred after the RPR and UDF lost their majority to the Socialist-led Plural Left alliance[4] in the 1997 legislative election. This was also the first time a cohabitation involved a President from the political right (Chirac) and a Prime Minister from the Socialists (Socialist leader Lionel Jospin) (Leuffen, 2009).

This third cohabitation would also be the last to date. This is because in 2000, a constitutional referendum passed which reduced the President's term from seven years to five years. This is in tandem with the Socialist government passing legislation in 2001 that changed the order of the Presidential election and the legislative election, so that the legislative election would occur within the matter of weeks after the Presidential election. Framers of the Fifth Republic originally intended the legislative

[2]This was at the suggestion of Chirac, who, while still RPR leader in 1993, did not want to be Prime Minister again.

[3]After the 1993 legislative election, the RPR and market-liberal Union for French Democracy (UDF) came together to form a coalition government.

[4]The Plural Left was an electoral alliance between the Socialists, the French Communist Party, the Greens, the social-liberal Radical-Socialist Party, and the left-wing Citizens' Movement.

election to precede the Presidential election in years where the Presidential election fell during the same year as the legislative election.

The combination of these two institutional reforms meant that the legislative election would immediately follow after the Presidential election every five years, since the term of the National Assembly is five years (Laver et al., 2006).[5] The Socialists hoped that by making the Presidential election immediately precede the legislative election, Jospin, who was very popular with French voters, would win the next Presidential election, and then translate his popularity into a Socialist majority in the legislative election immediately thereafter (Lewis-Beck et al., 2012).

# 1997 Legislative Election

## Background

The 1997 legislative election was the first national election held since the election of Chirac as President in 1995. After Chirac's victory, France was plagued by numerous industrial strikes. During this time, Chirac and his Prime Minister, Alain Juppé, suffered a decline in their poll numbers. However, by 1997, there was a calm in the strikes, and the poll numbers of both Chirac and Juppé began to rebound. Still, the next legislative election was originally scheduled for 1998, and by then, the French government would have to put in place austerity measures required for joining the European single currency (later created as the Euro). These austerity measures were expected to be unpopular, and combined with his and Juppé's rising poll numbers, Chirac decided to dissolve the National Assembly, and call for legislative elections in May and June of 1997.[6] Chirac's strategy was also in part to catch the Socialists

[5]The first Presidential election that was technically subject to the two changes was the 2007 Presidential election, since Chirac's seven-year term ended in 2002.

[6]France's elections for the National Assembly take place over two rounds.

off-guard, making them unprepared for a snap legislative election.

The main issues in the 1997 legislative campaign were the soon-to-be-enacted European single currency (known as the Euro) and unemployment. The main campaign focus of the RPR-led majority was the European Union, and the dangers of a Socialist-led majority in the Assembly. Leaders in the RPR and the UDF accused the Socialists on wanting to renege on commitments to the European Union, such as the Maastricht Treaty and the Euro. Much of their campaign involved talking about the consequences of a Socialist-led majority in the Assembly, and the Socialists' electoral pact with the Communists.

At the same time, the RPR-led majority presented a series of policy proposals. These included tax reductions, budgetary controls, and decentralization (along with their unconditional support for the Euro. On the Socialist side, their proposals included creating 700,000 new jobs for young French people: half of which in the private sector and the other half in the public sector. The Socialists also proposed to reduce the maximum work hours per week from 39 to 35.

In the first round of the legislative election, the Socialists and their leftist allies earned 45 percent of the popular vote (with the Socialists earning 26 percent of the vote).[7] Meanwhile, the RPR-led majority ended up with 36 percent of the vote (with the RPR attaining 15 percent of the vote).[8] After the disappointing results for the right, Juppé resigned as Prime Minister at the personal request of President Chirac. This was followed with Chirac making one of his few incursions into the legislative campaign, by addressing the French public the day after the first round of election. In his address, he promised a "renewed social model," and warned voters against abstaining or putting the Socialists' ideas "back in the saddle" (Le Figaro, 1997a).

[7]Vote totals for the left also include dissident Socialist politicians who were not attached to any major party.

[8]Vote totals for the right also include the joint ticket of the soft Eurosceptic Movement for France (MPF) and liberal-conservative National Centre of Independents and Peasants (CNI), along with dissident rightist politicians who were not attached to any major party.

The RPR-led majority also tried to shake up the campaign before the second round by making former Social Affairs and Employment Minister Philippe Séguin of the RPR and former Finance Minister Alain Madelin of the UDF more prominent in the campaign. The media and public thought of Séguin and Madelin each as a potential candidate for the position of Prime Minister if the right retained their majority in the second round (France Télévisions, 1997a).

The second round mirrored that of the results of the first round, in that the Socialist-led left finished first with 47 percent of the vote (the Socialists won 38 percent of the vote), while the RPR-led majority earned 46 percent of the vote (The RPR won 22 percent of the vote). This translated into 320 seats for the Socialists and their allies,[9] and 253 seats for the RPR-led majority[10] under the two-round majoritarian system used for French legislative elections. After the election, Chirac asked Jospin to form the next government, which Jospin subsequently did, by putting together a cabinet that included members of the Socialists, Communists, Radical-Socialists, Greens, and Citizens' Movement.

## Treatment of Issues and Institutions During Campaigning

During the 1997 campaign, the Socialists spoke of cohabitation as being a complete shift in policy control from one party to another, complete with a policy platform they would enact in a cohabitation situation. In addition, the RPR-led majority's attacks on the prospect of cohabitation were framed as a complete shift in policy control as well. This debate over cohabitation included a substantive policy discussion over each party's policies as well. Also, attempts by the President to intervene in the legislative

[9]The seat breakdown on the left was 255 seats for the Socialists, 35 seats for the Communists, 12 seats for the Radical-Socialist Party, 7 seats each for the Greens and Citizens' Movement, and 4 seats for unattached, dissident Socialist candidates.

[10]The seat breakdown on the right was 139 seats for the RPR, 112 seats for the UDF, and 2 seats for the MPF-CNI ticket.

campaign were relatively limited.

During the campaign, Jospin criticized divisions within the RPR over supporting the Euro (Noblecourt and Saux, 1997) and criticized the right's proposed policies, such as cutting government spending and abolishing the minimum wage (Noblecourt, 1997a). On the issue of the Euro, Jospin shifted his position away from the center, closer to the Communists' (which opposed the adoption of the Euro), promising to renegotiate the terms of the single currency, and not letting them stand as-is (Lichfield, 1997b). On European policy in general, Jospin framed a similarity in position with Chirac as a shift of Chirac to the Socialist position. While this may seem like a standard statement of agreement, it actually shows that Jospin was not shying from the Socialist position (Jarreau and Noblecourt, 1997).

Meanwhile, the right's criticism of cohabitation was based on the prospects of a policy shift to the left, and not that of a weakening of the President's power. Speaking for the right on French television, former President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of the UDF gave four reasons why the Socialists should not be in power. The first three reasons dealt with policy and ideology, while cohabitation was the last reason Giscard gave (France Télévisions, 1997a). In one of his few incursions into the campaign, Chriac talked about the dangers of cohabitation. Chirac spoke of the dangers of having a Socialist and Communist government taking a role in shaping policy toward Europe (Monnot and De Montvalon, 1997). Juppé also asked voters if they could imagine the next European Affairs Minister coming from the Communist Party (Noblecourt and Saux, 1997). In addition, Chirac did not speak of cohabitation as a weakening of his power, but instead as a shift away from economic liberalization (Henning, 1997). This is combined with him saying on television that electing the Socialists would be returning to the past (Le Figaro, 1997a). In an interview with *Le Figaro* before the first round of the election, Juppé said a Socialist victory would mean a shift to a new agenda, in the form of more taxes and more people collecting

unemployment benefits (Le Figaro, 1997f). Furthermore, shortly after the first round, then-former Budget Minister (and future President) Nicolas Sarkozy said that France could not make the choice to go backwards policy-wise (Le Figaro, 1997c). Finally, then-UDF leader François Léotard argued that cohabitation should be avoided because the Socialists' policies do not work (France Télévisions, 1997b). Léotard did not say, however, that cohabitation should be avoided because the president needs a majority in the legislature.

In addition, Jospin spoke of cohabitation not as a sharing of power, but as a policy shift toward a new direction (Fitchett, 1997). Furthermore, he said in a speech that when cohabitation occurs, power shifts from the President to the Prime Minister and his government (Noblecourt, 1997b). Moreover, former Socialist Prime Minister Laurent Fabius spoke of a Socialist victory also as a change in policy (Le Figaro, 1997b) and a change in governing (France Télévisions, 1997a). Additionally, Communist leader Robert Hue said the left's victory showed that French voters chose a new policy agenda (Le Figaro, 1997d).

These statements by Jospin, Fabius, and Hue implied that a Socialist-led victory in the legislative election would not be a check on power, but a new direction policy-wise. Jospin also said that in the event of a Socialist victory, France will have spoken with one voice, as in the case of every other legislative election that resulted in cohabitation (Le Figaro, 1997e). This was Jospin's way of claiming a mandate to govern. In addition, given that the 1997 election was a non-concurrent election, Jospin advocated a few policies that were non-centrist in nature. Two of the most notable were the proposal to reduce the workweek to 35 hours, and the creation of 350,000 new government jobs for young people (Lichfield, 1997a).

Jospin reinforced this belief in cohabitation being a change in policy direction by stressing the constitutional independence between the President and legislature. In an interview on the television network France 2, he mentioned that the French

Constitution bans the President from attending the National Assembly. He also said that his opponent was the RPR-led majority and not Chirac, and that Chirac could only help his opponents from the sidelines. This was evidenced by Jospin's subsequent attacking of Juppé and former Prime Minister Balladur, instead of directing attacks toward Chirac (France Télévisions, 1997c). Jospin also reminded voters during the campaign that the election was a legislative election, and not a Presidential election (Aphatie, 1997).

## Presidential Involvement in the Legislative Campaign

Direct Presidential involvement in the campaign was limited to a televised statement during the moment of the National Assembly's dissolution and a televised statement before the second round of the election. This relative lack of presidential involvement helped to highlight that there was independence between the President and his party in the legislature. Before the first round, there was ambiguity over whether or not a victory by the right would mean there would be a continuation of Chirac's policies. After Chirac said that there would be a continuation of the same policies after the election, then-leader of the UDF group in the National Assembly, Gilles de Robien, publicly hinted that there would be a change in policy directions if the RPR-led majority was re-elected, causing confusion over what the agenda would be after a RPR victory (Ottenheimer, 1997). After the first round result, then-Education Minister François Bayrou of the UDF said the "governing majority would announce how it intends to govern differently" (Le Figaro, 1997c). Also, on the eve of the second round, Giscard said the RPR-led majority would "govern differently with the same majority" if re-elected. Then-Speaker of the National Assembly, Philippe Séguin, also said at a pre-election rally that if the RPR-led majority were re-elected, it would be "liberated" (France Télévisions, 1997b).

These previous comments from leaders on the right hinted that the legislative

party would still have some autonomy from its President of the same party. This does not mean that a legislative party is going to be fully independent from the President during a non-concurrent election. This was evident occasional times in the campaign when Chirac asked for voters to re-elect the RPR-led majority. It was also evident in Juppé's resignation as Prime Minister after the first round at Chirac's request, despite the President's lack of formal power in removing a Prime Minister. This is due to informal powers presidents posses as the *de facto* head of their party in presidential regimes (Samuels and Shugart, 2010).

In the next section, it will be shown that these "presidential incursions" into the legislative election were more frequent in the 2002 election than during the 1997 election. It is important to keep in mind that presidential incursions are not in themselves coattail effects. Instead, presidents make incursions in a legislative election in the hopes of producing coattail effects. The closer a legislative election is to a presidential election, there exists more opportunities for the president to exert coattail effects onto the legislative election.

# 2002 Legislative Election

## Background

The 2002 legislative election was different from the 1997 election, since the 2002 election occurred weeks after the Presidential election. This was due to a referendum in 2000, which reduced the duration of the President's term from seven years to five years. This had the effect of making the Presidential election relatively concurrent with the legislative election.[11] Proponents of the change hoped that the occurrences of cohabitation would diminish (Buffotot and Hanley, 2003). As a result, the legislative

[11]The National Assembly already had five-year terms before the 2000 Constitutional referendum.

election in 2002 was held on the heels of the Presidential election.

In the Presidential campaign, Chirac was running again under the RPR banner for a second term, while Jospin was the candidate for the Socialists. It was widely expected that they would be the two candidates competing in the second round. However, Jean-Marie Le Pen of the far-right National Front finished second in the first round. [12]

This occurred due to two key factors. First, the main issue in the campaign was not the economy (which was rebounding since the Jospin government took power), but instead was insecurity (crime and public safety). Le Pen was able to take advantage of this unease among the electorate, since the anti-immigrant National Front linked the issue of insecurity with immigration (Gaffney, 2004). Second, the left went into the campaign fragmented, and as a result, significant amounts of the vote were spread amongst different leftist candidates Clift (2004).[13] These divisions were exacerbated by Jospin's centrist strategy in the Presidential campaign, by declaring that he was not an ideological Socialist, which alienated many of the Socialists' core voters.

Le Pen's surprise place on the second round ballot led to a wave of protests around the country against Le Pen and the National Front. In the second round, Chirac easily defeated Le Pen 82 percent to 17 percent. This was the biggest landslide in a Presidential election in the history of the Fifth Republic. Chirac owed his victory mainly to left-wing voters who declared they would "vote for the criminal[14] over the fascist."

Next would come the first round of the legislative election, which was scheduled to

[12]Chirac received 19.88 percent of the vote in the first round, Le Pen received 16.86 percent of the vote, while Jospin earned 16.18 percent of the vote.

[13]Aside from Jospin, Three leftist candidates received over five percent of the vote: Arlette Laguiller of the Trotskyist Workers' Struggle, Jean-Pierre Chevènement of the Citizens' Movement, and Noël Mamère of the Greens. In addition, Olivier Besancenot of the Revolutionary Communist League received over four percent of the vote, and Communist Robert Hue received over three percent of the vote.

[14]Chirac at the time was facing corruption allegations from his tenure as Mayor of Paris and a financial scandal over misused government funds during the cohabitation period.

take place five weeks after the second round of the presidential election. Spearheaded by Chirac, a new political grouping was created to contest the legislative election, named the Union for the Presidential Majority (UMP). This electoral alliance consisted of the RPR, Liberal Democracy, and part of the UDF.[15] All candidates who were elected to the National Assembly under the UMP brand would have to agree to support the President and agree to take part in the creation of a new political party in the fall of 2002.[16] Consistent with the catchall nature of this new party, after his re-election as President, Chirac named former Commerce and Industry Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin of Liberal Democracy the interim Prime Minister before the legislative election.[17] This was the second time during the Fifth Republic that a Prime Minister did not come from the Gaullist or Socialist ranks (Cole, 2004).[18]

The Socialists, demoralized after Jospin's defeat in the first round of the Presidential election, were effectively leaderless during the legislative campaign. This was because Jospin announced his resignation as Prime Minister and retirement from politics right after his first found defeat in the Presidential election. The Socialists' campaign was run by then-Socialist Party First Secretary (and future President) François Hollande, along with his then-domestic partner and former Environment Minister Ségolène Royal. However, there was no consensus among the Socialist leadership over Hollande being the Prime Minister-in-waiting in the event of a Socialist victory. Fabius and former Socialist Finance Minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn were skeptical of Hollande's claim to the Premiership if the Socialists won (Bell and Criddle, 2002). This also highlighted the disunity on the left in the wake of the Presidential election.

In the first round of the legislative election, the UMP and their allies attained

[15]Centrist elements of the UDF, led by Bayrou, refused to join the new UMP, and continued on under the UDF banner.

[16]The new party would be called the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP).

[17]Raffarin remained Prime Minister after the UMP won a majority in the legislative election.

[18]The first non-Gaullist or Socialist Prime Minister was liberal Raymond Barre, who was Prime Minister under liberal President Giscard.

43 percent of the popular vote (with the UMP earning 33 percent of the vote).[19] Meanwhile, the Socialists and their allies ended up with 36 percent of the vote (while the Socialists won 24 percent of the vote outright).[20] The second round mirrored that of the results of the first round, in that the right finished first with 52 percent of the vote (the UMP won 47 percent of the vote), while the left earned 45 percent of the vote (The Socialists won 35 percent of the vote). This translated into 320 seats for the UMP[21] and their allies and 253 seats for the United Left (Cole, 2002).[22]

## Treatment of Issues and Institutions During Campaigning

The main difference between the 1997 legislative election and the 2002 legislative election was that in 2002, there was a relative lack of discussion on substantive issues, combined with a different conception of cohabitation's effect on political power. While the Socialists framed cohabitation as a shift in policy from one party to another in 1997, they said that cohabitation was instead a weakening of the President's power during the 2002 campaign. The right also changed their framing of cohabitation as well. While in 1997, the RPR said that cohabitation would lead to shift toward the Socialists setting the policy agenda, in 2002 the UMP said cohabitation would weaken their own ability to set the policy agenda.

While debates during the 1997 legislative election centered primarily on unemployment and Europe, the 2002 legislative election campaign was devoid of substantial discussions of issues in the media. Instead, arguments by the right focused on the

[19]The UMP's allies were the UDF, the MPF, Liberal Democracy, the Rally for France (RPF), and dissident rightist candidates not attached to any major party.

[20]The Socialists' allies were the Communists, the Greens, The Radical Party of the Left (PRG; the new name for the Radical-Socialist Party) and dissident Socialist candidates not attached to any major party.

[21]The seat breakdown on the right was 357 seats for the UMP, 29 seats for the UDF, 2 seats for the MPF, 2 seats for Liberal Democracy, 1 seat for the RPF, and 8 seats for unattached, dissident rightist candidates.

[22]The seat breakdown on the left was 140 seats for the Socialists, 21 seats for the Communists, 7 seats for the PRG, 3 seats for the Greens, and 6 seats for unattached, dissident Socialist candidates.

need for the President to have a legislative majority. This was coupled with them stressing the importance of avoiding another five years of cohabitation. Even senior figures in the UMP admitted that the main theme of the party's campaign would be arguing against another period of cohabitation (Collomb-Robert, 2004). Therefore, attacks from the right were not targeted toward the left, but toward the situation of cohabitation (Bacque, 2002b). Raffarin even said that his opponent was "not the left, but cohabitation" (Mauroy, 2002). He would also say that voters wanted "political efficiency," and that the era of cohabitation in French politics was over (The Scotsman, 2002). As a result, the left accused the right of using "snooze tactics," effectively putting the legislative campaign to sleep in order to benefit from the coattails of Chirac's victory (Lichfield, 2002). In addition, former Socialist Defense Minister Alain Richard said Chirac was using the anti-cohabitation campaign theme as a "smokescreen" to avoid debate on the UMP's policy platform (Le Figaro, 2002f).

When issues were brought up, discussion turned toward the direction of the Presidency. After the first round of the legislative election, Raffarin said the UMP would keep all of the commitments made by the President during the Presidential campaign (Le Figaro, 2002c). After the results of the second round were announced, Raffarin subsequently said "Jacques Chirac's platform won its majority in the legislature" (Le Figaro, 2002d). These comments indicate how the legislative party (in this case, the UMP) converged more toward its Presidential candidate (Chirac) during the concurrent election. Furthermore, in a meeting with other UMP candidates during the campaign, Raffarin said that during periods of cohabitation, "political powerlessness" prevails (Collomb-Robert, 2004). This is in contrast to how the right framed cohabitation five years earlier, as being a shift toward a different ideological direction.

Conversely, the Socialists' main argument was that they should be elected to government for the purposes of being in a position to challenge the President's policies. Hollande said that "the threat of such a strong concentration of power in the hands

of one party would cause our democracy to become completely unbalanced. It is imperative that the voters return an effective opposition in the National Assembly" (Henley, 2002). Also, at a rally in Nantes, Hollande told the crowd "Raffarin long ago had a dream, that the right would have all of the powers for five years. We do not want that nightmare. We are not tired and we have energy to spare. It is not our individual fate that is at stake, it is the future of the country that is at stake" (Freyssenet, 2002). Furthermore, Fabius remarked that it is not healthy to have both the Presidency and the legislature to be controlled by the same party (Le Figaro, 2002a). Other Socialists, such as former Social Affairs Minister and Labor Minister Martine Aubry, spoke of the need to elect a Socialist legislative majority for the purpose of "rebalancing" policy (Waintraub, 2002). Even the Socialists' allies, like then-leader of The Greens, Dominique Voynet, said voters needed to "rebalance powers" in the legislative election (Le Figaro, 2002e).

These comments are in contrast to five years earlier, when the left spoke of cohabitation as a shift in a different policy direction, as opposed to a balancing of political institutions and policy. Even arguments from minor parties on the right involved institutional issues. Then-leader of the Rally for France, Charles Pasqua, argued, "how can we unconditionally support the government for five years? Even under [Charles] de Gaulle, this did not happen" (Huet, 2002).

## Presidential Involvement in the Legislative Campaign

The Presidential incursions into the legislative campaign were more pronounced in this election as compared to the 1997 election. Ten days before the first round of the legislative election, Chirac promised to be fully engaged in the campaign. Among his statements during the campaign, Chirac argued that the President needed a majority to govern (Bacque, 2002a). Socialists criticized the increased role the President played in the legislative campaign by accusing Chirac of "putting pressure on voters." For

instance, former Socialist Minister of Justice and Minister of Social Affairs Elisabeth Guigou accused Chirac of "pushing" French voters into voting for the UMP in the legislative election. She said it was appropriate for the President to tell people to vote in the legislative election, but it was inappropriate for him to tell the voters to vote for a specific party (Le Figaro, 2002b). Hollande even said on France Télévisions that Chirac was acting as a party leader and not as a head of state for the purposes of defeating the left (Collomb-Robert, 2004).

Again, the 2002 legislative election was different from the 1997 legislative election in several ways. First, major policy issues were not discussed as much as they were during the 1997 election. Second, the situation of cohabitation was treated not as a shift in policy from one party to another, but instead as a weakening of the incumbent President's power to enact their policy program. Essentially, the lack of policy discussion and framing of cohabitation as a weakening of executive power showed that the 2002 legislative election was more a function of Presidential-level politics than the 1997 legislative election was.

# Evidence From the Voters

## Data and Methods

The examination of the debate among political actors showed that debates in 1997 legislative election were more grounded in ideology. Conversely, debates in the 2002 legislative election were less based on ideology, and focused more on whether or not to give the President a second mandate and the institutional resources to advance his agenda. To empirically demonstrate that the 2002 legislative election was more a function of the 2002 Presidential election than the 1997 legislative election was of the 1995 Presidential election, I will use survey data from the Centre for Political

Research at Sciences Po (CEVIPOF) (Perrineau, 1997, 2002). Comparing each of these legislative elections to these respective Presidential elections will show how the difference in timing between Presidential elections and legislative elections in France affected voters' ideological perceptions of the major parties. According to the theory of presidentialism's effect on party competition, we should see stronger coattail effects from the Presidential election exhibited on the 2002 legislative election than on the 1997 legislative election.

Examining these two elections works well for two reasons. First, the 1997 legislative election was the last legislative election held before the 2000 constitutional referendum, while the 2002 legislative election was the first legislative election after the referendum. This will allow us to see immediate effects that the institutional changes caused. Second, the two major parties had the same candidates for President in 1995 and 2002 (Chirac for the RPR/UMP in 1995 and 2002, and Jospin for the Socialists in 1995 and 2002). This allows for a natural control on the personal characteristics of the Presidential candidates in the elections.

Two empirical tests will be conducted. The first test looks at the congruence between voters of a Presidential candidate and the ideological closeness of those voters to that Presidential candidate's party. This will involve examining Jospin voters in 1995's ideological proximity to the Socialist Party in 1997, and then Jospin voters in 2002's ideological proximity to the Socialist Party in 2002. It will also involve examining Chirac voters in 1995's ideological proximity to the RPR in 1997, and then Chirac voters in 2002's ideological proximity to the UMP in 2002.[23] This test will show that there was more ideological convergence between the two parties and their Presidential candidates during the 2002 Presidential and legislative elections.

[23]For both the 1995 and 2002 Presidential elections, the vote that will be analyzed will be voters' vote in the first round. This is in part because a voter's first round vote is closer to their true preference, and because Jospin failed to advance to the second round in 2002. As a result, most voters who would have otherwise voted for Jospin in the second round voted instead for Chirac over Le Pen.

Conversely, the test will also show that there will be less ideological congruence between the two parties and their respective Presidential candidates from 1995 during the 1997 legislative election.

Under the theory of presidentialism and party competition, parties move ideologically closer to their presidential candidate when there is more concurrence between the presidential election and legislative election. If there is more congruence between voting for a French Presidential candidate and feeling ideologically close to the candidate's party, then that is evidence that the party have moved closer to their Presidential candidate.

The second test will examine the extent to which voters at the center of the ideological spectrum felt ideologically close to the main parties in 1997 and 2002. According to the theory, more centrists will identify with either the UMP or the Socialists in 2002 than in 1997. The more that centrists perceive the Socialists or RPR/UMP to be ideologically close to them, the more the parties are moving toward the center of the political spectrum. We can expect the parties to converge more toward the center in 2002 because of the centrist nature of presidential elections. If legislative elections are concurrent with presidential elections, then parties will move ideologically closer to the position of their presidential candidate. And since presidential elections lead to the centrist positioning of candidates, this means parties will find themselves more toward the center of the political spectrum.

The first test will show that the parties are ideologically converging more with their Presidential candidates in 2002 than in 1997, while the second test will show that the parties are moving more toward the center of the ideological spectrum in 2002 than in 1997. For the first test, when looking at Jospin voters in 1995 and 2002, the dependent variable in question is whether or not a voter feels ideologically closest to the Socialist Party in 1997 and 2002 respectively. When looking at Chirac voters in 1995 and 2002, the dependent variable is whether or not a voter feels ideologically

closest to the RPR in 1997 and the UMP in 2002 respectively.

To create these variables, I took a question that asked voters which party they felt the closest to ideologically, and created two dummy dependent variables. The first dummy variable either classifies a Chirac voter as feeling closest to the RPR/UMP or feeling closest to any other or no party. The second dummy variable either classifies a Jospin voter as feeling closest to the Socialists or feeling closest to any other or no party. The key independent variable of interest is the year of the legislative election. This is a dummy variable in which the voter was surveyed in 1997 (for the 1997 legislative election) or surveyed in 2002 (for the 2002 Presidential and legislative elections).

In the second test, the dependent variable of interest is whether or not a centrist voter felt ideologically closest to the RPR/UMP or the Socialists. To create this dummy variable, I took the same ideological proximity variable mentioned above, and classified a voter as feeling closest to either the RPR/UMP or Socialists for the first category, and feeling closest to another or no party in the second category. The independent variable for this test is the same for the first test: the year in which the voter was surveyed (either 1997 or 2002). In this test, I am only examining voters that did not classify themselves as being either on the left or the right politically.[24] For both tests, I use several control variables: gender, age, and education.[25] Binary logistic regression models are used for both of the tests.

Figure 5.1: Percentage of Chirac Voters in 1995 Who Felt Closest to the RPR in 1997




Figure 5.2: Percentage of Chirac Voters in 2002 Who Felt Closest to the UMP in 2002



Figure 5.3: Percentage of Jospin Voters in 1995 Who Felt Closest to the Socialists in 1997




## Results

First the results for the first test are presented.[26] The first result within the first test compares the difference in closeness to the RPR/UMP among Chirac voters in 1997 and 2002. The results show that Chirac voters in 2002 were significantly more likely to feel the closest to the RPR/UMP in 2002 than in 1997, in line with expectations. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show this result.

The second result within the first test compares the difference in closeness to the Socialists among Jospin voters in 1997 and 2002. The results show that Jospin voters in 2002 were significantly more likely to feel the closest to the Socialists in 2002 than in 1997, also in line with expectations. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show this result. In all, the results for the first test demonstrate that the presence of concurrent Presidential

[24]In the CEVIPOF surveys, ideology is measured with three categories: left, right, or neither left nor right. In my second test I define centrists as someone who answered in the category "neither left nor right."

[25]For education, the survey asked what the highest diploma the respondent had attained.

[26]All of the full models used for both tests are presented in Appendix A.

Figure 5.4: Percentage of Jospin Voters in 2002 Who Felt Closest to the Socialists in 2002




and legislative elections caused more voters of the main Presidential candidates to feel ideologically closer to the Presidential candidate's respective party than when the legislative election was non-concurrent with the Presidential election. This indicates that the parties converged more toward the position of their Presidential candidate during the concurrent elections of 2002.

Next, the results for the second test (centrists' closeness to the main parties) are shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6. The results show that centrists are significantly more likely to feel the closest to either the RPR/UMP or Socialists during the concurrent elections of 2002 than during the 1997 legislative election. The second test thus shows that the presence of concurrent Presidential and legislative elections in 2002 caused more centrists to feel closest to the RPR/UMP or Socialists than during the non-concurrent legislative election of 1997. Taken along with the results from the first test, this indicates that not only did the parties move closer to the locations of their Presidential candidates, but since the Presidential candidates took relatively centrist positions, the parties were moving toward the center of the political spectrum as well.

Figure 5.5: Percentage of Centrists Who Felt the Closest to the RPR or Socialists in 1997




Figure 5.6: Percentage of Centrists Who Felt the Closest to the UMP or Socialists in 2002



# Conclusions

With evidence from both political leaders at the time and data from the CEVIPOF, I have shown that there were substantial differences in the campaigning styles of the parties in the 1997 and 2002 legislative elections. In the 1997 election campaign, election debate centered on substantial policy issues. When the constitutional changes from 2000 were in effect for the 2002 legislative election, however, the debate during the campaign was less policy-oriented, and centered around whether or not the President deserved a second mandate in the form of a legislative majority.

These differences in campaigning techniques had effects on the voters in these elections as well. Voters in the 2002 election who voted for Chirac or Jospin were more likely to have felt the closest ideologically to the UMP/RPR or Socialists respectively than voters in 1997 election. This indicates that there was more ideological congruence between the parties and their Presidential candidates in 2002 than in 1997. In addition, self-identifying centrist voters were more likely to feel ideologically closest to either the UMP/RPR or Socialists in 2002 than they were in 1997. This indicates too that since there was more congruence between the parties and their Presidential candidates in 2002 than in 1997, we could expect the parties to be perceived as more centrist in 2002. This is a result of the centrist nature of presidential elections. Ultimately, these results corroborate with the theoretical expectation put forth earlier that concurrent elections lead to legislative elections becoming a function of presidential elections.

# Chapter 6

# Conclusions

What explains how parties decide to ideologically position themselves? This has been a question that many scholars have tried to answer, mainly through the use of spatial models. However, these scholars have not considered the impact that presidential elections can have on legislative party competition. This is because existing spatial models have modeled party competition as if it were occurring under a presidential regime. However, in presidential regimes, the presidential election occurs separately from the legislative election. In presidential regimes, the presidential election will garner more attention than the legislative election. As a result, parties at the legislative level will have incentives to mimic the positions of their presidential candidates, in order to take advantage of coattail effects from the presidential election.

This dissertation argued that party competition is a function of presidential-level competition in presidential regimes. Through the usage of formal modeling, data on parties' positions, survey data, as well as qualitative evidence, I presented two general findings. First, presidentialism gives incentives for parties at the legislative level to take more centrist positions, and second, presidential elections help to shape voters' views about the parties competing in legislative elections. I can now present a more detailed overview of the findings from this project. Also, limitations in the findings will be discussed, along with further avenues for research that can build off of this

dissertation.

Chapter 2 detailed the new set of spatial models that explain how parties ideologically position themselves in a world of presidentialism. Most significantly, parties in multi-party legislative elections are in equilibria when they take positions that are closer to the median voter than comparable parties competing under a parliamentary regime. However, the coattail effects are weakened when the legislative election is occurring non-concurrently with the presidential election. Furthermore, the coattail effects weaken also when the legislative election is occurring under a semi-presidential regime.

In Chapter 3, we saw that parties in presidential regimes were more centrist than parties in parliamentary regimes. More specifically, the main parties of the left and the right in legislative elections are ideologically closer to each other in presidential regimes than in parliamentary regimes. These same parties were also closer to the location of the median voter in presidential regimes than in parliamentary regimes. In addition, within presidential regimes, the main parties of the left and the right are ideologically closer to each other and the median voter during legislative elections that are concurrent with the presidential election than similar parties during non-concurrent legislative elections. However, the empirical results showed that within presidential regimes, only parties competing in non-concurrent elections were ideologically closer to each other and the median voter in regimes where the presidential election is held under a plurality ballot instead of a runoff ballot.

Chapter 4 focused on the temporary change to direct elections for Prime Minister in Israel, and the impact it had on the parties and voters during and after the reform. The evidence from the 1996 and 1999 elections (which were the two elections that also featured a separate Prime Ministerial election) show that the Labor and Likud parties downplayed their parties' brands and images during these elections. This then led to a shrinking of the feeling gap between Labor and their party leader and Likud

and their party leader among voters. The leaders in effect replaced the parties. This, combined with the centripetal nature of the Prime Ministerial election, caused voters to perceive both Labor and Likud to be more centrist during the period of direct elections for Prime Minister than during the period of pure parliamentary elections.

Chapter 5 explained how the constitutional reforms in France, which led to permanent concurrent elections starting in 2002, impacted the parties and voters. The evidence from the 1997 legislative election shows that leaders in the RPR and Socialist parties focused on substantial policy issues and differences. Conversely, in the 2002 legislative election, the UMP and Socialists did not discuss policy issues, and the campaign revolved around whether or not President Chirac deserved a majority in the National Assembly. Also, the centripetal nature of the Presidential election caused more centrists to feel ideologically closest to either of the main two parties in 2002 than in 1997. In addition, the concurrence of the 2002 elections caused more voters who voted for one of of the main candidates in the Presidential election to feel ideologically closest to the party of that Presidential candidate than comparable voters in 1997 election.

## Limitations

Even though this dissertation uncovered many significant findings, there were still several limitations. First, in Chapter 3, limitations in data did not allow for a full replication of the formal theories put forth in Chapter 2. This was because of several reasons. First, the lack of information on the positions of presidential candidates in each election. Second, the datasets' lack of the full spectrum of democratic countries, primarily those in Latin America (where most of the world's pure presidential regimes are located). Third, the inability to distinguish between pure and semi-presidential regimes in the data, due to the limited range of cases. This limited range of cases

is also why there were mixed findings on a presidential ballot type's effect on party positioning. While the results from the chapter kept in line with the general expectations of the theory, having a stronger dataset would have provided more detail on the empirical realties of how presidentialism affects party systems.

In Chapter 4, there were a few limitations as well. First, there was only limited information from the CSES on Israeli voters' perceptions of Labor and Likud's ideological positions. Data on the parties' perceived positions were available for the 1996 and 2003 elections, but not for the 1992 and 1999 elections. In addition, the INES did not ask voters about their perception regarding where they thought the parties were located. This is also the case for the locations of the party leaders/Prime Ministerial candidates. However, still, the information that was available on perceived party location conformed to the theoretical expectations of presidentialism's influences on party competition. Additionally, the data that was available and used for the chapter showed that the direct elections for Prime Minister had an effect on how voters related to both of the parties and their respective leaders. This showed that the Knesset elections in 1996 and 1999 were functions of the direct elections for Prime Minister occurring concurrently.

Then there were also limitations in Chapter 5. The inconsistencies in questions asked over the course of the CEVIPOF made it more difficult to find identical questions for the 1997 and 2002 surveys. In addition, these two editions of the survey did not ask voters where they believed the parties (nor their leaders) were located ideologically. However, the data that I did use for the chapter still provided evidence that the timing of the Presidential election affected where voters felt in relation to either the Gaullists or Socialists.

## Future Research

There are also implications for future research. Previous research has investigated how different electoral systems lead to different policy outcomes, notably, on income redistribution and social welfare policies (Persson and Tabellini, 2004; Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Persson, 2007). Remember that PR electoral systems lead to parties that are more non-centrist than parties competing under majoritarian electoral rules. The presence of centrist parties would encourage lower levels of income redistribution and social welfare spending. With that said, scholars have made the assumption that income redistribution and social welfare spending levels will be similar (all things being equal) in all majoritarian systems or PR systems, regardless of whether or not the country in question has a presidential or parliamentary regime. If the factor of presidentialism is added into the studies, we could potentially find that within majoritarian and PR countries both, presidential regimes have lower levels of income redistribution and welfare spending than parliamentary regimes.

The implications can also be seen if we look at the level of the individual legislator. Results from Chapter 3 only showed the positions of legislators at the aggregate level. However, the positions of legislators can be disaggregated further to look at the voting ideologies of individual members of each party. We would expect to find in such an analysis that individual legislators would be sensitive to presidential election outcomes in their region or district.

For example, an analysis of the roll-call voting ideology of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives would show that the Presidential election results in a given member's district will be a strong predictor of that member's voting ideology. This is because members of Congress know that voters are generally most interested in the Presidential election when they make their voting decision. As a result, members of Congress will see the Presidential vote share as a good proxy for measuring his

district's ideology. In that light, individual legislators are following the Presidential election, making legislative behavior partly a function of politics at the Presidential level.

A more complete picture of presidentialism's effects on voters' views of parties' locations could also be presented by examining evidence from American politics. This is because the American National Election Study (ANES) has asked voters about the ideological positions of parties and their respective Presidential candidates every two years, over the course of several decades. Such a study would compare differences in perceived distances of parties from their presidential candidates during Presidential election years and midterm election years.

Also, this project has indicated that it is important for researchers to consider the positions of not just the parties in question, but the positions of parties' presidential candidates. This would mean that more election surveys should ask voters about not only the positions of each party, but each party's leader as well. Being able to asses the gap between parties and their leaders will allow future scholars to make stronger assessments of the extent presidentialism affects party competition in different institutional arrangements.

These improved surveys would not only help scholars in assessing whether or not coattail effects are present in presidential regimes, they will also be able to specifically determine the extent to which the coattail effects are working. This project did show in Chapter 2 that there are stronger coattail effects during concurrent elections. However, having the positions of presidential candidates as well would give greater precision in scholars' assessments to how much presidentialism is exerting a force on the party system.

More broadly, the findings in this dissertation will have consequences for institutional designers. These would be political consequences of introducing (or removing) presidentialism from the institutional framework of a democratic regime. The find-

ings show that the presence or absence of presidentialism will have effects on where parties decide to stake out a position. Also, the presence or absence of presidentialism in a country will have effects on how the voters perceive the parties as well.

These findings mean two things. First, institutional designers might be indirectly creating certain policy outcomes due to the inclusion or exclusion of presidentialism that were not been foreseen by these designers. Second, voters' relationships to their political leaders will vary, according to the presence or absence of presidentialism (or the nature of how presidentialism operates in the country). Voters will have different opinions on the range of ideologies that are represented by the leading parties in their country. If constitutional designers are intending to create a democratic regime in which there are parties that represent a broader segment of ideologies in the population, then including presidentialism would narrow the range of ideologies that the leading political parties and officials represent. Again, as mentioned in the first chapter, these consequences are even more important in newly democratized countries. It must be ensured that the institutional arrangements in these countries are facilitating the legitimization of the democratic process.

While there were several limitations to the findings in this dissertation, there was still a significant, common theme across them. That is, presidentialism has a unique effect on party competition. This highlights the importance of the need for future studies on this topic. Given the consistency of the findings through the chapters, future studies investigating the effects of presidentialism should uncover more consequences related to the findings in this dissertation. These implications for party competition and voter attitudes will further highlight the necessity of a thorough process of institutional design when designing new or reforming existing institutional structures in democracies.

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# Appendix A

Table A.1: List of Parties Used in Chapter 3

| **Country** | **Election Year** | **Left-Wing Party** | **Right-Wing Party** |
|---|---|---|---|
| Australia | 1946 | Australian Labor Party | Liberal Party of Australia |
| Australia | 1949 | Australian Labor Party | Liberal Party of Australia |
| Australia | 1951 | Australian Labor Party | Liberal Party of Australia |
| Australia | 1954 | Australian Labor Party | Liberal Party of Australia |
| Australia | 1955 | Australian Labor Party | Liberal Party of Australia |
| Australia | 1958 | Australian Labor Party | Liberal Party of Australia |
| Australia | 1961 | Australian Labor Party | Liberal Party of Australia |
| Australia | 1963 | Australian Labor Party | Liberal Party of Australia |
| Australia | 1966 | Australian Labor Party | Liberal Party of Australia |
| Australia | 1969 | Australian Labor Party | Liberal Party of Australia |
| Australia | 1972 | Australian Labor Party | Liberal Party of Australia |
| Australia | 1974 | Australian Labor Party | Liberal Party of Australia |
| Australia | 1975 | Australian Labor Party | Liberal Party of Australia |
| Australia | 1977 | Australian Labor Party | Liberal Party of Australia |
| Australia | 1980 | Australian Labor Party | Liberal Party of Australia |
| Australia | 1983 | Australian Labor Party | Liberal Party of Australia |
| Australia | 1984 | Australian Labor Party | Liberal Party of Australia |
| Australia | 1987 | Australian Labor Party | Liberal Party of Australia |

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|---|---|---|---|
| Australia | 1990 | Australian Labor Party | Liberal Party of Australia |
| Australia | 1993 | Australian Labor Party | Liberal Party of Australia |
| Australia | 1996 | Australian Labor Party | Liberal Party of Australia |
| Australia | 1998 | Australian Labor Party | Liberal Party of Australia |
| Australia | 2001 | Australian Labor Party | Liberal Party of Australia |
| Austria | 1949 | Socialist Party of Austria | Austrian People's Party |
| Austria | 1953 | Socialist Party of Austria | Austrian People's Party |
| Austria | 1956 | Social Democratic Party of Austria | Austrian People's Party |
| Austria | 1959 | Social Democratic Party of Austria | Austrian People's Party |
| Austria | 1962 | Social Democratic Party of Austria | Austrian People's Party |
| Austria | 1966 | Social Democratic Party of Austria | Austrian People's Party |
| Austria | 1970 | Social Democratic Party of Austria | Austrian People's Party |
| Austria | 1971 | Social Democratic Party of Austria | Austrian People's Party |
| Austria | 1975 | Social Democratic Party of Austria | Austrian People's Party |
| Austria | 1979 | Social Democratic Party of Austria | Austrian People's Party |
| Austria | 1983 | Social Democratic Party of Austria | Austrian People's Party |
| Austria | 1986 | Social Democratic Party of Austria | Austrian People's Party |
| Austria | 1990 | Social Democratic Party of Austria | Austrian People's Party |
| Austria | 1994 | Social Democratic Party of Austria | Austrian People's Party |

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|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | 1995 | Social Democratic Party of Austria | Austrian People's Party |
| Austria | 1999 | Social Democratic Party of Austria | Freedom Party of Austria |
| Austria | 2002 | Social Democratic Party of Austria | Austrian People's Party |
| Belgium | 1946 | Belgian Socialist Party | Christian Social Party |
| Belgium | 1949 | Belgian Socialist Party | Christian Social Party |
| Belgium | 1950 | Belgian Socialist Party | Christian Social Party |
| Belgium | 1954 | Belgian Socialist Party | Christian Social Party |
| Belgium | 1958 | Belgian Socialist Party | Christian Social Party |
| Belgium | 1961 | Belgian Socialist Party | Christian Social Party |
| Belgium | 1965 | Belgian Socialist Party | Christian Social Party |
| Belgium | 1968 | Belgian Socialist Party | Christian Social Party |
| Belgium | 1971 | Belgian Socialist Party | Christian People's Party |
| Belgium | 1974 | Belgian Socialist Party | Christian People's Party |
| Belgium | 1977 | Belgian Socialist Party | Christian People's Party |
| Belgium | 1978 | Socialist Party (Wallonia) | Christian People's Party |
| Belgium | 1981 | Socialist Party (Wallonia) | Christian People's Party |
| Belgium | 1985 | Socialist Party (Wallonia) | Christian People's Party |
| Belgium | 1987 | Socialist Party (Wallonia) | Christian People's Party |
| Belgium | 1991 | Socialist Party (Wallonia) | Christian People's Party |
| Belgium | 1995 | Socialist Party (Wallonia) | Christian People's Party |
| Belgium | 1999 | Socialist Party (Wallonia) | Christian People's Party |
| Bulgaria | 1990 | Bulgarian Socialist Party | Union of Democratic Forces |
| Bulgaria | 1991 | Bulgarian Socialist Party | Union of Democratic Forces |
| Bulgaria | 1994 | Bulgarian Socialist Party | Union of Democratic Forces |
| Bulgaria | 1997 | Bulgarian Socialist Party | Union of Democratic Forces |
| Bulgaria | 2001 | Bulgarian Socialist Party | National Movement Simeon II |
| Canada | 1945 | Liberal Party of Canada | Progressive Conservative Party of Canada |

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| Canada | 1949 | Liberal Party of Canada | Progressive Conservative Party of Canada |
| Canada | 1953 | Liberal Party of Canada | Progressive Conservative Party of Canada |
| Canada | 1957 | Liberal Party of Canada | Progressive Conservative Party of Canada |
| Canada | 1958 | Liberal Party of Canada | Progressive Conservative Party of Canada |
| Canada | 1962 | Liberal Party of Canada | Progressive Conservative Party of Canada |
| Canada | 1963 | Liberal Party of Canada | Progressive Conservative Party of Canada |
| Canada | 1965 | Liberal Party of Canada | Progressive Conservative Party of Canada |
| Canada | 1968 | Liberal Party of Canada | Progressive Conservative Party of Canada |
| Canada | 1972 | Liberal Party of Canada | Progressive Conservative Party of Canada |
| Canada | 1974 | Liberal Party of Canada | Progressive Conservative Party of Canada |
| Canada | 1979 | Liberal Party of Canada | Progressive Conservative Party of Canada |
| Canada | 1980 | Liberal Party of Canada | Progressive Conservative Party of Canada |
| Canada | 1984 | Liberal Party of Canada | Progressive Conservative Party of Canada |
| Canada | 1988 | Liberal Party of Canada | Progressive Conservative Party of Canada |
| Canada | 1993 | Liberal Party of Canada | Reform Party of Canada |
| Canada | 1997 | Liberal Party of Canada | Reform Party of Canada |
| Canada | 2000 | Liberal Party of Canada | Canadian Alliance |

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|---|---|---|---|
| Cyprus | 1996 | Progressive Party of Working People | Democratic Rally |
| Cyprus | 2001 | Progressive Party of Working People | Democratic Rally |
| Czech Republic | 1990 | Communist Party of Czechoslovakia | Civic Forum |
| Czech Republic | 1992 | Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia | Civic Democratic Party |
| Czech Republic | 1996 | Czech Social Democratic Party | Civic Democratic Party |
| Czech Republic | 1998 | Czech Social Democratic Party | Civic Democratic Party |
| Czech Republic | 2002 | Czech Social Democratic Party | Civic Democratic Party |
| Denmark | 1945 | Social Democrats | Conservative People's Party |
| Denmark | 1947 | Social Democrats | Conservative People's Party |
| Denmark | 1950 | Social Democrats | Conservative People's Party |
| Denmark | 1953 | Social Democrats | Conservative People's Party |
| Denmark | 1953 | Social Democrats | Conservative People's Party |
| Denmark | 1957 | Social Democrats | Conservative People's Party |
| Denmark | 1960 | Social Democrats | Conservative People's Party |
| Denmark | 1964 | Social Democrats | Conservative People's Party |
| Denmark | 1966 | Social Democrats | Conservative People's Party |
| Denmark | 1968 | Social Democrats | Conservative People's Party |
| Denmark | 1971 | Social Democrats | Conservative People's Party |
| Denmark | 1973 | Social Democrats | Progress Party |
| Denmark | 1975 | Social Democrats | Venstre |
| Denmark | 1977 | Social Democrats | Progress Party |
| Denmark | 1979 | Social Democrats | Venstre |
| Denmark | 1981 | Social Democrats | Conservative People's Party |
| Denmark | 1984 | Social Democrats | Conservative People's Party |
| Denmark | 1987 | Social Democrats | Conservative People's Party |
| Denmark | 1988 | Social Democrats | Conservative People's Party |
| Denmark | 1990 | Social Democrats | Conservative People's Party |

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| Denmark | 1994 | Social Democrats | Venstre |
| Denmark | 1998 | Social Democrats | Venstre |
| Denmark | 2001 | Social Democrats | Venstre |
| Estonia | 1992 | Popular Front Bloc | Fatherland Bloc |
| Estonia | 1995 | Estonian Centre Party | Estonian Coalition Party |
| Estonia | 1999 | Estonian Centre Party | Fatherland Union |
| Estonia | 2003 | Estonian Centre Party | Res Publica Party |
| Finland | 1945 | Social Democratic Party of Finland | National Coalition Party |
| Finland | 1948 | Social Democratic Party of Finland | National Coalition Party |
| Finland | 1951 | Social Democratic Party of Finland | National Coalition Party |
| Finland | 1954 | Social Democratic Party of Finland | National Coalition Party |
| Finland | 1958 | Social Democratic Party of Finland | National Coalition Party |
| Finland | 1962 | Finnish People's Democratic League | National Coalition Party |
| Finland | 1966 | Finnish People's Democratic League | National Coalition Party |
| Finland | 1970 | Social Democratic Party of Finland | National Coalition Party |
| Finland | 1972 | Social Democratic Party of Finland | National Coalition Party |
| Finland | 1975 | Social Democratic Party of Finland | National Coalition Party |
| Finland | 1979 | Social Democratic Party of Finland | National Coalition Party |
| Finland | 1983 | Social Democratic Party of Finland | National Coalition Party |

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| Finland | 1987 | Social Democratic Party of Finland | National Coalition Party |
| Finland | 1991 | Social Democratic Party of Finland | National Coalition Party |
| Finland | 1995 | Social Democratic Party of Finland | National Coalition Party |
| Finland | 1999 | Social Democratic Party of Finland | National Coalition Party |
| Finland | 2003 | Social Democratic Party of Finland | National Coalition Party |
| France | 1946 | French Communist Party | Popular Republican Movement |
| France | 1951 | French Communist Party | Rally of the French People |
| France | 1956 | French Communist Party | National Centre of Independents and Peasants |
| France | 1973 | Socialist Party | Union of Democrats for the Republic |
| France | 1978 | Socialist Party | Rally for the Republic |
| France | 1981 | Socialist Party | Rally for the Republic |
| France | 1986 | Socialist Party | Rally for the Republic |
| France | 1988 | Socialist Party | Rally for the Republic |
| France | 1993 | Socialist Party | Rally for the Republic |
| France | 1997 | Socialist Party | Rally for the Republic |
| France | 2002 | Socialist Party | Union for a Popular Movement |
| Georgia | 2004 | United National Movement | New Rights Party of Georgia |
| Germany | 1949 | Social Democratic Party of Germany | Christian Democratic Union of Germany |
| Germany | 1953 | Social Democratic Party of Germany | Christian Democratic Union of Germany |
| Germany | 1957 | Social Democratic Party of Germany | Christian Democratic Union of Germany |
| Germany | 1961 | Social Democratic Party of Germany | Christian Democratic Union of Germany |

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| Germany | 1965 | Social Democratic Party of Germany | Christian Democratic Union of Germany |
| Germany | 1969 | Social Democratic Party of Germany | Christian Democratic Union of Germany |
| Germany | 1972 | Social Democratic Party of Germany | Christian Democratic Union of Germany |
| Germany | 1976 | Social Democratic Party of Germany | Christian Democratic Union of Germany |
| Germany | 1980 | Social Democratic Party of Germany | Christian Democratic Union of Germany |
| Germany | 1983 | Social Democratic Party of Germany | Christian Democratic Union of Germany |
| Germany | 1987 | Social Democratic Party of Germany | Christian Democratic Union of Germany |
| Germany | 1990 | Social Democratic Party of Germany | Christian Democratic Union of Germany |
| Germany | 1994 | Social Democratic Party of Germany | Christian Democratic Union of Germany |
| Germany | 1998 | Social Democratic Party of Germany | Christian Democratic Union of Germany |
| Germany | 2002 | Social Democratic Party of Germany | Christian Democratic Union of Germany |
| Greece | 1974 | Panhellenic Socialist Movement | New Democracy |
| Greece | 1977 | Panhellenic Socialist Movement | New Democracy |
| Greece | 1981 | Panhellenic Socialist Movement | New Democracy |
| Greece | 1985 | Panhellenic Socialist Movement | New Democracy |
| Greece | 1989 | Panhellenic Socialist Movement | New Democracy |
| Greece | 1989 | Panhellenic Socialist Movement | New Democracy |
| Greece | 1990 | Panhellenic Socialist Movement | New Democracy |
| Greece | 1993 | Panhellenic Socialist Movement | New Democracy |
| Greece | 1996 | Panhellenic Socialist Movement | New Democracy |
| Greece | 2000 | Panhellenic Socialist Movement | New Democracy |

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| Hungary | 1990 | Hungarian Socialist Party | Hungarian Democratic Forum |
| Hungary | 1994 | Hungarian Socialist Party | Alliance of Free Democrats |
| Hungary | 1998 | Hungarian Socialist Party | Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Union |
| Hungary | 2002 | Hungarian Socialist Party | Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Union |
| Ireland | 1948 | Fianna Fáil | Fine Gael |
| Ireland | 1951 | Fianna Fáil | Fine Gael |
| Ireland | 1954 | Fianna Fáil | Fine Gael |
| Ireland | 1957 | Fianna Fáil | Fine Gael |
| Ireland | 1961 | Fianna Fáil | Fine Gael |
| Ireland | 1965 | Fianna Fáil | Fine Gael |
| Ireland | 1969 | Fianna Fáil | Fine Gael |
| Ireland | 1973 | Fianna Fáil | Fine Gael |
| Ireland | 1977 | Fianna Fáil | Fine Gael |
| Ireland | 1981 | Fianna Fáil | Fine Gael |
| Ireland | 1982 | Fianna Fáil | Fine Gael |
| Ireland | 1982 | Fianna Fáil | Fine Gael |
| Ireland | 1987 | Fianna Fáil | Fine Gael |
| Ireland | 1989 | Fianna Fáil | Fine Gael |
| Ireland | 1992 | Fianna Fáil | Fine Gael |
| Ireland | 1997 | Fianna Fáil | Fine Gael |
| Ireland | 2002 | Fianna Fáil | Fine Gael |
| Israel | 1951 | Mapai | General Zionists |
| Israel | 1955 | Mapai | Herut |
| Israel | 1959 | Mapai | Herut |
| Israel | 1961 | Mapai | Herut |
| Israel | 1965 | Alignment | Gahal |
| Israel | 1969 | Alignment | Gahal |
| Israel | 1973 | Alignment | Likud |
| Israel | 1977 | Alignment | Likud |
| Israel | 1981 | Alignment | Likud |

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| Israel | 1984 | Alignment | Likud |
| Israel | 1988 | Alignment | Likud |
| Israel | 1992 | Israeli Labor Party | Likud |
| Israel | 1996 | Israeli Labor Party | Likud |
| Israel | 1999 | One Israel | Likud |
| Italy | 1946 | Italian Socialist Party | Christian Democracy |
| Italy | 1948 | Italian Communist Party | Christian Democracy |
| Italy | 1953 | Italian Communist Party | Christian Democracy |
| Italy | 1958 | Italian Communist Party | Christian Democracy |
| Italy | 1963 | Italian Communist Party | Christian Democracy |
| Italy | 1968 | Italian Communist Party | Christian Democracy |
| Italy | 1972 | Italian Communist Party | Christian Democracy |
| Italy | 1976 | Italian Communist Party | Christian Democracy |
| Italy | 1979 | Italian Communist Party | Christian Democracy |
| Italy | 1983 | Italian Communist Party | Christian Democracy |
| Italy | 1987 | Italian Communist Party | Christian Democracy |
| Italy | 1992 | Democratic Party of the Left | Christian Democracy |
| Italy | 1994 | Democratic Party of the Left | Forza Italia |
| Italy | 1996 | Democratic Party of the Left | Forza Italia |
| Italy | 2001 | Democrats of the Left | Forza Italia |
| Japan | 1960 | Japan Socialist Party | Liberal Democratic Party |
| Japan | 1963 | Japan Socialist Party | Liberal Democratic Party |
| Japan | 1967 | Japan Socialist Party | Liberal Democratic Party |
| Japan | 1969 | Japan Socialist Party | Liberal Democratic Party |
| Japan | 1972 | Japan Socialist Party | Liberal Democratic Party |
| Japan | 1976 | Japan Socialist Party | Liberal Democratic Party |
| Japan | 1979 | Japan Socialist Party | Liberal Democratic Party |
| Japan | 1980 | Japan Socialist Party | Liberal Democratic Party |
| Japan | 1983 | Japan Socialist Party | Liberal Democratic Party |
| Japan | 1986 | Japan Socialist Party | Liberal Democratic Party |

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| Japan | 1990 | Japan Socialist Party | Liberal Democratic Party |
| Japan | 1993 | Japan Socialist Party | Liberal Democratic Party |
| Japan | 1996 | New Frontier Party | Liberal Democratic Party |
| Japan | 2000 | Democratic Party of Japan | Liberal Democratic Party |
| Latvia | 1993 | National Harmony Party | Latvian Way |
| Latvia | 1995 | Democratic Party - Saimnieks | People's Movement for Latvia |
| Latvia | 1998 | National Harmony Party | People's Party |
| Latvia | 2002 | For Human Rights in United Latvia | New Era Party |
| Lithuania | 1992 | Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania | Sajudis |
| Lithuania | 1996 | Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania | Homeland Union - Lithuanian Conservatives |
| Lithuania | 2000 | Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania | Liberal Union of Lithuania |
| Macedonia | 1994 | Social Democratic Union of Macedonia | Party for Democratic Prosperity |
| Macedonia | 1998 | Social Democratic Union of Macedonia | VMRO–DPMNE |
| Mexico | 1997 | Institutional Revolutionary Party | National Action Party |
| Mexico | 2000 | Institutional Revolutionary Party | National Action Party |
| Moldova | 1994 | Socialist Party of Moldova - Unity Movement | Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova |
| Netherlands | 1946 | Labour Party | Catholic People's Party |
| Netherlands | 1948 | Labour Party | Catholic People's Party |
| Netherlands | 1952 | Labour Party | Catholic People's Party |
| Netherlands | 1956 | Labour Party | Catholic People's Party |
| Netherlands | 1959 | Labour Party | Catholic People's Party |
| Netherlands | 1963 | Labour Party | Catholic People's Party |
| Netherlands | 1967 | Labour Party | Catholic People's Party |

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| Netherlands | 1971 | Labour Party | Catholic People's Party |
| Netherlands | 1972 | Labour Party | Catholic People's Party |
| Netherlands | 1977 | Labour Party | Christian Democratic Appeal |
| Netherlands | 1981 | Labour Party | Christian Democratic Appeal |
| Netherlands | 1982 | Labour Party | Christian Democratic Appeal |
| Netherlands | 1986 | Labour Party | Christian Democratic Appeal |
| Netherlands | 1989 | Labour Party | Christian Democratic Appeal |
| Netherlands | 1994 | Labour Party | Christian Democratic Appeal |
| Netherlands | 1998 | Labour Party | People's Party for Freedom and Democracy |
| Netherlands | 2002 | Labour Party | Christian Democratic Appeal |
| Netherlands | 2003 | Labour Party | Christian Democratic Appeal |
| New Zealand | 1946 | New Zealand Labour Party | New Zealand National Party |
| New Zealand | 1949 | New Zealand Labour Party | New Zealand National Party |
| New Zealand | 1951 | New Zealand Labour Party | New Zealand National Party |
| New Zealand | 1954 | New Zealand Labour Party | New Zealand National Party |
| New Zealand | 1957 | New Zealand Labour Party | New Zealand National Party |
| New Zealand | 1960 | New Zealand Labour Party | New Zealand National Party |
| New Zealand | 1963 | New Zealand Labour Party | New Zealand National Party |
| New Zealand | 1966 | New Zealand Labour Party | New Zealand National Party |
| New Zealand | 1969 | New Zealand Labour Party | New Zealand National Party |
| New Zealand | 1972 | New Zealand Labour Party | New Zealand National Party |
| New Zealand | 1975 | New Zealand Labour Party | New Zealand National Party |
| New Zealand | 1978 | New Zealand Labour Party | New Zealand National Party |
| New Zealand | 1981 | New Zealand Labour Party | New Zealand National Party |
| New Zealand | 1984 | New Zealand Labour Party | New Zealand National Party |
| New Zealand | 1987 | New Zealand Labour Party | New Zealand National Party |
| New Zealand | 1990 | New Zealand Labour Party | New Zealand National Party |
| New Zealand | 1993 | New Zealand Labour Party | New Zealand National Party |
| New Zealand | 1996 | New Zealand Labour Party | New Zealand National Party |
| New Zealand | 1999 | New Zealand Labour Party | New Zealand National Party |

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| New Zealand | 2002 | New Zealand Labour Party | New Zealand National Party |
| Northern Ireland | 1921 | Nationalist Party | Ulster Unionist Party |
| Northern Ireland | 1925 | Nationalist Party | Ulster Unionist Party |
| Northern Ireland | 1929 | Nationalist Party | Ulster Unionist Party |
| Northern Ireland | 1933 | Nationalist Party | Ulster Unionist Party |
| Northern Ireland | 1938 | Northern Ireland Labour Party | Ulster Unionist Party |
| Northern Ireland | 1945 | Northern Ireland Labour Party | Ulster Unionist Party |
| Northern Ireland | 1949 | Nationalist Party | Ulster Unionist Party |
| Northern Ireland | 1953 | Northern Ireland Labour Party | Ulster Unionist Party |
| Northern Ireland | 1958 | Northern Ireland Labour Party | Ulster Unionist Party |
| Northern Ireland | 1963 | Northern Ireland Labour Party | Ulster Unionist Party |
| Northern Ireland | 1965 | Northern Ireland Labour Party | Ulster Unionist Party |
| Northern Ireland | 1969 | Northern Ireland Labour Party | Ulster Unionist Party |
| Norway | 1945 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| Norway | 1949 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| Norway | 1953 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| Norway | 1957 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| Norway | 1961 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| Norway | 1965 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| Norway | 1969 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| Norway | 1973 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| Norway | 1977 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| Norway | 1981 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| Norway | 1985 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| Norway | 1989 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| Norway | 1993 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| Norway | 1997 | Labour Party | Progress Party |
| Norway | 2001 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| Poland | 1991 | Democratic Left Alliance | Democratic Union |
| Poland | 1993 | Democratic Left Alliance | Polish People's Party |

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| Poland | 1997 | Democratic Left Alliance | Solidarity Electoral Action |
| Poland | 2001 | Democratic Left Alliance | Civic Platform |
| Portugal | 1975 | Socialist Party | Democratic People's Party |
| Portugal | 1976 | Socialist Party | Democratic People's Party |
| Portugal | 1979 | Socialist Party | Social Democratic Party |
| Portugal | 1980 | Socialist Party | Social Democratic Party |
| Portugal | 1983 | Socialist Party | Social Democratic Party |
| Portugal | 1985 | Socialist Party | Social Democratic Party |
| Portugal | 1987 | Socialist Party | Social Democratic Party |
| Portugal | 1991 | Socialist Party | Social Democratic Party |
| Portugal | 1995 | Socialist Party | Social Democratic Party |
| Portugal | 1999 | Socialist Party | Social Democratic Party |
| Romania | 1996 | Social Democracy Party of Romania | Romanian Democratic Convention |
| Romania | 2000 | Social Democracy Party of Romania | Greater Romania Party |
| Russia | 2003 | Communist Party of the Russian Federation | United Russia |
| Serbia | 2000 | Socialist Party of Serbia | Democratic Opposition of Serbia |
| Slovakia | 1990 | Communist Party of Czechoslovakia | Public Against Violence |
| Slovakia | 1992 | Party of the Democratic Left | Movement for a Democratic Slovakia |
| Slovakia | 1994 | Party of the Democratic Left | Movement for a Democratic Slovakia |
| Slovakia | 1998 | Party of the Democratic Left | Movement for a Democratic Slovakia |
| Slovakia | 2002 | Direction - Social Democracy | Movement for a Democratic Slovakia |
| Slovenia | 1996 | Liberal Democracy of Slovenia | Slovenian People's Party |
| Slovenia | 2000 | Liberal Democracy of Slovenia | Slovenian People's Party |

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| South Korea | 1992 | Democratic Party | Democratic Liberal Party |
| South Korea | 1996 | National Congress for New Politics | New Korea Party |
| South Korea | 2000 | Millennium Democratic Party | Grand National Party |
| South Korea | 2004 | Uri Party | Grand National Party |
| South Korea | 2008 | United Democratic Party | Grand National Party |
| Spain | 1977 | Spanish Socialist Workers' Party | Union of the Democratic Centre |
| Spain | 1979 | Spanish Socialist Workers' Party | Union of the Democratic Centre |
| Spain | 1982 | Spanish Socialist Workers' Party | People's Alliance |
| Spain | 1986 | Spanish Socialist Workers' Party | People's Alliance |
| Spain | 1989 | Spanish Socialist Workers' Party | People's Party |
| Spain | 1993 | Spanish Socialist Workers' Party | People's Party |
| Spain | 1996 | Spanish Socialist Workers' Party | People's Party |
| Spain | 2000 | Spanish Socialist Workers' Party | People's Party |
| Sri Lanka | 1952 | Sri Lanka Freedom Party | United National Party |
| Sri Lanka | 1956 | Sri Lanka Freedom Party | United National Party |
| Sri Lanka | 1960 | Sri Lanka Freedom Party | United National Party |
| Sri Lanka | 1965 | Sri Lanka Freedom Party | United National Party |
| Sri Lanka | 1970 | Sri Lanka Freedom Party | United National Party |
| Sri Lanka | 1977 | Sri Lanka Freedom Party | United National Party |
| Sweden | 1944 | Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party | National Organization of the Right |
| Sweden | 1948 | Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party | National Organization of the Right |
| Sweden | 1952 | Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party | Rightist Party |
| Sweden | 1956 | Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party | Rightist Party |
| Sweden | 1958 | Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party | Rightist Party |

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| Sweden | 1960 | Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party | Rightist Party |
| Sweden | 1964 | Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party | Rightist Party |
| Sweden | 1968 | Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party | Rightist Party |
| Sweden | 1970 | Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party | Moderate Party |
| Sweden | 1973 | Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party | Moderate Party |
| Sweden | 1976 | Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party | Moderate Party |
| Sweden | 1979 | Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party | Moderate Party |
| Sweden | 1982 | Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party | Moderate Party |
| Sweden | 1985 | Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party | Moderate Party |
| Sweden | 1988 | Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party | Moderate Party |
| Sweden | 1991 | Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party | Moderate Party |
| Sweden | 1994 | Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party | Moderate Party |
| Sweden | 1998 | Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party | Moderate Party |
| Sweden | 2002 | Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party | Moderate Party |
| Switzerland | 1947 | Social Democratic Party of Switzerland | Christian Democratic People's Party of Switzerland |
| Switzerland | 1951 | Social Democratic Party of Switzerland | Christian Democratic People's Party of Switzerland |

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| Switzerland | 1955 | Social Democratic Party of Switzerland | Christian Democratic People's Party of Switzerland |
| Switzerland | 1959 | Social Democratic Party of Switzerland | Christian Democratic People's Party of Switzerland |
| Switzerland | 1963 | Social Democratic Party of Switzerland | Christian Democratic People's Party of Switzerland |
| Switzerland | 1967 | Social Democratic Party of Switzerland | Christian Democratic People's Party of Switzerland |
| Switzerland | 1971 | Social Democratic Party of Switzerland | Christian Democratic People's Party of Switzerland |
| Switzerland | 1975 | Social Democratic Party of Switzerland | Christian Democratic People's Party of Switzerland |
| Switzerland | 1979 | Social Democratic Party of Switzerland | Christian Democratic People's Party of Switzerland |
| Switzerland | 1983 | Social Democratic Party of Switzerland | Christian Democratic People's Party of Switzerland |
| Switzerland | 1987 | Social Democratic Party of Switzerland | Christian Democratic People's Party of Switzerland |
| Switzerland | 1991 | Social Democratic Party of Switzerland | Christian Democratic People's Party of Switzerland |
| Switzerland | 1995 | Social Democratic Party of Switzerland | Christian Democratic People's Party of Switzerland |
| Switzerland | 1999 | Social Democratic Party of Switzerland | Swiss People's Party |
| Switzerland | 2003 | Social Democratic Party of Switzerland | Swiss People's Party |
| Turkey | 1950 | Republican People's Party | Democratic Party |
| Turkey | 1954 | Republican People's Party | Democratic Party |
| Turkey | 1957 | Republican People's Party | Democratic Party |
| Turkey | 1961 | Republican People's Party | Justice Party |
| Turkey | 1965 | Republican People's Party | Justice Party |
| Turkey | 1969 | Republican People's Party | Justice Party |

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| Turkey | 1973 | Republican People's Party | Justice Party |
| Turkey | 1977 | Republican People's Party | Justice Party |
| Turkey | 1983 | People's Party | Motherland Party |
| Turkey | 1987 | Social Democratic Populist Party | Motherland Party |
| Turkey | 1991 | Social Democratic Populist Party | True Path Party |
| Turkey | 1995 | Democratic Left Party | Welfare Party |
| Turkey | 1999 | Democratic Left Party | Nationalist Movement Party |
| Ukraine | 1994 | Communist Party of Ukraine | People's Movement of Ukraine |
| Ukraine | 1998 | Communist Party of Ukraine | People's Movement of Ukraine |
| Ukraine | 2002 | Communist Party of Ukraine | Viktor Yushchenko Bloc - Our Ukraine |
| United Kingdom | 1945 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| United Kingdom | 1950 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| United Kingdom | 1951 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| United Kingdom | 1955 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| United Kingdom | 1959 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| United Kingdom | 1964 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| United Kingdom | 1966 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| United Kingdom | 1970 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| United Kingdom | 1974 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| United Kingdom | 1974 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| United Kingdom | 1979 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| United Kingdom | 1983 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| United Kingdom | 1987 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| United Kingdom | 1992 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| United Kingdom | 1997 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| United Kingdom | 2001 | Labour Party | Conservative Party |
| United States | 1920 | Democratic Party | Republican Party |
| United States | 1924 | Democratic Party | Republican Party |

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| United States | 1928 | Democratic Party | Republican Party |
| United States | 1932 | Democratic Party | Republican Party |
| United States | 1936 | Democratic Party | Republican Party |
| United States | 1940 | Democratic Party | Republican Party |
| United States | 1944 | Democratic Party | Republican Party |
| United States | 1948 | Democratic Party | Republican Party |
| United States | 1952 | Democratic Party | Republican Party |
| United States | 1956 | Democratic Party | Republican Party |
| United States | 1960 | Democratic Party | Republican Party |
| United States | 1964 | Democratic Party | Republican Party |
| United States | 1968 | Democratic Party | Republican Party |
| United States | 1972 | Democratic Party | Republican Party |
| United States | 1976 | Democratic Party | Republican Party |
| United States | 1980 | Democratic Party | Republican Party |
| United States | 1984 | Democratic Party | Republican Party |
| United States | 1988 | Democratic Party | Republican Party |
| United States | 1992 | Democratic Party | Republican Party |
| United States | 1996 | Democratic Party | Republican Party |
| United States | 2000 | Democratic Party | Republican Party |
| United States | 2004 | Democratic Party | Republican Party |
| United States | 2008 | Democratic Party | Republican Party |

Table A.2: Regression Results Used to Make Figure 3.1

| | **Model 1a** | **Model 1b** | **Model 1c** |
|---|---|---|---|
| Presidentialism | -6.22 | | |
| | (1.95)*** | | |
| Concurrent Elections | | -8.00 | |
| | | (2.69)*** | |
| Non-Concurrent Elections | | -5.63 | |
| | | (2.33)** | |
| Concurrent Elections with Plurality Ballot | | | -6.84 |
| | | | (3.04)** |
| Concurrent Elections with Runoff Ballot | | | -13.36 |
| | | | (4.70)*** |
| Non-Concurrent Elections with Plurality Ballot | | | -13.63 |
| | | | (4.03)*** |
| Non-Concurrent Elections with Runoff Ballot | | | -5.22 |
| | | | (2.43)** |
| Majoritarian | 5.19 | 5.59 | 4.18 |
| | (2.78)* | (2.92)* | (3.15) |
| Proportional | 7.13 | 7.10 | 5.88 |
| | (2.59)** | (2.60)*** | (2.88)** |
| Constant | 22.89 | 22.79 | 23.97 |
| | (2.44)*** | (2.47)*** | (2.67)*** |
| $N$ | 440 | 440 | 440 |
| $F$-statistic of model fit | 6.68*** | 5.66*** | 7.50*** |
| $R^2$ | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.04 |

Cells report Prais-Winsten FGLS parameter estimates with semirobust standard errors in parentheses.
$*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A.3: Regression Results Used to Make Figure 3.4

| | **Model 2a** | **Model 2b** | **Model 2c** |
|---|---|---|---|
| Presidentialism | -2.09 | | |
| | (1.17)* | | |
| Concurrent Elections | | -2.64 | |
| | | (1.09)** | |
| Non-Concurrent Elections | | -1.91 | |
| | | (1.45) | |
| Concurrent Elections with Plurality Ballot | | | -2.19 |
| | | | (1.10)** |
| Concurrent Elections with Runoff Ballot | | | -4.74 |
| | | | (3.02) |
| Non-Concurrent Elections with Plurality Ballot | | | -4.82 |
| | | | (1.26)*** |
| Non-Concurrent Elections with Runoff Ballot | | | -1.76 |
| | | | (1.52) |
| Majoritarian | 2.12 | 2.24 | 1.72 |
| | (1.20)* | (1.30)* | (1.39) |
| Proportional | 5.11 | 5.10 | 4.65 |
| | (1.30)*** | (1.30)*** | (1.44)*** |
| Constant | 5.33 | 5.30 | 5.73 |
| | (1.10)*** | (1.13)*** | (1.20)*** |
| $N$ | 440 | 440 | 440 |
| $F$-statistic of model fit | 6.38*** | 5.35*** | 21.29*** |
| $R^2$ | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 |

Cells report Prais-Winsten FGLS parameter estimates with semirobust standard errors in parentheses.
$*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A.4: Regression Used to Make Figure 4.1

| | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1996 Election | 1.35*** | 1.29*** | 1.40*** |
| | (-0.08) | (-0.09) | (-0.09) |
| Age | 0.01*** | 0.01*** | |
| | (-0.002) | (-0.003) | |
| Female | 0.03 | -0.08 | |
| | (-0.08) | (-0.08) | |
| Education | -0.004 | -0.01 | |
| | (-0.02) | (-0.01) | |
| Education$^2$ | 0.0001 | | |
| | (-0.0004) | | |
| Ideology | -2.21*** | 0.14*** | |
| | (-0.10) | (-0.02) | |
| Ideology$^2$ | 0.29*** | | |
| | (-0.01) | | |
| Constant | 5.92*** | 2.66*** | 3.30*** |
| | (-0.29) | (-0.22) | (-0.05) |
| Observations | 5001 | 5001 | 5219 |
| $R^2$ | 0.17 | 0.06 | 0.05 |

Ordinary least squares regression, robust standard errors in parentheses
$*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A.5: Regression Used to Calculate the Feeling Thermometer Gap Between the Labor Party and Its Leader in Figure 4.2

| | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1992 Election | 0.36*** | 0.33*** | 0.35*** |
| | (-0.09) | (-0.09) | (-0.08) |
| 1996 Election | -0.24*** | -0.24*** | -0.24*** |
| | (-0.07) | (-0.07) | (-0.07) |
| 1999 Election | -0.37*** | -0.37*** | -0.36*** |
| | (-0.07) | (-0.07) | (-0.07) |
| Age | -0.0001 | -0.0003 | |
| | (-0.002) | (-0.002) | |
| Female | 0.03 | 0.02 | |
| | (-0.05) | (-0.05) | |
| Education | -0.06*** | -0.03*** | |
| | (-0.01) | -0.01 | |
| Education$^2$ | 0.001*** | | |
| | (-0.0001) | | |
| Ideology | -0.32*** | -0.04*** | |
| | (-0.07) | (-0.02) | |
| Ideology$^2$ | 0.03*** | | |
| | (-0.01) | | |
| Constant | 2.53*** | 1.91*** | 1.33*** |
| | (-0.22) | (-0.15) | (-0.06) |
| Observations | 4987 | 4987 | 5187 |
| $R^2$ | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.02 |
| Ordinary least squares regression, robust standard errors in parentheses $*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$ (two-tailed) | | | |

Table A.6: Regression Used to Calculate the Feeling Thermometer Gap Between Likud and Its Leader in Figure 4.2

| | **Model 1** | **Model 2** | **Model 3** |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1992 Election | 0.11 | 0.14* | 0.12 |
| | (-0.09) | (-0.09) | (-0.08) |
| 1996 Election | -0.34*** | -0.33*** | -0.34*** |
| | (-0.06) | (-0.06) | (-0.06) |
| 1999 Election | -0.41*** | -0.40*** | -0.39*** |
| | (-0.07) | (-0.07) | (-0.06) |
| Age | 0.003* | 0.003** | |
| | (-0.002) | (-0.001) | |
| Female | -0.03 | -0.02 | |
| | (-0.05) | (-0.05) | |
| Education | 0.02 | 0.01 | |
| | (-0.01) | (-0.01) | |
| Education$^2$ | -0.0003* | | |
| | (-0.0001) | | |
| Ideology | 0.29*** | 0.02* | |
| | (-0.06) | (-0.01) | |
| Ideology$^2$ | -0.03*** | | |
| | (-0.01) | | |
| Constant | 0.50*** | 0.96*** | 1.25*** |
| | (-0.19) | (-0.13) | (-0.05) |
| Observations | 4978 | 4978 | 5179 |
| $R^2$ | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 |

Ordinary least squares regression, robust standard errors in parentheses
$*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Table A.7: Regression Results Used to Make Figures 5.1 and 5.2

| | **Model 1** | **Model 2** |
|---|---|---|
| 1997 Election | -0.64*** | -0.81*** |
| | (-0.12) | (-0.11) |
| Female | -0.05 | |
| | (-0.12) | |
| Age | 0.01** | |
| | (-0.004) | |
| Left | -0.55** | |
| | (-0.28) | |
| Right | 1.55*** | |
| | (-0.15) | |
| Education | 0.07*** | |
| | (-0.02) | |
| Constant | -1.18*** | 0.72*** |
| | (-0.30) | (-0.08) |
| $N$ | 1480 | 1488 |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | 0.13 | 0.03 |
| Logistic Regression, Standard errors in parentheses<br>$*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$ (two-tailed) | | |

Table A.8: Regression Results Used to Make Figures 5.3 and 5.4

| | **Model 1** | **Model 2** |
|---|---|---|
| 1997 Election | -0.75*** | -0.90*** |
| | (-0.15) | (-0.14) |
| Female | -0.24* | |
| | (-0.14) | |
| Age | 0.01*** | |
| | (-0.005) | |
| Left | 1.71*** | |
| | (-0.2) | |
| Right | 0.2 | |
| | (-0.47) | |
| Education | 0.06** | |
| | (-0.03) | |
| Constant | -0.52 | 1.85*** |
| | (-0.37) | (-0.12) |
| $N$ | 1431 | 1434 |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | (-0.10) | (-0.03) |
| Logistic Regression, Standard errors in parentheses<br>$*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$ (two-tailed) | | |

Table A.9: Regression Results Used to Make Figures 5.5 and 5.6

| | **Model 1** | **Model 2** |
|---|---|---|
| 1997 Election | -0.36*** | -0.36*** |
| | (-0.12) | (-0.12) |
| Female | 0.14 | |
| | (-0.12) | |
| Age | 0.01*** | |
| | (-0.004) | |
| Education | 0.001 | |
| | (-0.02) | |
| Constant | -1.65*** | -0.94*** |
| | (-0.26) | (-0.08) |
| $N$ | 1515 | 1515 |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | (-0.02) | (-0.01) |
| Logistic Regression, Standard errors in parentheses<br>$*p < 0.10$; $**p < 0.05$; $***p < 0.01$ (two-tailed) | | |